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Executive summary 
 
There is increasing recognition of the potential of migration in stimulating 
development in countries of origin. This acknowledgment accompanies a call to 
engage migrants and diaspora organisations in development cooperation. The present 
study analyses how multilateral organisations as well as European governments and 
development agencies have implemented such ‘migrants and development’ policies 
over the past three decades. It focuses specifically on the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom and France, but also considers Belgium, Germany, Italy and Spain.  
 
The extent to which the stated priority for this issue has been turned into concrete 
action has been limited up to now, with the exception of remittance policies. 
However, valuable lessons can be drawn from past and current experiences with the 
implementation of policies to support and to strengthen the engagement of diasporas 
and their members in the development of countries of origin. The study identifies a 
number of points of departure for implementing successful policies in this field:  
 
• Recognising that migrants are already mobilised for development on their own 
initiative. Rather than ‘mobilising diasporas’, development actors themselves 
should be ‘mobilised’ to engage with and to learn from diasporas in 
development cooperation so as to establish a genuine two-way working 
relationship; 
 
• Setting realistic expectations through increasing awareness of past experiences 
and studies that show migration is no panacea for development. Expectations 
must be set more realistically so as to avoid disappointment and the 
subsequent abandonment of the migration and development agenda;  
 
• Successful alliance building also implies that established development actors 
should recognise the added value of diaspora organisations and show a serious 
and long-term commitment through giving them a real say in policy 
formulation and access to substantial funding;  
 
• Increasing coherence between development cooperation and migration 
policies cannot be achieved by subordinating the first policy area to the 
second. Paradoxically, restrictive immigration policies force migrants into 
permanent settlement and impede circular movement, with negative 
consequences for the transnational engagement of diaspora groups; 
 
• Avoiding double agendas. Diaspora organisations are unlikely to cooperate 
with development policies whose hidden agenda is to curb migration through 
development. This is not only an unrealistic aim but it will also almost 
certainly lead diaspora organisations to shun cooperation with development 
actors.  
 
This study identifies four broad areas in which development agencies and 
governments can support and strengthen the engagement of diasporas and their 
members in the development of countries of origin:  
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1. Facilitating and reducing costs of remittances. This is the most tangible and 
therefore least problematic area of policy intervention. However, the only 
feasible way to serve the interests of migrants is to improve the banking 
system rather than to clamp down on the informal system without creating 
viable alternatives. Policies that try to channel remittances into productive 
investments are not only patronising and neglectful of the potentially positive 
impacts of consumption and ‘non-productive’ investments but they are also 
bound to fail as long as general investment conditions do not improve;  
 
2. Supporting migrants to set up small enterprises in countries of origin and 
facilitating ‘brain circulation’. Repeated experiences haves shown that such 
programmes are unlikely to succeed if they focus on or are conditional upon 
return. More promising results have been achieved by the Dutch IntEnt 
projects for migrant entrepreneurs and by UNDP’s long-standing TOKTEN 
programme to facilitate ‘brain circulation’. Both programmes avoid imposing 
a return conditionality. 
 
3. Supporting collective development projects initiated or implemented by 
diaspora organisations and their members. It has proven difficult to put this 
idea into practice, due to differences in size, organisational culture and 
objectives of official development actors and diaspora organisations. For 
projects to succeed, it seems important that development actors do not 
stipulate the kind of projects to be funded but rather link up with existing 
initiatives of diaspora organisations. Co-funded projects that have been 
selected through an open tendering system – such as have been implemented 
in the Netherlands – have generally been more successful than ‘co-opted’ 
projects based on 100 percent funding. The French-Moroccan example of 
Migrations et Développement demonstrates that a successful implementation 
of projects should evolve from a long learning process and from a thorough 
knowledge of local contexts and cultural sensitivities;  
 
4. Supporting diaspora networks and capacity building of diaspora 
organisations along with creating durable alliances with established 
development actors. Government or agency-led efforts to ‘engineer’ 
consultative bodies or migrant platforms do not seem to be the way forward to 
create such alliances. A more fruitful strategy seems to support existing, 
spontaneously created diaspora organisations or networks, such as Afford in 
the UK, which have already gained legitimacy through their role in 
development and advocacy of migrant rights and interests. However, there is a 
delicate balance between strengthening and patronising diaspora organisations.  
 
In general, it would be a mistake to assume that diaspora groups and their members 
should be taught how to ‘do’ development or how best to spend their remittances. 
Diaspora organisations have survived independently for many years; any attempt to 
patronise or to state ‘what is best for them’ would appear to be a recipe for failure. 
The challenge for development actors is not to make diaspora organisations more like 
them, but to build on their unique strengths. 
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Introduction  
 
 
1.1. Background 
 
Over the past five years, the issue of ‘migration and development’ has regained 
substantial attention among multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and the 
IMF, national governments and development agencies. Presumably urged by the 
spectacular surge in remittances – which now amount to well over two times the 
amount of official development assistance and to tenfold the amount of net private 
capital transfers to developing countries1 – an increasing need is felt to integrate 
migration into development policies. However, this coincides with a one-sided focus 
on the macro-economic impact of migration, such as the importance of remittances 
for national accounts and their potential role in enabling business investments. 
Consequently, policy measures discussed at conferences and implemented in practice 
tend to focus on measures to facilitate and channel remittances into formal channels 
as well as to enhance their macro-economic impact.  
 
This goes along with a comparative neglect of the important micro-level contribution 
of remittances to development in migrant sending societies. Firstly, the at least US$ 
126 billion in remittances that are now sent yearly from North to South are primarily 
sent between individuals and families. These transfers have significant direct poverty-
reducing and welfare-increasing effects2. Secondly, even consumption and ‘non-
productive investments’ – which tend to receive a bad press – can have significant 
positive multiplier impacts on economic growth and employment3.  
 
Furthermore, migrants might contribute to development in countries of origin in many 
ways other than by sending remittances alone. These contributions are less tangible 
than remittances but not necessarily less relevant. For instance, they might contribute 
to economic growth through setting up enterprises themselves or helping relatives to 
do so. This is not only a function of remittances, but it also potentially implies a 
beneficial transfer of know-how and competencies: what is called ‘brain gain’. 
Besides contributing to economic development, migrants can also play an important 
role in the stimulation of political debate, the strengthening of civil society, the 
enabling and encouraging of education for non-migrants, and the emancipation of 
women and minority groups in countries of origin 4.  
 
                                                          
1
 Kapur and McHale 2003. 
2
 See Adams and Page 2005.  
3
 See de Haas 2005; Taylor 1999.  
4
 See Massey et al. 1998.  
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Yet it is important to emphasise that, depending on specific circumstances, migration 
and remittances can also have negative effects on origin-country development: for 
instance, through increasing inequality, dependency or even support for warring 
parties5. As both negative and positive effects on development are found to varying 
degrees, the relevant question is under what conditions are migration and social and 
economic development more positively correlated than under others. It is difficult to 
generalise, since migration does not have some kind of predetermined impact. What 
seems essential is that, depending on the specific context at the sending end, 
migration enables people to disengage from, just as much as to engage in the social, 
economic and political development of countries of origin6. 
 
Traditionally, it has been assumed by both sending and receiving countries that the 
positive contributions of migration to origin-country development normally coincide 
with the return of migrants. However, it has become increasingly clear that migrants 
have become progressively more transnational in their orientations and can thus be 
simultaneously involved in two or more societies at the same time7.  
 
The radically improved technical possibilities allow migrants to foster links with their 
societies of origin through the (mobile) telephone, fax, (satellite) television, the 
internet and by remitting money through globalised banking systems or informal 
channels. This increasingly enables migrants to foster double loyalties, to travel back 
and forth, to foster relationships, to work and to do business simultaneously in distant 
places. The implication is that clear-cut dichotomies of ‘origin’ or ‘destination’ and 
categories such as ‘permanent’, ‘temporary’ and ‘return’ migration seem more and 
more difficult to sustain in a world in which the lives of migrants seem increasingly 
characterised by circulation and simultaneous commitment to two or more societies8.  
 
In contrast to classical conceptions of migrant integration, the integration of migrants 
in receiving countries can not only coincide with but also even tends to amplify their 
involvement in the development of countries of origin. After all, successful and 
‘integrated’ migrants generally also possess the attitudes, know-how, rights and 
financial capacity for setting up enterprises, participating in public debates and 
establishing development projects in their regions and countries of origin. Hence, 
transnationally operating migrant communities are emerging as independent and 
potentially powerful factors of development. The potential strength of migrants is 
their simultaneous knowledge of and involvement in two or more societies, which 
make them a potentially effective link between wealthy and poor countries. 
 
Such forms of transnational economic, social and civic engagement can take place at 
the individual or family level, but seem to acquire an increasingly collective 
dimension. Migrants and their descendants exhibit a continued interest in their 
countries of origin, which is exemplified by the establishment of associations that 
explicitly aim to foster links with the countries of origin, to provide small-scale aid 
and to set up development projects. Numerous ‘home town associations’ have 
committed themselves to contribute to issues such as schooling, health care, 
                                                          
5
 See Van Hear 2003. 
6
 de Haas 2005. 
7
 Vertovec 1999. 
8
 de Haas 2005. 
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infrastructure and women’s empowerment and to provide micro-credits to facilitate 
small-scale enterprises in regions and communities of origin. 
 
Without denying the significant contribution of individually sent remittances and 
other forms of private transfers to poverty reduction and economic development (both 
directly and through income multipliers) in regions and countries of origin, the much-
celebrated micro-level at which remittances are transferred is not only their strength, 
but also their main weakness, since this also implies that individual migrants are 
generally not able to remove general development constraints. Such constraints might 
exist in the form of a lack of road and public infrastructure and badly functioning 
markets such as lack of access to credit facilities, as well as failing government 
institutions, excessive bureaucracy and corruption. On the one hand, this points to the 
fact that migration is by no means a substitute for good governance by governments 
of migrant-sending countries9. On the other hand, it also points to the potential 
strength of migrants’ collective contributions through organisations: Collective action 
is more likely to resolve some of such structural constraints than are scattered 
individual efforts. This might be in the form of small-scale contributions to local 
development through drinking water projects or the construction of schools, wells and 
roads, but also through more large-scale projects aimed at, for instance, promoting 
agricultural development through irrigation schemes and improving women’s 
economic independence through vocational training and micro-credits. Alternatively, 
migrant organisations might also strive to promote democratisation and strengthening 
civil society in sending countries through sustaining local organisations.  
 
The transfers of social, financial and cognitive resources by migrants for the benefit of 
origin-country development have recently gained substantial attention in the 
‘migration and development’ debate. This has coincided as well with a growing 
aspiration among government and development agencies to go ‘beyond remittances’10 
and to support migrants’ individual and collective transnational engagement in origin- 
country development, or to ‘mobilise’ migrants for development cooperation.  
 
Substantial heed has been paid to the ways in which governments of sending states 
can contribute to enhancing the development impact of migration. In particular the 
Mexican experience has garnered considerable interest. As part of its Program for the 
Attention of Mexican Communities Abroad, the Mexican government has 
successfully implemented two-for-one and three-for-one programmes that match 
funds for every dollar raised by Home Town Associations for approved public 
infrastructure projects in Mexico. These Home Town Associations similarly receive 
financial and technical support from the Mexican government through its consular 
offices11.  
 
In comparison, the interest in the potential contribution of governments and NGOs of 
migrant-receiving countries to migrants’ transnational engagement in the development 
of sending countries received scant attention until the early 21st century. Although 
several development agencies have been involved in work with migrants in the North 
as an expression of social concern about their abuse and exploitation, few have taken 
migrants seriously as development actors. However, ‘if migration is an important 
                                                          
9
 See de Haas 2005; Taylor 1999. 
10
 ‘Beyond remittances’ is adopted from the title of Newland and Patrick 2004.  
11
 Bada 2003.  
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strategy for development and can contribute to the reduction of poverty in the south, 
there may be considerable potential for NGOs to work with migrants and diaspora 
groups in order to meet their goals’12.  
 
A new consensus seems to have arisen that because of their simultaneous engagement 
in two or more societies, migrants and their organisations can be effective partners for 
implementing development policies. However, the potentially positive role of 
migrants and migrant organisations in development beyond remittances has thus far 
seldom been incorporated into day-to-day practices of development cooperation and 
migration policies.  
 
 
1.2. Aims and research questions 
 
Both governmental and non-governmental development actors have gradually 
recognised the high potential of migration and migrants for the development of 
countries of origin. Yet the extent to which the stated priority for this issue has been 
turned into concrete action by national ministries for development cooperation and 
development NGOs seems to be very limited up to now. Although development 
agencies show a vivid interest in sustaining migrant organisation, it has proven to be 
difficult to implement such ‘migration and development’ policies in practice. The 
focus of this study will be on whether and how governments and development 
agencies can practically support and enhance the transnational engagement of 
migrants in the development of countries of origin. 
 
Migrants can be potentially involved in development policies in many different ways, 
such as through (1) actively involving migrants and migrant organisations in policy 
formulation; (2) supporting capacity building and network formation among migrant 
organisations so as to enhance their abilities to undertake development initiatives; (3) 
directly sustaining development initiatives of migrants by providing financial and/or 
organisational support; (4) involving migrants and migrant and diaspora organisations 
as ‘experts’ or ‘consultants’ in development projects designed by development 
agencies; and, more controversially, (5) involving migrant and diaspora organisations 
in programmes of permanent or temporary return13. 
 
Insofar as the ideas to involve migrants and their organisations in development 
policies have been formulated over the past years, there is no comparative knowledge 
of the characteristics and aims of such policies, how they have been put into practice, 
and to what extent they have been successful. More knowledge is required as to which 
specific fields and under what conditions successful partnerships between migrant 
organisations and development agencies can and should be built. 
 
This study aims to fill part of this gap through a systematic analysis of whether, why 
and how European governments and development agencies have formulated and 
implemented ‘migration and development’ policies, and more specifically to what 
                                                          
12
 Source: Programme of DSA Annual Conference, Connecting People and Places: Challenges and 
Opportunities for Development, September 7th – 9th 2005, Open University, Milton Keynes. Accessed 
at http://www.devstud.org.uk/studygroups/ngo.htm (14 April 2006). 
13
 In particular return migration has been seen.  
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extent and how they actively involve migrant and diaspora organisations and their 
members in development cooperation. This study will address the following specific 
questions:  
 
• Which development actors are active in the field of migration and 
development?  
• What concrete actions and policies have they implemented to address the 
migration and development nexus?  
• In what practical ways do they establish, maintain and build links with 
migrants and their organisations as part of these policies?  
• What are their experiences with past and present activities? What are the main 
factors determining failure and success and what are their future plans? 
• What are the ‘enabling’ and ‘disabling’ environments for the involvement of 
migrant organisations in development cooperation and what role can 
development actors play to enhance this involvement?  
• What practical policy recommendations can be formulated so as to help and 
motivate development actors and migrant organisations in building mutual 
partnerships?  
 
Through synthesising scattered information and comparing policies and – successful 
and less successful – practices in a number of western European countries, this study 
aims to shed light on the available policies options. This overview and increased 
insight into the enabling factors that contribute to successful policies might help and 
motivate governments, development agencies and migrants to learn from previous 
experiences and to implement effective policies.  
 
This study is primarily of an exploratory nature. Taking into account its limited scope, 
it can also serve as a basis for future research. In particular the following issues seem 
to deserve further investigation: 
 
• A detailed evaluation of the effectiveness of projects supported by 
development agencies to build networks and increase capacities among 
migrant and diaspora organisations or that sustain development projects 
initiated by migrants. Because this is a new policy field, detailed evaluations, 
which would serve to identify best practices, are not yet available;  
• In this effort, it would be particularly useful to study and to learn from the 
long experience of those joint development actions that have been 
accumulated at the local and regional level: for instance through city twinning 
programmes; 
• A study similar to this one, but from the perspective of policies that 
development actors in sending countries can adopt to involve migration in 
their policies; 
• A study focusing on the gender dimensions of ‘migration and development’ 
policies. In most policy documents and studies, this dimension is largely 
ignored. Are diaspora organisations dominated by men, and what is the 
gendered impact of projects? Is there a gendered difference in remittance 
behaviour and project design and implementation? How can development 
actors ensure women’s participation in such projects?  
 6 
• A study of how the efforts by governments and development agencies to 
‘mobilise diasporas for development cooperation’ are perceived by migrant 
and diaspora organisations themselves. Why is there such a perceived gap 
between them and the ‘established development sector’? When and why do 
they experience the ‘courting’ by development agencies as patronising? What 
do they see as the added value of and the major obstacles to building effective 
partnerships? 
 
 
1.3. Scope, limitations and concepts 
 
This study will focus on initiatives undertaken by governments and nationally 
organised development agencies to involve migrants and migrant and diaspora 
organisations in their development policies. Because such agencies often collaborate 
closely with national governments and diverse multilateral development agencies, the 
relevant policies of the latter have also been taken into consideration.  
 
The report first analyses how relevant policies have evolved in the Netherlands. In 
subsequent chapters this is compared with practices in the United Kingdom and in 
France. This choice is motivated by the fact that these three countries have relatively 
evolved migration and development policies, but show significant differences in the 
concrete orientation of these policies and, more specifically, the role they attribute to 
migrants and diaspora organisations. Another chapter will briefly review – without the 
pretense of being comprehensive – the situation in Belgium, Germany, Spain and Italy 
as cases of both well-established and recent immigration countries, where migration 
and development policies are less evolved for various reasons. This choice does not 
presume to be exhaustive or representative of Europe as a whole. For instance, it is 
only for brevity’s sake that the interesting cases of Sweden and Denmark have not 
been discussed.  
 
It was equally for brevity’s sake that this study largely ignores the numerous and often 
much more established forms of joint-development cooperation between migrant 
organisations and local and regional NGOs and governments, such as through project 
support of city twinnings. Nor does the study pay specific attention to the extremely 
numerous spontaneous and independent efforts by individual migrants and their 
organisation to contribute to development14. This was a deliberate choice, due to this 
study’s focus on the potential link between migrants and the established world of 
development cooperation.  
 
However, this focus should not give the impression that migrant and diaspora 
organisations are passively awaiting or are in desperate need of help from 
governments and development agencies. In fact, in most cases, migrants have entered 
the development arena voluntarily and at their own expense in terms of time, effort 
and money. Or, as Newland and Patrick state: ‘The dense web of ties between 
diaspora and country of origin is, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the creation 
of individuals and groups acting on their own initiative, rather than a product of 
government intervention15.’ 
                                                          
14
 cf. Van Hear et al. 2004.  
15
 Newland and Patrick 2004, p. 17.  
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Finally, it would seem useful to discuss briefly the key terms used in this study: 
‘migrant organisations’, ‘ diaspora organisations’ and ‘development actors’16.  
 
A migrant organisation is any kind of organisation consisting mainly of migrants and 
their descendants, irrespective of the specific activities of such organisations. The 
commonly used term ‘diaspora’ is a highly contested concept, many definitions of 
which exist17. As there is no room for extensive discussion here, we employ the 
definition put forward by Van Hear, Pieke and Vertovec: 
 
‘Diaspora are defined as populations of migrant origin who are scattered 
among two or more destinations, between which there develop multifarious 
links involving flows and exchanges of people and resources: between the 
homeland and destination countries, and among destination countries18.’  
 
Although there is an analytical distinction between diaspora and migrant 
organisations, in practice the terms are often used interchangeably in different 
national contexts, and in this report as well we cannot always avoid doing so. 
 
Migrant organisations, which are incredibly varied in scope, organisation and size, 
tend to focus on the lives, rights and integration of migrants in receiving countries. 
This study focuses on the minority of migrant organisations that aim at promoting 
development in countries of origin. AFFORD19 made the following categorisation 
regarding multiple organisational forms in which transnational engagement can take 
shape: Individuals (and families); Hometown associations; Ethnic associations; 
Alumni associations; Religious associations; Professional associations; Development 
NGOs; Investment groups/businesses; Political groups; National development groups; 
Welfare/refugee groups; Supplementary schools; and Virtual organisations 
 
As far as activities are concerned, AFFORD20 distinguished:  
 
• Person-to-person transfers of money, consumer goods, and even larger items 
such as cars, mainly to family, immediate and extended; 
• Community-to-community transfers for constructive but sometimes for 
destructive purposes; 
• Identity building/awareness raising in current home about ancestral home 
either with other members of same community or with wider groups; 
• Lobbying in current home on issues relating to ancestral home, either of 
current home politicians or visiting ancestral home leaders; 
• Trade with and investment in ancestral home (including electronic commerce) 
• Transfers of intangible resources such as knowledge, values and ideas 
• Support for development on a more ‘professional’ basis; 
• Payment of taxes in ancestral home. 
 
                                                          
16
 For an extensive discussion of the concept ‘development’ itself see Sen 1999, and for a specific 
discussion of the concept of development in relation to migration, see de Haas 2003, cf. de Haas 2006. 
17
 Cohen 1997. 
18
 Van Hear et al. 2004, p.3.  
19
 AFFORD 2000, pp. 5-6.  
20
 AFFORD 2000, p.6.  
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By ‘development actors’ we mean all individuals and institutions that act with the 
intention to contribute to development in poor countries. This includes governmental 
departments for international development, multilateral agencies and professional 
development agencies (NGOs) as well as migrants and their organisations aiming to 
contribute to the development of countries of origin.  
 
 
1.4. Methodology 
 
This study took place between November 2005 and March 2006. The first stage 
consisted of studying the relevant literature and in particular an analysis of policy and 
other available documents. This served to identify the existence, evolution and 
practical implementation of ‘migration and development policies’ among 
development actors. Subsequently, relevant specialists working for the various 
development actors were approached by email and telephone for additional 
consultations to supplement the written sources. Respondents also helped to identify 
other persons and organisations working on migrant involvement in development 
cooperation. This allowed the identifying of most relevant organisations in the field in 
order to obtain an adequate overview of the ‘migrants and development field’ in each 
of the countries under study.  
 
 
1.5. Structure of report  
 
In order to put the analysis into a framework of the general trends of the globally 
increasing attention for migration and development issues, Chapter 2 will provide an 
overview of whether and how relevant international organisations and multilateral 
agencies have formulated and concretely developed ideas and implemented policies 
towards migration and development and involving migrant organisations in their 
policies for international development cooperation. 
 
The subsequent chapters contain the country-specific analyses. Each chapter will start 
with an analysis of national policies as formulated by governments and ministerial 
departments for international cooperation. Secondly, the migration and development 
policies of development agencies within each country will be evaluated. The 
conclusion will summarise the results and put forward a number of policy 
recommendations. 
  
2 
 
  
The international framework  
 
 
2.1. The need for more awareness 
 
The current interest in ‘migration and development’ in European migrant-receiving 
states is part of a global trend. In the first years of the 21st century, the issue of 
migration and development has gained the increasing attention of organisations such 
as the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU), financial institutions such 
as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as other 
international organisations such as the International Labour Office (ILO) and the 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM). This chapter will analyse the recent 
evaluation of policies and practices with regard to the place of migration and migrants 
in development cooperation.  
 
In the past few years there has been a remarkable renaissance in the interest in the 
issue of migration, development and remittances by policy makers, multilateral 
organisations and scholars21. In particular, remittances seem to be a subject of 
unprecedented optimism and euphoria. This ‘fashion’ tends to coincide with a certain 
perception that it concerns a ‘new’ issue, which usually accompanies a call for more 
research. However, any suggestion that the subject of migration and development is 
‘new’ testifies to a lack of awareness of the large existing body of research on this 
issue. Also in the policy field there have been earlier periods in which migration was 
seen as a vital development resource and in which policies have been designed and 
implemented to increase the development potential of migration. Lest we ‘reinvent the 
wheel’22, we should not lose sight of the findings of previous work and policies. 
 
It therefore seems useful to provide a certain historical context. In general, we can 
distinguish four periods in the post-WWII thinking on migration and development 
(see table 1). In the 1950s and 1960s it was widely assumed that through a policy of 
large-scale capital transfer and industrialization poor countries would be able to jump 
on the bandwagon of rapid economic development and modernization. In the same 
period, large-scale labour migration from developing to developed countries began to 
gain momentum. Many developing countries became involved in the migration 
process amidst expectations of the ‘dawning of a new era’23.  
 
                                                          
21
 Kapur 2003; Ratha 2003. 
22
 Russell 2003. 
23
 Papademetriou 1985. 
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Table 1. Main phases in migration and development research and policies  
Period Research community Policy field 
until 1973 Development and 
migration optimism  
Developmentalist optimism; capital and 
knowledge transfers by migrants would help 
developing countries in development take-off.  
1973-1990 Development and 
migration pessimism 
(dependency, brain 
drain) 
Growing scepticism; concerns on brain drain; after 
experiments with return migration policies focused 
on integration in receiving countries. Migration 
largely out of sight in development field. 
1990-2001 Readjustment to more 
subtle views under 
influence of increasing 
empirical work 
Persistent scepticism and neglect; tightening of 
immigration policies. 
> 2001 Boom in studies: mixed, 
but generally positive 
views. 
Resurgence of migration and development 
optimism and a sudden turnaround of views: brain 
gain, remittances and diaspora involvement; 
further tightening of immigration policies but 
greater tolerance for high-skilled immigration. 
 
Governments of developing countries started to actively encourage emigration, since 
they considered it one of the principal instruments to promote national development. 
The general expectation was that remittances — as well as the experience, skills and 
knowledge that migrants would acquire abroad before returning — would greatly help 
developing countries in their economic take-off 24. Return migrants were expected to 
invest large sums of money in industrial enterprises in the country of origin. 
Expectations ran high. In the same vein, it was thought that large-scale emigration 
could ‘contribute to the best of both worlds: rapid growth in the country of 
immigration. . . and rapid growth in the country of origin’25. In recent years, this 
optimistic view of migration and development seems to be experiencing a certain 
renaissance26. 
 
After the Oil Crisis of 1973 Europe experienced a massive economic downturn, 
industrial restructuring and increasing unemployment. This more or less coincided 
with a turning point in thinking on migration and development issues. As of the late 
1960s, prevalent optimistic views on migration and development were increasingly 
challenged by views of migration as a mechanism provoking not only a ‘brain drain’27 
but also passive dependency of emigration regions and countries on migrant 
remittances. The departure of young, talented men and women would maintain and 
aggravate problems of underdevelopment. It was increasingly believed that migrants 
would tend to fritter remittances away on ‘conspicuous consumption’ and that they 
would mainly invest their money in ‘non-productive’ enterprises such as housing28.  
 
The socio-cultural effects of migration were also increasingly placed in a negative 
light. Exposure to the relative wealth and success of migrants, combined with 
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changing tastes and expanding material aspirations, were thought to make the way of 
life in migrant sending regions and countries less appealing. A ‘culture of migration’ 
would subsequently perpetuate the vicious circle of ongoing out-migration29. 
 
In the early 1970s, on the assumption that the great age of migration had ended and 
that most labour migrants or ‘guest workers’ would or should return, western 
European governments such as the Netherlands, Germany and France began to 
experiment with specific measures to discourage family reunification and to 
encourage migrants to return to their origin countries. These measures included 
departure bonuses, training programs before return and investment programs for 
return migrants30. Such return policies typically failed, largely because of the lack of 
opportunities for investments and employment in most countries of origin, which 
continued to suffer from high unemployment, political instability and repression. 
Moreover, after a certain ‘period of grace’ return migrants were generally not allowed 
to go back to the receiving countries if their investment project failed or if they failed 
to re-adapt. This made migrants decide to stay, ‘to be on the safe side’31.  
 
However, and as will be described in following chapters, return migration policies 
including financial bonuses and re-integration assistance have often continued 
whether or not in a modified form– and have in some cases been reinvented. In the 
same period, the UNDP started the TOKTEN programme to counter the effects of the 
brain drain through a reverse transfer of technology and knowledge. In fact, the 
programme still exists. 
 
A growing body of research on migration and development conducted over the 1980s 
and 1990s, and under the influence of the new economics of labour migration 
(NELM), challenged the dominant pessimistic views on migration impacts. Based on 
substantial evidence pointing to the diverse nature of migration impacts, NELM 
offered a more subtle view, in which both positive and negative development 
responses were possible, depending on the degree to which sending countries and 
regions provided attractive environments in which to invest and to which to return32.  
 
Nevertheless, in the development policy field a high degree of scepticism on the issue 
of migration and development persisted from the mid 1970s until the late 1990s. This 
also coincided with an increasing awareness of the permanent, non-temporary 
character of immigration to Europe. Consequently, the focus shifted to the receiving- 
country dimension of international migration, which went along with a trend among 
European policy makers to focus more on the integration of immigrants and less on 
the developmental consequences of migration for sending countries33.  
 
Against the background of a long period of pessimism and near-neglect, the sudden 
‘rediscovery’ of the migration and development issue and the rapid shift from 
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pessimistic to optimistic views of ‘migration and development’ among multilateral 
organisations, governments and development agencies in the first half of the 2000s is 
a remarkable phenomenon34.  
 
This near-euphoria seems to have been instigated by a strong and unexpected increase 
in remittances. Remittances suddenly seem to have been re-discovered and have 
become a subject of unprecedented optimism and euphoria. The money remitted by 
migrants to developing countries rose from $31.1 billion in 1990 to $76.8 billion in 
2000 to no less than $116.0 billion in 2003. Remittances to developing countries more 
than doubled during the 1990s, whereas official aid flows showed a declining trend. 
Remittances have proved to be less volatile, less pro-cyclical, and therefore a more 
reliable source of income than other capital flows to developing countries, such as 
foreign direct investment and development aid35. It is claimed that remittances are 
close to tripling the value of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) provided to 
low-income countries, and they comprise the second-largest source of external 
funding for developing countries after Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 36.  
 
This phenomenon ran parallel with a striking reversal – from pessimist to optimist – 
of dominant views regarding how migration affects development. It has recently been 
argued that remittances are a safety net for relatively poor areas and countries, and 
remittances are freer from political barriers and controls than either product or other 
capital flows. Remittances appear to be a more effective instrument for income 
redistribution than large, bureaucratic development programmes or development aid. 
This ‘private’ foreign aid seems to flow directly to the people who really need it, does 
not require a costly bureaucracy on the sending side, and far less of it is likely to be 
siphoned off into the pockets of corrupt government officials37. As part of the same 
optimistic mood and paradigm shift, there is also growing optimism about the 
potential role of migrant diasporas. The ‘brain drain’ argument has been increasingly 
countered by the argument that migration can lead to a significant ‘brain gain’ 
through a counter flow of remittances, investments, trade relations, new knowledge, 
innovations, attitudes and information38. 
 
In brief, migration remittances seem to be a well-nigh ideal form of ‘bottom-up’ 
development finance and innovation. Although there is an element of truth in this, 
such euphoria may be overly optimistic. Migration and remittances are apparently 
now being proclaimed as the newest ‘development mantra’39 among institutions such 
as the World Bank, governments and development NGOs. As a result, there is a real 
danger that amnesia regarding previous work leads to a naïve optimism reminiscent of 
earlier developmentalist beliefs; this will inevitably lead to the same exaggerated 
expectations and deep disappointments. Now that the pendulum has swung from sheer 
optimism to sheer pessimism and back again, it is time to nudge it steadily toward the 
middle. 
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Kapur argues that the current remittance euphoria is in part a reaction to previously 
failed development mantras, and therefore warns against uncritical optimism 
characterising this latest fashion in development thinking40. Any suggestion that the 
subject of migration and development is ‘new’ testifies to a lack of awareness of the 
existing body of research and policy experience, which indicate that the impacts of 
migration on development in migrant-sending communities and countries are 
fundamentally heterogeneous, and that migration is not a panacea to solve more 
structural development problems. 
 
Migration and migrants can constitute a valuable resource for development in 
countries of origin, but this positive impact is a potential rather than an automatic 
mechanism. The fundamental question is not whether migration leads to certain types 
of development, but how different policy environments explain why migration has 
more positive development outcomes in some cases and less positive or negative 
outcomes in others41.  
 
The remainder of this chapter will demonstrate how multilateral agencies and inter-
governmental bodies have recently attempted to formulate policies and to develop 
concrete actions so as to maximise the development contribution of migration through 
the active involvement of migrant communities.  
 
 
 
2.2. Multilateral financial agencies  
 
2.2.1. Inter-American Development Bank  
 
The Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) of the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) has pioneered remittance research through extensive fieldwork in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, through numerous publications – in particular by Manuel 
Orozco42 – and by its efforts to forge more efficient public-private partnerships to 
support the efficient delivery of remittance services43. Urged by surging remittances, 
the Multilateral Investment Fund began exploring remittance issues in 2000, and in 
May 2001 convened the first ever LAC (Latin America and the Caribbean) Regional 
Conference on Remittances. As background for the second LAC Regional Conference 
on Remittances, the MIF commissioned two studies on remittances to Latin America. 
In 2002, the MIF summarised the results in its report Remittances to Latin America 
and the Caribbean 44, which drew international attention to the dramatic acceleration 
in remittances. Several studies and surveys were to follow, which concluded that the 
majority of foreign-born Latino people living in the US send remittances regularly. 
These studies equally conclude that providing access to financial institutions for 
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remittance-receiving families in order to reduce transaction costs is an important 
priority45.  
 
 
2.2.2. World Bank  
 
Before 2003, ‘migration and development’ was a relatively minor issue for the World 
Bank46. For instance, the Policies towards migration section of the Globalization, 
Growth, and Poverty report, published in 2002, mostly focuses on the implications of 
migration for receiving countries, and does not mention remittances at all47. The scant 
attention to remittances in the Global Economic Prospects 2002 report mainly 
concerned a couple of warnings that remittances are a vulnerable and stagnant 
external source of income48. 
 
This all changed with the publication of the highly influential Global Development 
Finance report by the World Bank in 2003, and more specifically the chapter by Dilip 
Ratha, entitled Workers’ remittances: an important and stable source of external 
development finance49. This report raised global awareness of the developmental 
relevance of migration and sent a shockwave through the development community. 
The chapter stressed the relative importance of workers’ remittances as a source of 
development finance in developing countries and discusses measures that industrial 
and developing countries could take to increase remittances. It concluded that 
remittance flows are the second-largest source, behind FDI, of external funding for 
developing countries and that remittances are often invested by the recipients, 
particularly in countries with sound economic policies. It also observed that the 
transaction costs of fund transfers often exceed 20 percent, and that reducing them by 
even 5 percent could generate an annual saving of $3.5 billion for the workers sending 
money home.  
 
In October of the same year the World Bank collaborated with DfID (Department for 
International Development of the United Kingdom) to organise a major conference on 
migrant remittances in London. It was apparently the first ‘global’ meeting of its type 
on this topic and was attended by 100 participants from 42 countries50. The report and 
the conference signified the definite breakthrough of the migration issue on the global 
development cooperation agenda. It drew attention to soaring remittances and their 
developmental role, and reflected the priority given to the issue by global 
development actors. 
 
This was the kick-off of a major series of World Bank empirical studies and 
publications analysing remittances, poverty and development issues as part of its 
ongoing Research Program on International Migration. The 2004 Global 
                                                          
45
 See http://www.iadb.org/mif/remittances/markets/senders.cfm?language=en&parid=2 and 
http://www.iadb.org/mif/remittances/. See also Orozco 2003.  
46
 Notwithstanding occasional publications, such as Russell 1995. 
47
 World Bank 2002.  
48
 World Bank 2001. 
49
 Ratha 2003.  
50
 International Conference on Migrant Remittances: Development Impact, Opportunities for the 
Financial Sector and Future Prospects, 9-10 October 2003, London. See 
http://www.livelihoods.org/hot_topics/migration/remittances.html  
 15 
Development Finance Report51 contained an appendix entitled Enhancing the 
Developmental Effect of Workers’ Remittances to Developing Countries. It first cited 
a World Bank study showing that at the individual level, remittances augment the 
income and reduce the poverty of the recipients52; it also argued that, at the macro 
level, remittances are believed to have a favourable effect on growth to the extent that 
they are used to finance education and health expenses. Its main policy 
recommendation focused on reducing remittance transaction costs through stimulating 
greater competition among money-transfer agents; better access to banking services 
for migrant workers in remittance-source countries and households in recipient 
countries; harmonization of the financial infrastructure supporting remittances; and a 
better investment climate in the remittance-receiving country, for example, through 
removal of foreign-exchange restrictions53.  
 
The 2005 Global Development Finance Report also stressed that workers’ remittances 
provide valuable financial resources to developing countries, particularly the 
poorest54. Another major World Bank study completed in 2005, entitled International 
migration, remittances, and the brain drain55, suggested, amongst other things, that 
both internal and international remittances reduce the level, depth and severity of 
poverty. However, one chapter in the study suggested that the size of the brain gain 
and its impact on welfare and growth is significantly smaller than is often assumed 
and may even be negative. It also showed that migration could lower the education 
attainment of children and increase inequality at least in the shorter term, although 
empirical evidence does not support the view that migration leads unequivocally to 
higher inequality in sending countries. 
 
The World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects 2006: Economic Implications of 
Remittances and Migration56 analysed the gains and losses associated with 
international migration and policies to improve the developmental impact of 
migration, with particular attention to remittances. It showed that international 
migration generates significant economic gains for the migrants, the countries of 
origin, and the countries of destination and that the benefits to the countries of origin 
are especially large in the case of low-skilled migration. The most feasible means of 
increasing such emigration would be to promote managed migration programmes 
between origin and destination countries that combine temporary migration of low-
skilled workers with incentives for return. It also recommended measures to reduce 
remittance costs.  
 
In March 2006, the World Bank collaborated with the Belgian government and the 
International Organization for Migration and the European Commission to organise 
another major international conference on Migration and Development in Brussels. 
The conference was attended by more than 400 decision-makers from migrant-
receiving and migrant-sending countries and by representatives of migrant 
associations. 
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In the same vein as the World Bank, the IMF has recently been multiplying 
remittance studies over the past few years. Although rich in content and scope, the 
IMF and World Bank studies and policy documents tend to focus strongly on the 
remittance dimensions, and pay relatively little attention to non-monetary dimensions 
of the migration and development nexus. Although these institutions do engage in the 
‘brain drain vs. brain gain’ debate, this does not comprise the often collective 
contribution that migrants can make to development in sending countries by less 
tangible contributions to democratisation, civil society and knowledge transfer. 
 
 
2.2.3. European Investment Bank  
 
In 2005, the European Investment Bank (EIB) – responsible outside the EU for 
implementing the financial components of agreements concluded under European 
development aid and cooperation policies – took an interest in the migration and 
development issue. This materialized in the commissioning of a study by the EIB’s 
Facility of Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) on improving 
the efficiency of workers’ remittances from the EU to eight Mediterranean partner 
countries (MPCs; Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and 
Syria). The study, published in 2006, concluded that methods of transfer used are 
extremely expensive for those sending the money and prevent the funds from being 
put to sufficiently good use to finance productive investment57. 
 
Its recommendations include the improvement of payment systems and links with EU 
countries in order to reduce transaction costs and to provide better services; 
encouraging the use of banking systems through offering banking services specifically 
targeted at migrants — including mortgage products, remittance-tailored bank 
accounts, and investments funds — in order to channel remittances into productive 
investments; increasing competition in the banking sector and access to financial 
services by migrants and implementing new technologies for remitting funds. 
Interestingly, the report also recommends the pooling of remittance resources through 
local associations. The purpose would be to pool resources to finance infrastructure 
projects as well as entrepreneurial activities and productive investments in countries 
of origin, which could also be stimulated by matching government or donor funds.  
 
As well as these local pooling schemes, the report also envisages the development of 
larger cooperative pooling schemes, whereby the migrant organisation and NGOs in 
host and recipient countries could help pool resources and work with banks and 
multilateral organizations to finance projects. The report also recommends promoting 
the transfer of knowledge and know-how of migrants and support for diaspora 
organisations wishing to stimulate business development in countries of origin. 
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2.2.4. Other agencies  
 
In 2003, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) funded a case study on the Philippines 
remittance industry, and has extended the study to review overseas remittance flows 
among Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, China and Philippines. 
The aim is to identify factors in the policy and institutional framework that impact 
these flows. The 2003 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Report on 
Alternative Remittance Systems examined the factors that result in the use of informal 
financial systems over formal financial systems, and specifically analysed the U.S.-
Mexico and Canada-Vietnam remittance corridors.  
 
 
 
2.3. UNDP and TOKTEN 
 
Although the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) does not specifically 
address the migration-development nexus in its policies, it is worth mentioning that 
back in 1977 it introduced the Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals 
(TOKTEN) Programme, which is still in force58. It is probably the longest standing 
and most successful programme aimed at a transfer of competencies without being 
linked to permanent return, and in many ways was a ‘brain circulation’ programme 
avant-la-lettre. 
 
The TOKTEN programme, which was created against the background of the serious 
concerns that came up in the 1970s about the brain drain, seeks to bring the 
knowledge, expertise and experience of qualified expatriates back to their country of 
origin through a reverse transfer of technology and knowledge through short-term 
consultancy missions. Between 1977 and 1997 TOKTEN placed about 5000 
volunteers on assignments in 49 developing countries. TOKTEN participants work 
with public or private institutions, including universities or NGOs, in fields ranging 
from agriculture and manufacturing to health, law, management and technology59. 
TOKTEN is currently running in 35 developing countries60.  
 
For instance, more than 400 Palestinian expatriate professionals have temporarily 
served in senior advisory and planning positions in various Palestinian Authority 
ministries, NGOs and private sector institutions. Of these experts 18 percent have 
decided to remain in the occupied Palestinian territories61. In Mali, a joint TOKTEN - 
UNESCO program brought in Malian visiting professors from Europe, North America 
and Africa to fill urgent teaching and research needs at the University of Mali. A 
TOKTEN program in Bosnia-Herzegovina, implemented jointly with IOM, has 
received applications from Bosnian nationals living across the world and attempts to 
match them with requests from Bosnian NGOs that need the services of a TOKTEN 
consultant. The selected candidates can return for a period of up to 2 months to work 
in the public and private sectors. After completing their consultancies, participants 
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can continue to provide their expertise on-line62.  
 
Applicant information is entered into the TOKTEN database and a steering committee 
consisting of host government and UN officials decides whether the applicant’s 
knowledge and expertise is appropriate. TOKTEN consultants receive no payment, 
only a per diem allowance, insurance policy and reimbursement for travel expenses. 
The fee for an average TOKTEN consultant is about one-quarter that of a traditional 
international expert consultant. This feature of the programme makes it popular and 
financially efficient, but limits participation to those diaspora members who are in a 
position to forgo their professional earnings for periods of volunteer consultancy63. 
 
 
 
2.4. IOM and MIDA64 
 
In the field of migration and development, the International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM) states: ‘Properly managed international migration holds enormous 
potential for the development of countries’65. In particular through surging 
remittances, migration is perceived to contribute to the reduction of poverty and to a 
reduction in the economic vulnerability of developing countries. In order to mitigate 
as much as possible the negative effects of ‘brain drain’ and to encourage the return of 
qualified nationals resulting in ‘brain gain’, the IOM focuses especially on stimulating 
circular and temporary migration, which would imply persistent involvement of 
migrants with countries of origin. As well as reducing remittance costs, promoting 
skill transfers and ‘brain circulation’, IOM promotes policies that facilitate voluntary 
return and reintegration, either temporary or permanent, particularly of the highly 
skilled. Partly migration-propelled development is also considered to ‘contribute to 
the management of migration’66.  
 
With the UK Department for International Development (DfID) and the Netherlands 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IOM organised an Intersessional Workshop 
Mainstreaming Migration into Development Policy Agendas in February 200567. 
Close to one hundred countries and forty intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organizations attended the workshop. In addition to general measures to facilitate 
remittance flows through formal channels, particular attention was paid to recognise 
the desirability to engage diasporas as agents for development. Some of the more 
concrete measures that were suggested included increasing the transparency of 
government development strategies and goals; supporting the establishment of 
migrant networks while respecting their autonomy; and engaging migrants in the 
process of policy making and in development programmes in a variety of ways, 
including project identification, implementation and monitoring. Furthermore, 
measures were proposed to identify diasporas through developing databases (similar 
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to proposals put forward by the European Commission later in 2005)68. It was also 
recommended to foster a sense of double belonging among members of diasporas, for 
instance through introducing dual citizenship and stimulating political participation. 
Also similar to the 2005 proposals by the EC, stimulating return, temporary and 
circular migration as well as temporary returns of qualified immigrants were seen as 
means to stimulate positive migration-development linkages. IOM also participated in 
organising the aforementioned migration and development conference in March 2006 
in Brussels69.  
 
In terms of concrete policies, IOM has been particularly active in ‘migration 
management services’, mainly in the form of ‘assisted voluntary return’ (AVR) 
programmes. Such programmes are operated in collaboration with governments of 
destination countries, with IOM being the implementing body. AVR aims at ‘orderly, 
humane and cost effective return and reintegration of asylum seekers, denied asylum 
seekers and other migrants residing or stranded in host countries, who are willing to 
return voluntarily to their countries of origin’70. Return assistance includes 
information and counselling to potential returnees, travel arrangements and medical 
assistance, post-arrival reception, information, referral, onward travel to the home 
location and reintegration assistance. AVR programmes have been implemented 
around the world, such as recently in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan71. For IOM, 
AVR is an area of expertise, developed over more than 20 years of practice. Between 
1993 and 2002, IOM claims to have assisted more than 3.5 million migrants return to 
over 160 countries72.  
 
The focus of the AVR programmes, however, has been very much on return rather 
than on development, and in fact no explicit link with development policies exists. 
Accordingly, IOM’s return policy and programmes are first and foremost seen as ‘a 
contribution to combating irregular migration’73. Nevertheless, one area of 
engagement with the role of diasporas in development has been the attention to 
‘bridging identified human resource gaps’ through the Return of Qualified Afghans 
(RQA) programme and the Return and Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals 
(RQAN) programme. However, such programs have had only limited and costly 
success for countries that were not able otherwise to attract returnees74. The RQAN 
programme, for example, reintegrated slightly more than 100 African nationals per 
year between 1983 and 199975.  
 
An example of a programme with a stronger ‘development’ component, and which is 
focused on ‘brain circulation’ and temporary returns, is the Migration for 
Development in Africa (MIDA) programme, which was launched in cooperation with 
OAU in 200176. MIDA is a capacity-building programme that aims to develop ‘the 
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potential synergy between the profiles of African migrants and the demand from 
countries, by facilitating the transfer of vital skills and resources of the African 
diaspora to their countries of origin’ The programme is based on the ‘notion of 
mobility of people and resources and, as such, offers options for reinvestment of 
human capital, including temporary, long-term or virtual return’. Approaches are 
tailored to meet the needs of the origin country without jeopardizing migrants’ legal 
status in their host countries or newly adopted home countries. Most importantly, they 
avoid the return conditionality, which is the most significant difference from human 
resource programmes such as RQA and RQAN, which were more narrowly focused 
on return and reintegration.  
 
Since its inception, nine MIDA projects have been funded, three of which have been 
financed entirely by European governments: Belgium for MIDA Great Lakes, Italy 
for MIDA Ethiopia and Ghana, and the Netherlands for research on the potential role 
of the Ghanaian diaspora in the health sector in Ghana. To date, only MIDA Great 
Lakes and MIDA Italy have received full evaluations, given their sizeable budgets of 
3.4 M and 520,000  respectively. The MIDA Great Lakes project has been 
evaluated as overall successful, having effectively made 163 physical transfers during 
phase I (March 2001-December 2003) and 80 transfers during the 12 months of phase 
II, which ended in January 2006. While virtual and financial transfers have proved to 
be insufficient, evaluators have observed that over time the IOM representatives, the 
national governments and the diaspora members have demonstrated greater 
collaboration. A sense of accountability has developed, which has resulted in positive 
feedback from the beneficiary institutions. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
several students were able to complete their studies thanks to a national expert who 
taught a required course. A third phase of this project to last 24 months has been 
approved, although reduced funding might compromise the end results.  
 
The MIDA Italy pilot project has aimed to promote the transfer of knowledge and 
expertise as well as the engagement of the diaspora communities in the form of 
investments and deployment of remittances and to promote capacity building of the 
Ethiopian and Ghanaian governments in dealing with diasporas. A pilot project 
funded by the Government of Italy – to which a wide range of institutions and NGOs 
and over 140 African associations contributed – included research, an information 
campaign and workshops organised across Italy to identify and to encourage African 
migrants to contribute to the development of their countries of origin. This generated 
about 90 funding requests for small entrepreneurial projects from migrants from 12 
sub-Saharan African countries living in Italy, but mainly from Ghanaian and 
Senegalese nationals. Other proposals included projects submitted by Italian local 
authorities interested in co-funding projects with sub-Saharan African communities77.  
 
The research findings and the evaluation of the proposed projects conducted in the 
initial phase of the project supported the selection of Ethiopia and Ghana as pilot 
countries. In particular, the project encouraged the engagement of the Ghanaian 
diaspora in the development of micro-enterprises in the agricultural sector. For the 
Ethiopian community, the goal was the creation of a comprehensive website that 
would allow an exchange of information for the Ethiopian diaspora.  
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This project was beset by a number of problems, the most significant of which was 
the lack of commitment of the African governments, which resulted in the absence of 
support for the project’s activities and ultimately led to unsatisfactory outcomes. The 
government of Ethiopia was particularly unsupportive of the project. Despite all 
difficulties a website was created, but it was quickly put aside once the project ended. 
The evaluation indicated that the Ethiopian community had not demonstrated great 
interest in the program, although the program administrators had initially assumed 
that the Ethiopian community would be motivated for it, based on the mere fact that 
they are the oldest immigrant community in Italy. 
 
Five investment projects were implemented in Ghana, among which were the 
establishment of small farms and a partnership between the Ghanaian migrant 
association and local authorities and private companies of the Emilia-Romagna 
Region to create an import-export tropical fruit enterprise78. However, even in this 
instance they were isolated from national economic efforts and other development 
initiatives, and in the end it became clear that the ministry in charge was not interested 
in small-scale investments such as those promoted by MIDA.  
 
Despite these initial obstacles, the MIDA Italy project was extended as the MIDA-
Ghana/Senegal project with a start date of January 2006. It was decided to exclude 
Ethiopia and to target Senegal instead, given the large number of Senegalese in Italy 
and their interest in participating in the programme. Ghana was retained in the project, 
because during the initial phase a few investment projects were started in which 
several Italian businesses and local government agencies had invested. The project’s 
main focus remains on investment and remittances. Several steps have been taken to 
avoid the previous mistakes and to ensure greater collaboration between the IOM, the 
participating government and the diaspora members. 
 
The Netherlands Ghana project started in January 2005 and will run until June 2007. 
It targets African health workers in Europe who are interested in working in the health 
sector in Ghana79. To date, the project appears to be relatively successful, possibly 
because of its flexibility. In fact this project allows all Africans, not just Ghanaians, to 
volunteer in Ghana. This MIDA project also contains an innovative ‘reverse 
component’ giving interested Ghanaian health workers the possibility to receive 
additional training in the Netherlands. It targets specifically the brain ‘strain’ problem 
that Ghana is experiencing and it tries to address the problem from different angles80. 
In fact, this seems to come very close to the principles of the TOKTEN programme. 
 
 
 
2.5. ILO and UNHCR  
 
The International Labour Office (ILO) has one of the longest established records of 
studies and policies on migration issues81, in which ILO tends to stress migrant 
workers’ rights in contrast to IOM’s traditional focus on ‘migration management’ and 
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return migration. ILO conducted a series of studies under the DfID-sponsored project 
on Skilled labour migration (the ‘brain drain’) from developing countries: Analysis of 
impact and policy issues82. Within the framework of its Project on Sustainable 
Migration Solutions, ILO published a series of discussion papers83 and organised an 
expert meeting entitled Migration and Development - Working with the diaspora in 
May 2004 with the German Agency for Technical Cooperation GTZ84. Both IOM and 
ILO participate heavily in a series of activities preceding the UN High Level Dialogue 
Meeting on Migration and Development in September 200685.  
 
Although it is not a development agency, nor does it have a mandate regarding 
international migration, UNHCR recognised that most countries hosting large refugee 
and IDP (internally displaced persons) populations rank at the lowest levels of the 
Human Development Index. Moreover, UNHCR has been charged by the UN General 
Assembly and the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme 
with playing a catalytic role in seeking to encourage development-related investments 
in refugee and returnee-hosting areas, as a means to encourage self-reliance and to 
prepare for the durable solutions of voluntary repatriation, local integration and 
resettlement. This makes development issues increasingly relevant for UNHCR’s 
work86. 
 
 
 
2.6. Global Commission on International Migration  
 
In December 2003, acting on the encouragement of UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan, the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) was established. 
The mandate of the Commission was to ‘provide the framework for the formulation of 
a coherent, comprehensive and global response to the issue of international 
migration’87. This independent body was an initiative by the governments of Sweden 
and Switzerland, joined by those of Brazil, Morocco and the Philippines, and 
supported by a core group of 32 states. Its objective was to provide recommendations 
on how to strengthen the governance of international migration.  
 
The GCIM report, which was presented in October 2005, offers, amongst a wider 
range of other migration-related issues, a comparatively comprehensive approach 
towards the migration and development issue, which also goes beyond the usual focus 
on remittances. A separate chapter entitled Migration and development: Realizing the 
potential of human mobility recognised the role that migrants play in promoting 
development and poverty reduction in countries of origin88. Four of the report’s 33 
recommendations directly relate to migration and development issues:  
 
1. Remittances are private money and should not be appropriated by states. 
Governments and financial institutions should make it easier and cheaper to 
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transfer remittances and thus encourage migrants to remit through formal 
transfer systems (recommendation 8). Costs of remittances should be reduced, 
for instance through fostering greater competition within the formal transfer 
system;  
2. In countries of origin, measures to encourage the transfer and investment of 
remittances must be combined with macro-economic policies that are 
conducive to economic growth and competitiveness (recommendation 9); 
3. Diasporas should be encouraged to promote development by saving and 
investing in their countries of origin and participating in transnational 
knowledge networks (recommendation 10); 
4. States and international organizations should formulate policies and 
programmes that maximize the developmental impact of return and circular 
migration (recommendation 11). 
 
Interestingly, GCIM sees a role for migrant associations and civil society institutions 
in collecting, analysing and disseminating relevant information on the different 
transfer services that are available to people who wish to remit. Such increased 
transparency in the financial services sector would allow migrants to make an easy 
comparison between the costs of transferring remittances with different service 
providers. 
 
GCIM also sees an important role for home-town associations and diaspora 
organisations in collecting and transferring ‘collective remittances’ to their place of 
origin, which can be used for infrastructural and other projects that bring benefits to 
whole communities rather than to individual households. It also recommended 
combining such collective remittances with matching funds provided from public 
sources or by development agencies, as has been done in the Mexican two-for-one 
and three-for-one programmes. 
f 
The GCIM report distinguishes itself by the attention given to ‘diasporas and 
development’: ‘Diasporas should be encouraged to promote development by saving 
and investing in their countries of origin and participating in transnational knowledge 
networks.’ This can be done through fund matching by countries of origin such as in 
the Mexican example, but also by ‘mobilizing diaspora networks’, in which 
destination countries can play a role. By supporting the establishment of professional 
diaspora organisations and other civil society entities that incorporate migrants, 
programmes can be developed that  
 
‘facilitate the transfer of skills and knowledge from the diaspora to their 
countries of origin. This might entail physical return, by means of short-term 
secondments or sabbatical visits, but can also involve ‘virtual return’, using 
the video-conferencing and internet facilities that are increasingly available in 
even the poorest of countries89.’  
 
A good practice example given by GCIM was the African Human Resources 
programme90 of NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development)91 and 
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UNESCO92. The goal of this programme is to create a database of Africans teaching 
in universities and high schools in Europe, United States of America, Canada and in 
the world. This database will be available for African states and any other 
organisation in the field of education and teaching in Africa. The Economic 
Commission for Africa (ECA) is co-ordinating activities related to the development of 
database on African experts and the diaspora, and making them available for access 
and utilisation by member States, development actors and others. Such databases are 
believed to constitute an essential information base into which users could tap to 
identify the trained workforce they require to establish and maintain research 
networks, virtual learning networks, policy reforms, and so on.93 Nevertheless, it 
remains unclear to what extent these programmes have met their objectives in 
practice.  
 
Although GCIM stressed that if the developmental impact of international migration 
is to be maximized, countries of origin must first and fore most strive to create a 
healthy business environment, it acknowledged that individual migrants and diaspora 
organisations can play an important role in promoting trade and investment in their 
countries of origin. Specific measures that were proposed are training programmes 
and business counselling, which help migrants to develop the entrepreneurial skills 
and business acumen needed to engage in successful trade and investment activities.  
 
 
2.7. UN high level dialogue meeting on migration and 
development  
 
The launching of GCIM coincided with the decision of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations in December 2003 to devote a high-level dialogue to international 
migration and development on 14-15 September 2006. This is allegedly the first 
major event in United Nations history that focuses exclusively on international 
migration issues. The stated purpose of the high-level dialogue is ‘to discuss the 
multidimensional aspects of international migration and development in order to 
identify appropriate ways and means to maximize its development benefits and 
minimize its negative impacts’94. Core topics to be addressed are the effects of 
international migration on economic and social development; the migration of highly 
skilled persons; actions to improve the impact of remittances on development; 
international cooperation to prevent and combat the trafficking in persons; and 
institutional mechanisms to enhance international cooperation for the benefit of 
countries and migrants alike. Although the High Level Dialogue on Migration and 
Development has no formal link with GCIM, it recommended taking into account the 
recommendations in its final report95.  
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In preparation for the High Level Dialogue meeting, the Population Division of the 
UN extracted from outcome documents of earlier major United Nations conferences 
and summits those parts that relate to international migration as well as to compare 
these to the recommendations made by the Global Commission on International 
Migration (GCIM). The ensuing Compendium of Recommendations on International 
Migration and Development 96 shows that past UN events focused mostly on issues 
like migration management and the protection of the rights of migrants and refugees. 
They paid scarce attention to the development dimension of migration, with the 
exception of the usual declarations to reduce costs and facilitate remittances97 as well 
as to implement macro-economic and fiscal measures to channel migrations through 
formal channels and into productive investment98. This is also reflected in the ‘core 
topics’ of the High Level Dialogue. These largely correspond to the two first 
aforementioned GCIM recommendations, but largely ignore its other 
recommendations pertaining to how to stimulate the role of diasporas in development 
beyond facilitating remittances.  
 
 
2.8. European Union  
 
As an officially proclaimed ‘major strategic policy priority’, migration has been at the 
heart of EU policies towards ‘third states’ over the past decade. However, the 
emphasis of these policies has been very much on cooperation in migration control 
(control of external borders, readmission) rather than migration and development per 
se. EU policies seem to increasingly embrace the concept of ‘co-development’, which 
tends to be associated with assisted return, thereby employing a focus on the ‘return 
potential’ as a development factor99. In light of the growing European focus on 
migration and border control, the French co-development policies – which were 
heavily criticized for being too focused on migration prevention – have now become 
‘acceptable’ and have recently been a source of inspiration for recent migration and 
development policies at the European level100. More in general, the EU policies of 
trade liberalisation and development aid towards ‘third countries’, such as the 
Barcelona process and MEDA programme have been based partly on the idea that 
increased aid and capital flows would alleviate the causes of migration and therefore 
substitute labour (migration) flows in the longer term. 
 
In 1998, the European Commission set up the High Level Working Group (HLWG) 
on Asylum and Migration as a second path to developing an explicit migration 
prevention policy in addition to its development aid and ‘root causes’ policies. The 
HLWG was charged with preparing Action Plans on countries from which large 
numbers of refugees and migrants come to Europe. Initially, the plans were meant to 
develop measures for cooperation with sending countries regarding foreign policy, 
and for development and trade. However, in practice the action plans emphasize 
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repressive measures such as the promotion of readmission of rejected asylum-seekers 
and securing protection in the conflict region, without addressing the question of how 
this coincides with human rights abuses in a given country101.  
 
Since the Tampere European Council in 1999, the European Union has laid the 
foundations for a common asylum and immigration policy. These policies strongly 
focus on the harmonisation of border controls to tackle illegal migration, trafficking in 
and smuggling of human beings, terrorism and organised crime. It is frequently 
mentioned that the EU should work together with countries of origin in achieving a 
comprehensive approach, involving all stages of migration, with respect to the root 
causes of migration, entry and admission policies and integration and return policies. 
The European Council meeting in Seville in June 2002 concluded that ‘closer 
economic cooperation, trade expansion, development assistance and conflict 
prevention are all means of promoting economic prosperity in the countries concerned 
and thereby reducing the underlying causes of migration flows’102. 
 
Accordingly, in December 2002 the European Commission issued a policy document 
containing a large section on migration and development. The emphasis in this 
document is on ‘migration management’ and a reduction of unwanted migration 
flows. As far as the development dimension is addressed, its prime aim is to reduce 
migration: ‘the long-term priority of the Community should be to address the root 
causes of migration flows. One should duly recognise the effect of long-term 
development programmes on migratory flows, in particular in poverty eradication, 
institution and capacity building and in conflict prevention. Development resources 
should concentrate on this objective’103.  
 
The only area in which the positive developmental role of diasporas – apart from 
remittances – is mentioned is in the form of voluntary return of migrants. This would 
bring back  
 
‘accumulated amounts of financial, human and social capital into developing 
countries. Traditionally, return has therefore been seen as an essential aspect 
in ensuring a positive relationship between migration and development. This 
positive correlation assumes that a migrant has spent sufficient time abroad to 
acquire skills and resources, and that he or she is capable and willing to 
dedicate (part of) this capital to new activities in the country of origin. These 
countries of origin can facilitate a successful reintegration, which is also 
beneficial to the local society at large, by creating the right social, economic 
and institutional environment for the returning migrant104.’ 
 
Although it is mentioned that governments of migrant-sending countries can set up 
active policies to intensify contacts with their diasporas and involve them in the 
national development process, and that destination countries can also implement ‘co-
development’ schemes to facilitate ‘brain circulation’ and assist legal migrants to 
contribute to the development process of their country of origin, no concrete policy 
measures were proposed. A practical problem here is that since the disappearance of 
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the European Union of Migrants Forum in 1999105 the EU has no interlocutor who 
could represent diaspora organisations at the European level.  
 
As a follow-up, the European Commission presented its draft conclusions on 
‘migration and development’ in May 2003, claiming that they ‘reflect a fair balance 
between migration and development interests and contain a series of short and mid-
term policy measures for the Commission to follow, with a view to paving the way for 
increasing synergy between migration and development cooperation’ 106. It reiterated 
the focus on border control, return migration and readmission of earlier documents. 
Partnerships with third countries are primarily seen through the lens of an ‘improved 
joint management of migration flows, including border control, readmission, 
institutional capacity building and strengthening the safeguards with respect to the 
international obligations to provide protection for refugees’. Voluntary return is the 
only concrete measure suggested ‘to support local development through the 
repatriation of skills and resources’. However, one new element is the proposal to 
facilitate the ‘efforts of migrants residing in the EU who intend to contribute to the 
economic and social development of their country of origin’, for instance through 
‘strengthening of communication facilities between trans-national communities and 
their country or region of origin’107.  
 
A second new element is the referral to remittances: 
 
‘The flows of remittances should be addressed, with the aim to improve their 
efficient utilisation in the macro-economic development of countries of origin. 
In this respect the Commission is invited to investigate how the transfer of 
funds from the EU to source countries can be made cheaper and more reliable, 
and to propose, where appropriate, pilot programmes to channel remittances 
into productive investment in countries of origin and assess their impact on 
migratory flows in the long-term 108.’ 
 
A final new element is the Commission’s intent to elaborate ‘a review of development 
cooperation related job policy and the feasibility and impact of generalising the hiring 
of staff originating from target countries for development cooperation under financial 
conditions sufficiently attractive to provide an alternative for emigration’ 109.  
 
In November 2004, The European Council stated: ‘Policies which link migration, 
development cooperation and humanitarian assistance should be coherent and be 
developed in partnership and dialogue with countries and regions of origin’. In 
addition the Council recommended ‘to develop these policies, with particular 
emphasis on root causes, push factors and poverty alleviation, and urges the 
Commission to present concrete and carefully worked out proposals by the spring of 
2005’110.  
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In synergy with the presentation of GCIM’s final report and as a precursor to the UN 
High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development, and building on its December 
2002 communication, in September 2005 the European Commission proposed a series 
of more concrete measures in its Communication Migration and Development: Some 
concrete orientations111. The communication focused on specific topics that are 
associated with South-North migration, and ‘in particular on possible actions that 
could be carried out at EU level, in partnership with developing countries of origin’. 
The EU proposals merit some attention, because it is the first time that an 
intergovernmental body has proposed such a concrete and more comprehensive set of 
measures to address the migration and development nexus. These comprise (1) 
facilitating remittances, (2) the role of diasporas, (3) encouraging circular migration 
and brain circulation and (4) mitigating the adverse effects of the brain drain. 
 
 
1. Facilitating Remittances 
 
The EC identifies two main areas for policy action on remittances:  
 
(a) fostering cheaper, faster and more secure ways to send remittances through: 
 
• Improving data through improving data collection and household surveys on 
selected bilateral ‘remittance corridors’. Such studies should identify possible 
indicators of a lack of competition and technical inefficiencies in the 
remittance industry; 
• Enhance transparency through a Directive on payment services that will 
increase competition and enhance transparency. The EC also suggested setting 
up a Europe-wide website providing information on the various remittance 
channels; 
• Creating a harmonised legal framework for money transfer operators 
throughout the European Union, as well as EU and EIB assistance in 
improving the financial and economic infrastructure in developing countries to 
facilitate remittances;  
• Fostering the use of new remittances technologies (such as the use of debit 
cards and ATMs) and improving access to financial services in developing 
countries including micro-finance institutions. 
 
(b) enhancing the development impact of remittances in recipient countries to 
improve the incentive and informational infrastructure so as to stimulate productive 
investments:  
 
• To enhance financial intermediation in developing countries through 
facilitating partnerships between micro-finance institutions and mainstream 
financial institutions – in partnership with the countries concerned and, where 
relevant, in cooperation with the EIB.  
• To provide funding for collective remittances and co-funding schemes: that is, 
joint projects by diaspora organisations and local organisations so as to 
support local development.  
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2. Diasporas as actors in home country development 
 
The EC recognises diasporas as ‘an important potential actor in the development of 
countries of origin’, and puts forward the following initiatives and recommendations 
to contribute to a stronger involvement of diaspora members through helping 
developing countries to map their diasporas and build links with them by  
 
• Supporting developing countries by helping them to set up databases where 
‘members of diasporas interested in contributing to home countries’ 
development can register on a voluntary basis, and more generally to maintain 
links between these countries and their diasporas, in coordination with other 
donors.’112 ;  
• Stimulating Member States to identify and engage diaspora organisations that 
could be suitable and representative interlocutors in development policy and/or 
possible initiators of development projects in countries of origin113; 
• Encouraging diaspora organisations involved in the development of countries 
of origin to set up a mechanism that could ensure appropriate representation 
of their interests at EU level; 
• Besides existing initiatives, notably by local authorities in the framework of 
twinning schemes, the EC considers the feasibility of introducing youth 
exchange schemes focused in particular on migrant communities, based on the 
experience gathered with existing intra-EU schemes. 
 
 
3. Encouraging circular migration and brain circulation.  
 
This largely reiterates issues raised in the EC December 2002 Communication. It is 
proposed to increase the role of migrants’ return – permanent, temporary or even 
‘virtual’ – in ‘fostering the transfer of skills to the developing world, together with 
other forms of brain circulation’. This objective should be seen in the general context 
of EC policies towards economic migration, which seem to be heading in the direction 
of  
 
• Stimulating the potential of temporary migration through encouraging circular 
migration, by  
- giving a priority for further temporary employment to workers who have 
already worked under such schemes and have returned at the end of their 
contract  
- stimulating short-term and seasonal migration;  
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• Facilitating return migration through  
- the elaboration and management of assisted return programmes  
- supporting countries of origin with the successful reintegration of return 
migrants;  
- measures in areas such as the transferability of pension rights, the recognition 
of qualifications or mechanisms to ensure that researchers or other 
professionals who have worked in the EU can keep in touch with their former 
colleagues to facilitate voluntary returns and help them reintegrate 
successfully; 
 
• Simulating temporary or virtual return through  
- building upon existing experience in temporary or virtual return programmes 
(such as TOKTEN and MIDA) 
- considering support to e-learning schemes  
- facilitating networking between foreign researchers working in the EU and 
research organisations in their countries of origin  
- protecting residence rights in the EU of diaspora members who decide to 
engage in such activities  
- continuing support, under the Aeneas programme114, to projects by which 
diaspora members set up sustainable economic activities in countries of origin. 
- involving interested entrepreneurs from migrant communities to contribute to 
the development of their country of origin 
- identifying best practices in areas such as secondments or sabbatical leaves 
that can facilitate temporary return. 
 
 
4. Mitigating the adverse effect of brain drain, through  
 
• Improving the evidence base of interested developing countries in order to 
improve their knowledge of their labour markets, including shortages or 
excesses of skills at the sectoral level;  
• Disciplining recruitment through encouraging Member States to develop 
mechanisms such as codes of conduct to limit active recruitment (‘cherry 
picking’) in cases where it would have significantly negative repercussions for 
targeted developing countries, especially in the health care sector; 
• Fostering institutional partnerships between institutions (research institutions, 
universities, hospitals or other bodies) in the EU and in interested developing 
countries or regions could play a role in addressing the causes of brain drain, 
for instance through the elaboration of ‘shared work schemes’;  
• Encouraging development cooperation as a source of employment 
opportunities for skilled professionals in developing countries.  
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This communication by the EC appears to be a step forward in developing a more 
comprehensive approach towards migration and development than had been in place 
until recently. It goes beyond a narrow focus on remittances, which includes the 
broader developmental role of diasporas. Nevertheless, the underlying objective in 
particular of the third objective (‘circular migration and brain circulation’) still seems 
discouraging permanent settlement rather than the development of countries of origin 
per se. Furthermore, with a few exceptions, most policies are still in their formulation 
phase115.  
 
 
2.9. Conclusion 
 
Over the past five years there has been increasing international recognition of the 
development potential of international migration, resulting in a wealth of studies, 
workshops and conferences. These have made it possible to identify most of the 
obstacles to reaping the full benefits of migration for development as well as the 
various policy areas in which interventions are possible. However, in terms of 
formulation and implementation of concrete policies, surprisingly little has been 
achieved at the international level. Only in the field of facilitating remittances through 
reductions of costs and increased transparency of remittance markets has a set of 
relatively concrete and more or less ready-to-implement proposals been developed.  
 
While the initial focus was on remittances, in the past couple of years there seems 
more renewed awareness of other developmental roles for migrant communities. 
Consequently, proposals to ‘mobilise diasporas for development’ tend towards 
declarations of good intent and remain vague in terms of concrete policy 
implementation. Moreover, in particular in EU policies, and to a certain extent also 
with institutions organisations such as IOM, proposals to promote the involvement of 
migrants in development appear to be entangled with and subordinate to policy 
objectives to reduce permanent migration and to promote temporary migration.  
 
Therefore, it seems useful to look at the practical experience some European countries 
have in implementing policies that attempt to engage migrants in development 
cooperation or to strengthen development activities of their organisations. Through 
studying how governments and development agencies have attempted to enhance the 
development contribution of migration and to involve migrants in development 
cooperation, we might learn what types of actions are likely to be successful or not.  
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The Netherlands  
 
 
3.1. National policies 
 
3.1.1. Introduction  
 
The Directoraat-Generaal voor Internationale Samenwerking (DGIS; Directorate 
General for International Cooperation) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is 
responsible for Dutch development collaboration. In 2003, about 3.8 billion  (0.8% 
of the Dutch Gross National Product) was reserved for development policy. Besides 
financial contributions to international organisations (such as the World Bank and the 
United Nations), governments of developing countries, international NGOs and other 
donor countries, one of the unique features of Dutch development cooperation is its 
co-financing structure. This entails that DGIS, in addition to a regular project support 
for a wider variety of NGOs, channels substantial structural funds to a small number 
of Dutch development NGOs known as co-financing agencies. Traditionally, the most 
prominent of these co-financing agencies (CFAs) have been Oxfam Novib, Cordaid 
(Catholic), ICCO (Protestant) and Hivos (Humanist).  
 
Before the introduction of the programme financing agreement between CFAs and 
DGIS in 1980, each development project had to be approved individually for funding 
by the Ministry. Since then the co-financing institutions have considerable leeway for 
pursuing independent programme management, as long as the development practices 
adhere to the broad strategy set out by DGIS. CFAs only need to report on their use of 
funds on an annual basis. The co-financing agreement is evaluated every four years. 
In their turn, CFAs have funding links with almost 3,000 partner organisations in 
developing countries. They cooperate with and support these organisations, and do 
not have their own operational programmes116.  
 
 
3.1.2. Migration and development avant la lettre: the REMPLOD 
experience 
 
Although several western European countries began to experiment with programmes 
of return migration and reintegration support (mainly for the supposed ‘guest 
workers’) in the 1970s, the Netherlands boasts what is probably the first ‘migration 
and development’ programme. The Dutch REMPLOD project (Reintegration of 
Emigrant Manpower and Promotion of Local Opportunities for Development) is 
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perhaps the oldest example of research preparing and evaluating migration policies 
that were combined with explicit components of a development policy.  
 
The REMPLOD project was initiated and funded in 1974 by the Dutch Ministry of 
Development Cooperation in order to explore ways in which international labour 
migration could contribute to development and combat the causes of emigration in 
sending countries such as Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey117. This was in a time when it 
was generally expected that labour migration from Mediterranean countries would be 
temporary, and, consequently, that most migrants would return. Large-scale 
emigration to Europe, which gained full momentum in the late 1960s, was still 
relatively new. The idea was that returning migrants could use their skills and savings 
for local development by contributing to existing projects or founding new businesses.  
 
However, the conclusions of the associated REMPLOD research project were not 
optimistic about the potential of influencing regional and local development by 
returning migrant entrepreneurs. Extensive field research in the REMPLOD project 
on the social and economic effects of emigration and return indicated that the 
investment opportunities for migrants in their regions of origin were very limited, and 
that, in fact, development in migrant-sending regions was a prerequisite for return 
and/or investment rather than a consequence of migration118. They showed that to 
stimulate development processes in regions of origin, more structural changes are 
necessary than migrants can effectuate119.  
 
In the case of Morocco, the political situation and the endemic corruption 
strengthened the historical mistrust of the northern part of Morocco towards the 
central government and its regional and local representatives. This lack of confidence 
also hampered potential initiatives and concomitant investment of migrant workers in 
northern Morocco120.  
 
The Turkish research team looked in particular at existing initiatives of Turkish 
migrants to invest productively in the regional of origin: the Joint Stock Corporation, 
established by migrants themselves, and Village Development Cooperatives, a form 
of local economic initiatives whose members were given priority to be sent to Europe 
as guest workers on the condition that they would invest part of their saving in these 
cooperatives at home. The research showed the dismal conditions in which the great 
majority of these initiatives struggled in the mid-1970s: poor management, lack of 
government interest in supporting these initiatives, financial problems, problems of 
trust and other abuses. Only a few of these initiatives survived, and the successful 
ones were taken over by larger institutional investors in Turkey, thereby 
marginalizing the original migrant initiators121. 
 
This REMPLOD-research led to two policy measures. The first was that, 
notwithstanding these pessimistic research conclusions, the Dutch government 
decided, even before the research was finished, to develop a policy programme to 
endorse individual returning migrants from the Netherlands to establish small 
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enterprises in their home countries: this TPP-programme (Return Projects 
Programme) was implemented by IMOS (International Migration and Development 
Cooperation) a welfare organisation in the Netherlands, NCB (Netherlands Centre for 
Foreigners). The prerequisites for participation in the programme were high and 
included an appropriate good professional background, an elaborate and promising 
business plan and a considerable amount of capital122. This programme ran until the 
early 1980s when it was abolished after an evaluation.  
 
The second policy strand was that the Dutch government concluded bilateral 
agreements with sending countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Yugoslavia and Turkey) to 
implement projects in which returning migrants would have an important place. In the 
case of Turkey some seven of the existing Turkish Joint Stock Corporations and 
Village Development Cooperatives were offered professional assistance and 
monitoring through FMO, a funding agency for development. These bilateral 
agreements turned out to be a temporary and limited policy endeavour that did not 
survive the 1970s. From the mid-1980s onwards all policy efforts were stopped. The 
results were seen as too limited to justify the high costs. The support for returnees was 
now also seen as running counter to the spirit of the new Dutch integration polities123 
 
 
3.1.3. The new Dutch ‘development and migration’ policies  
 
In 1996, DGIS wrote a policy memorandum called ‘migration and development’. The 
document contained a very general analysis of the topic, and proposed few concrete 
measures, but stated its willingness to support a ‘general remigration program, aiming 
at the voluntary return of migrants to developing countries’ 124. It also asserted that 
well-coordinated foreign and aid policies could lead to a reduction in ‘undesired 
migration’. Referring to the negative experiences with earlier return programmes such 
as REMPLOD, improved cooperation with authorities and NGOs in countries of 
origin, more tailor-made employment programmes responding to local demand and 
more flexibility to adopt the programme to specific needs countries were 
recommended. There was, however, no real follow-up to the report.  
 
In 2003, the government of the Netherlands, DGIS and the Ministry of Justice took up 
the issue again and started orienting on the issue of migration and development, and 
in particular what has been phrased as improving the coherence between migration 
and development policies. Within this framework, the migration and development 
agenda has been dominated by the emphasis on controlling (i.e. curbing) migration ‘in 
accordance with the absorptive capacity of Dutch society, with a view to preventing 
the abuse of the system and illegal migration, while offering protection to all those 
who genuinely need it’125. Consequently, the search for policy coherence between 
migration and development policies has been conceived primarily from the ‘need to 
improve migration management’ and to regulate migration, which ‘created increasing 
pressure to include migration issues within the context of foreign and development 
policy’126.  
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The 2004 policy memorandum on development and migration 
 
After internal discussion and a series of consultations with academics and 
development and migrant NGOs, the ministries for Development Cooperation (DGIS) 
and Immigration and Integration issued a joint policy memorandum entitled 
Development and Migration in July 2004127. In the memorandum, the Dutch 
government expressed its expectation that well-coordinated development policies 
would contribute to reducing immigration. Furthermore, the government proposes to 
intensify existing voluntary and forced return migration programs as a means to 
promote development in migrant-sending countries. The document concluded that 
there was considerable room to improve the coherence between migration and 
development policies, in particular through (1) improving capacity building in the 
field of ‘migration management’ and (2) ‘protection in the region’, encouraging (3) 
‘effective return of illegal migrants’ deemed necessary ‘for the integrity of and public 
support for the asylum system and migration policy in general’; (4) ‘assisted 
voluntary return’ and (5) circular migration.  
 
On the practical level, capacity building for migration management is, for instance, 
envisaged through its integration into existing bilateral programmes and policies for 
‘good governance’. Enhancing refugees’ ‘protection in the region’ is primarily 
envisaged through partnerships with countries neighbouring refugee source countries 
and through channelling additional funds to UNHCR for investing in regional refugee 
protection schemes, as has been done in Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania and Yemen. The 
Dutch ministries of Development Cooperation and Immigration and Justice present 
the policies promoting ‘protection in the region’ and sustainable return as one of the 
ways that coherence between migration, development and humanitarian policies is 
achieved128.  
 
The 2004 Development and Migration policy memorandum proclaims circular 
migration as an optimum strategy to reconcile the interests of the migrant and of the 
sending and destination countries. With the exception of what are called knowledge 
migrants, the Dutch government considers any other type of labour migration to be 
primarily temporary. Circular migration is here mainly interpreted as ‘temporary’ 
migration, which is seen as an intermediate solution to fill shortages on the domestic 
labour market while avoiding permanent settlement. Circular migration is seen as one 
of the areas where the interests of individual migrants, host and home societies 
coincide: it allows developed countries to fill temporary job openings, migrants to 
earn an income and to acquire skills, and origin countries to benefit from skills and 
knowledge transfers, while the brain drain is counteracted129.  
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This view coincides with an emphasis on the temporary nature of migration and on 
return: 
 
‘Effective return policies are a condition for policies to promote temporary 
labour migration and circular migration. It is important to encourage voluntary 
return using a combination of policies, such as forced return where necessary, 
agreements with countries of origin, support of or pressure on countries of 
origin, support for migrants and migrant organisations, support to activities of 
the Dutch civil society in the field of education and re-integration, support for 
temporary labour migration including effective return, and support for 
(temporary) return for the benefit of the (re)building of the country of 
origin130.’  
 
Voluntary and forced ‘effective return of illegal migrants’ and rejected asylum 
seekers is for instance envisaged through concluding readmission agreements with 
countries of origin and transit. Assisted return is envisaged through appropriate 
training, preparation and financial support, in particular in cooperation with the IOM, 
which is extremely active in facilitating the return of (former) asylum seekers.  
 
IOM facilitates the return of (former) asylum seekers living in the Netherlands. The 
standard instrument for these policies is the Return and Emigration of Aliens from the 
Netherlands (REAN) regulation, in addition to which a ‘reintegration contribution’ 
can be handed out (for instance, assistance to facilitate transport of goods needed to 
start an own enterprise) through a number of programmes, such as the Re-Integration 
Project Return (HRPT) and the REAN+ regulations for Iraq, Afghanistan, Angola en 
de Democratic Republic of Congo. From January to November 2005, 3304 persons 
returned from the Netherlands through these programmes, of whom 1338 and 374 
used the HRPT and REAN+ regulations, respectively131.  
 
Within the Return, Migration and Development (TMO) programme, which was 
launched in 2005 and has a yearly budget of approximately 5 M, the Dutch 
government finances a project of CARE International, which aims at the reintegration 
of Somalis who returned to Somaliland from within the ‘region’ and the Netherlands, 
through the education and professional training of 100 returnees each year132. The 
TMO programme has also provided funding to the foundation Maatwerk bij 
Terugkeer (Individual Return Assistance Agency), which was established by the CFA 
Cordaid, and which aims at facilitating the return and reintegration of rejected asylum 
seekers, corresponding to the prime aim of the TMO programme133.  
 
In the field of voluntary and temporary return, the Migration for Development in 
Africa (MIDA) pilot project (in which the IOM, the Sub-Saharan Africa Department 
of DGIS and various West African countries, Netherlands-based migrant groups and 
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the Netherlands embassy in Ghana are closely cooperating) is mentioned as a good 
practice. The programme aims to promote ‘brain gain’ in Africa by encouraging the 
temporary return to Ghana of Ghanaian professionals working in the Netherlands, 
especially of medical personnel. It also offers the opportunity to Ghanaian doctors and 
students to follow internships in the Netherlands134. 
 
Another example that has been mentioned is IOM’s programme Return of Qualified 
Afghans (RQA), to which the Netherlands has given financial support, and which is 
aimed at the temporary return (6 to 12 months) of highly skilled Afghans. One-third 
of the participants came from the Netherlands. The RQA programme, which is co-
funded by the European Commission, reached its capacity by the end of June 2005, 
and facilitated the return of 150 qualified and skilled Afghans (14 female and 136 
male)135. At the time of the writing of this report, no evaluation of the programme was 
available, although its overall success is said to be limited136. 
 
In 1985, the Dutch government adopted a remigration regulation. An amended 
version came into effect as the Remigration Act in 2001. The act mainly targets 
former guest workers from Mediterranean countries, but also includes migrants from 
Surinam, the Indonesian Moluccas and the Cape Verde Islands as well as 
acknowledged refugees. The Remigration Act offers those who wish to re-migrate to 
their country of origin the facilities with which to realise that desire. Under certain 
conditions, the Remigration Act offers two facilities: a basic provision (to cover costs 
of travel, moving and resettlement) and a remigration provision for those at least 45 
years of age (a monthly benefit dependent upon the composition of the family and the 
standard of living in the country of destination, health insurance and additional 
benefits). During the first year after return, participants have the right to return to the 
Netherlands. The Netherlands Migration Institute (NMI) offers practical assistance 
and guidance for prospective return migrants who intend to use the Dutch remigration 
facility137. In 2002, 509 migrants returned with a remigration provision, and 219 with 
only a basic provision. Of the total of 728 migrants, 289 returned with their 
partners138. 
 
Together with three other organisations (AGEF139), Caritas-Wien, The Göteborg 
Initiative), the NMI carried out a research project called Migration and Development 
Project (Migdev) in 2004 aimed at evaluating projects and practical lessons learned in 
the field of return migration and development. The project was funded by the 
European Refugee Fund, Oxfam Novib and the partner organisations. The report, 
which was published in March 2005, identified a number of success factors based on 
return migration experience in various post-conflict situations, in particular relating to 
the establishment of small businesses, the supply of labour and construction 
projects140.  
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The report stressed that migrants should be seen as a potential resource rather than as 
a problem. Their decision to return should not be prompted by the prospect of 
financial support, but by a genuine willingness to return and the capacity to be 
reintegrated. Voluntary return creates the best opportunities for success. Adequate 
supervision of return projects should be flexible and tailor-made in order to succeed, 
and substantial and continuous monitoring and cooperation of host and origin 
countries is necessary. This labour-intensive character will keep down the numbers of 
migrants. The report observed that it is difficult to determine the impact of return and 
business start-ups on development, as it cannot be verified by indicators. A more 
comprehensive and extended evaluation of the projects would be required. One 
commentary on the report stated: ‘creating the right conditions to promote sustainable 
development will have a greater effect than supporting individuals 141.’ 
 
 
Government views on diaspora involvement and remittances 
 
The 2004 policy memorandum recognises the contributions to development by 
migrants and their organisations in the Netherlands. However, no concrete measures 
to involve them in development cooperation are proposed apart from the intent to 
consult them on migration and development policies through the National Ethnic 
Minorities Consultative Committee (LOM), originally set up by the Dutch 
Government in 1997 to discuss its integration policies with interlocutors from the 
main immigrant and minority groups142. 
 
The memorandum also mentions a number of obstacles in building relationships 
between migrant organisations and development organisations:  
 
• Migrant organisations are often essentially interest groups that mainly support 
the members’ own families or districts, which is not always compatible with a 
development organisation’s broader approach;  
• Political analyses made by migrant organisations do not always match those 
made by development organisations;  
• A high degree of rivalry exists between the various migrant organisations.  
• There is a certain ambivalence regarding public authorities and the Dutch 
authorities in particular;  
• They do not always have expertise in development cooperation, and as a result 
their proposals often fail to qualify for support under existing programmes;  
• Development organisations are sometimes confronted with rivalry between 
migrant and partner organisations in countries of origin and migrant 
organisations. 
 
On the increased use of remittances for development purposes, the Dutch government 
holds the position that the money remitted by migrants is their own private wealth, 
and that ‘all governments can therefore do is create conditions in which remittances 
can be optimised and put to the best possible use in countries of origin’. In reducing 
transaction fees charged on remittances, the Dutch government primarily sees a role 
for the free market and strategic behaviour by consumers, and no role for the 
government. On the issue of the use of remittances for development purposes, the 
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government states that ‘migrants and migrant organisations are very reluctant to 
channel their own money through governmental or non-governmental development 
organisations143.’  
 
 
The AIV advisory report 
 
In June 2005, and at the request of the Minister for Development Cooperation in 
November 2003, the Migration and Development Cooperation Committee of the 
Dutch Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) issued an advisory report 
entitled Migration and Development Cooperation: Coherence Between Two Policy 
Areas 144. The report stated: ‘Measures to promote coherence between development 
cooperation and migration policy cannot be achieved by subordinating one policy area 
to the other’ and ‘it is not always possible to reconcile all the various interests at 
stake’145.  
 
Because of the complex, long-term and often contradictory linkages between 
migration and development, AIV suggested not to use instruments for development 
policy for migration policy or to make aid conditional on cooperation in restrictive 
immigration policies. Instead, it stated that development cooperation should focus on 
its primary goals of poverty reduction. This implies that immigrants in Netherlands 
from most important origin countries will be excluded, because they generally do not 
belong to the (low income) partner countries enjoying Dutch development 
cooperation.  
 
There exists a difference of opinion about the Dutch government’s policy 
memorandum and AIV advice with regard to the relationship between (return) 
migration and development policies146. Firstly, AIV advice voiced a strong hesitation 
to link forced return migration to development policies – which in addition to 
voluntary and temporary return is one of the main ways the government’s policy 
memorandum envisages putting migration and development policies into operation:  
 
‘One complicating factor is that returning asylum-seekers whose applications 
were rejected are not in the same starting position as migrants who have made 
a positive decision to build an economic future in their country of origin. One 
of the AIV’s conclusions is that return can be encouraged if returning migrants 
are given a safety net in the form of possible readmission to the Netherlands. 
Recent studies have failed to show whether return projects have any clear 
effect on development, apart from activities in the construction industry 147.’ 
 
Secondly, AIV also suggested promoting immigration from partner countries of 
Dutch development cooperation partly to encourage an efficient diaspora connection 
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so as to promote development in these countries. This is not in line with the Dutch 
government’s restrictive migration policies. AIV identified a number of policy 
measures that can increase the contribution of migrants to development. First of all, 
‘migrant organisations should be given more help in establishing consultative 
structures, and migrants themselves could be given specific support to set up and 
realise small development projects in their region of origin’. On remittances, the AIV 
report says: ‘Although migrants are free to decide what happens to the money they 
send home, this does not rule out measures to enhance the development effects of 
these remittances. Various financial services can be offered to migrants to persuade 
them to invest in the interests of development148.’ 
 
 
Practical initiatives to enhance migrant involvement 
 
The Dutch government has a positive stance regarding support to migrants and 
migrant organisations involved in development cooperation. Together with DfID (UK 
Department for International Development) it is among the most generous sponsors of 
conferences and workshops on this topic149. However, its point of departure is that the 
initiative should rest mainly with the migrants and migrant organisations themselves, 
as well as the decision as to how individual and collective remittances are to be used. 
Nevertheless, the Dutch government does indirectly (mainly through co-financing 
channels) support capacity building and encourages migrant and development 
organisations to continue seeking closer cooperation, so that migrant organisations 
can enhance their contribution to development150.  
 
 
IntEnt is the only larger programme funded by DGIS that is specifically directed at 
migrants151. It is a programme intended to help migrants set up small private 
businesses in countries of origin. For a further description, see section 3.6. However, 
there are various government-supported channels through which migrant and other 
organisations in the Netherlands can obtain advice and financial support for 
development-related activities in their countries of origin. As part of a major change 
of course of its policies implying an increased priority given to lowering the threshold 
between the civil society and official development world, as of 1998 DGIS started to 
actively target its policies at involving Dutch civil society in development 
cooperation.  
 
This stood in marked contrast to established, classical views among development 
professionals, who often tend to disdain particular development initiatives, and, in the 
same vein, frequently claim that migrants are not necessarily the best development 
actors. These views are based on the view that development cooperation is a 
profession and that ‘civilians’ – who are sometimes indicated as ‘hobbyists’ and 
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‘amateurs’152 – are not professionals and who, despite their good intentions, 
‘sometimes have no clue about what they bring about through offering aid’153. Despite 
significant resistance among development actors to recognise ‘civilians’ (migrant or 
not) as development actors, several initiatives have been set up by the Dutch 
government to try to increase involvement of all civilians, migrant or non-migrant.  
 
 
Front Offices and Linkis  
 
The Small-Scale Local Activities (KPA) programme, which was introduced in 1991 
and is currently implemented by NCDO (National Commission for international 
cooperation and Sustainable Development154), awards grants of up to 100,000  to top 
up (i.e., doubling) the proceeds of relatively small-scale fund-raising activities in the 
Netherlands for projects in developing countries. The programme’s budget has 
increased from the equivalent of 1.13 M in 1994 to 6.75 M in 2004. However, the 
DGIS estimates that at the moment too few migrant organisations make use of this 
programme155.  
 
Following the example of the KPA programme, and at the strong instigation of DGIS, 
NCDO and five CFAs (Oxfam Novib, Cordaid, ICCO, Hivos and Plan Nederland) 
established Front Offices in 2003, where Netherlands-based individuals and 
organisations (migrant or non-migrant) can apply for funding for small-scale 
development projects. The idea of establishing such Front Offices is to increase public 
support for development cooperation in the Netherlands and to facilitate the access of 
civilians to development finance. Each Front Office has the freedom to develop its 
own policy in terms of implementation and projects to be funded156.  
 
The Front Offices of the co-financing agencies, NCDO (National Commission for 
international cooperation and Sustainable Development) and the Netherlands Local 
Development Cooperation Centre (COS Nederland, a nationwide association of 
fifteen centres for international cooperation) participate in Linkis (Low-Threshold 
Initiatives & Contact and Information Centre for International Cooperation) initiative. 
It is basically an online facility (www.linkis.nl), which was launched in 2004 and 
aims at improving involvement of citizens and small organisations in the field of 
development cooperation157.  
 
Reflecting the policy priorities of DGIS, the aim of Linkis is to further lower the 
threshold between the Dutch civil society and the professional and often large-scale, 
complex and opaque ‘development world’. Its most crucial function is to inform and 
advise groups of citizens (including migrants and migrant organisations) on concrete 
opportunities to submit proposals for small-scale development projects (co-funding up 
to 50,000 ) with the Front Offices of the participating development agencies. 
Through filling in a brief on-line questionnaire on the main characteristics of the 
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intended project, the website guides proposers to the Front Offices of the development 
agencies that are likely to fund such projects. COS Nederland provides practical 
support to diaspora and other organisations in developing project proposals.  
 
Thus, Linkis is primarily a ‘digital counter’, showing citizens the ropes with regard to 
official development cooperation. Over a three-year period, more than 1,500 small-
scale projects have been funded by Dutch development agencies through the Front 
Offices. In following sections, we will see that these Front Offices have also enabled 
several Netherlands-based migrant organisations to realise development projects in 
countries of origin.  
 
 
 
Netherlands Financial Sector Development Exchange (NFX) 
 
Although DGIS officially sees few opportunities for government intervention 
regarding remittances, together with the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs DGIS has supported the creation of the Netherlands Financial 
Sector Development Exchange (NFX) in 2005158. This is a public-private partnership 
(with leading Dutch banks participating) for the development of the financial sector in 
developing countries, to improve transparency and competition and access to financial 
services through building local financial sector know-how. This is based on the idea 
that ‘a solid and well-functioning financial sector is a powerful engine behind 
economic growth in developing countries and emerging markets’. Remittances form 
one of the core areas of NFX’s activities, and the underlying assumption is that 
‘effective banks can channel international streams of private remittances for the 
benefit of higher production and investment. The financial sector therefore provides 
the rudiments for income-growth and job creation, and contributes to raising the 
standard of living 159.’  
 
 
Co-financing agencies 
 
Most Dutch CFAs and other development NGOs have developed policies that 
specifically target the involvement of migrants and migrant organisations in 
development cooperation, both within and outside the Front Offices and the Linkis 
framework, although this is not one of the priorities of DGIS. This can be explained 
by the relative freedom CFAs have within the co-financing framework, despite the 
fact that the lion’s share of their funding is provided by DGIS. This also explains the 
significant differences in the approach of the different CFAs towards migration and 
development in general and the involvement of migrants’ organisations in particular. 
The following sections will analyse the relevant policies of the main (though not all) 
Dutch development agencies. 
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3.2. Oxfam Novib  
 
Among the Dutch CFAs, Oxfam Novib traditionally represents the non-
denominational sector of the Dutch ‘pillarised’ society160. It was founded as Novib 
(Netherlands Organisation for International Assistance) in 1956. Novib joined Oxfam 
International in 1994. In 2006, it changed its name from Novib to Oxfam Novib to 
express the importance the organisation attaches to international cooperation in 
achieving its core missions of reducing global injustice and poverty. Oxfam Novib 
has its own constituency but also raises its own funds. It works together with the ten 
other members of Oxfam International, who collaborate with more than 3,000 local 
organisations.  
 
Oxfam Novib has a staff of 330 persons, and of its total budget of 148.2 M in 2004, 
73.3 percent originated from government subsidies (mostly co-financing money) and 
26.6 percent from own fundraising, such as the contributions of more than 333,000 
individuals among whom 159,000 donors. In 2004, Oxfam Novib transferred 122 M 
to its partner organisations in developing countries, who implement most of its 
programmes. Oxfam Novib works according to a rights-based approach, in which 
‘poverty’ is regarded as a lack of rights: ‘Due to a lack of basic rights, people that live 
in poverty do not have (sufficient) access to power, material resources and basic 
services. This leads to hunger, exclusion, exploitation, a lack of opportunities and 
inequality161.’ 
 
In the 1990s, Oxfam Novib set up the Novib Nederland Fonds (NNF), a ‘window’ 
where migrant organisations could apply for small funding to finance their activities 
such as conferences and seminars. These activities were mostly conducted to generate 
awareness among the Dutch public about the situation in migrants’ countries of 
origin. Since 1998, Oxfam Novib has become increasingly active in the migration and 
development field and began working actively with diaspora organisations. In 1998 
Oxfam Novib established the awareness-raising Arc Mundi project (Awareness 
Rising for Change – Multicultural Networks and Developments Initiatives) with a 
number of other organisations162. Arc Mundi aims at establishing an equal and 
durable cooperation and dialogue between organisations for development cooperation 
and self-organisations of migrants and refugees through information evenings, 
seminars and special training activities for refugees, migrants and journalists. The 
objective is to increase the number of diaspora organisations supporting small 
development projects in their countries of origin. In 1999, Oxfam Novib started to 
support ERCOF (Economic Resource Centre for Overseas Filipinos), a Filipino 
organisation that aims to enable Filipino migrants to utilise their remittances and 
human resources for more productive use and rural development in communities of 
origin.  
 
Serious internal debate on migration issues in relation to development started in 2001. 
Responding to the growing needs of diaspora organisations, such as those expressed 
in the Arc-Mundi framework, Oxfam Novib formulated a migrant policy in 2002 that 
would guide its work among diaspora organisations. This was a significant policy 
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shift, considering that Oxfam Novib as a development agency is supposed to channel 
its resources to developing countries. However, aided by the 2003 Global 
Development Finance report of the World Bank and the major International 
Conference on Migrant Remittances taking place in the same year163, there was 
growing recognition of positive migrant contributions to the development of their 
countries of origin.  
 
Oxfam Novib has been involved in the Inter-Agency Remittances Task Force, a 
policy platform on remittances that was designed by the World Bank, and in which 
DfID, CGAP (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor), IOM Geneva, IDB (Inter-
American Development Bank) and the IABD were also involved. The Task Force 
emerged from the major 2003 remittance conference in London, and aimed at 
improving remittance data and to coordinate the efforts of donors and international 
financial institutions toward improving remittance data and to develop remittance 
principles for regulators and the private sector. Based on its work with diaspora 
organisations, Oxfam Novib has participated in the consultative meetings in 
connection with the drafting of the EU Communication on Migration and 
Development164. Oxfam Novib also collaborates with other international organisations 
such as the IOM, the Inter-American Dialogue, the Asian Development Bank, and 
DfID. 
 
However, the emphasis of Oxfam Novib’s migration and development activities has 
not been on facilitating remittances, but on strengthening the involvement of diaspora 
organisations and their members in development cooperation. Oxfam Novib’s support 
to diaspora organisations concentrates on: 
 
• Strategic financing of small and large development projects of diaspora 
organisations; 
• Capacity building (project management, project cycle management, fund 
raising, lobbying, and so on); 
• Supporting alliance building with other NGOs;  
• Linking and learning/exchange visits’ 
• Organising expert meetings and conferences. 
 
Since 2003, Oxfam Novib has organised and sponsored expert meetings and 
workshops and has provided financial support for a range of conferences in and 
outside the Netherlands on this topic, including: 
 
• Expert meeting on Migration, globalisation and development, March 2003, the 
Netherlands165; 
• Conference Programs to Harness the Resources of Overseas Filipinos for the 
Development of Local Economies, July 2003, the Philippines166; 
• Expert meeting Bridging the gap: International migration and the role of 
migrants and their remittances in development, November 2004, the 
Netherlands167; 
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• Conference Remittances and Poverty Reduction in Africa, March 2006, the 
Netherlands. This conference was organized by African migrant organisations 
in the Netherlands168; 
• International conference The Impact of Remittances in Latin America: 
Microfinance as alternative channel for remittances, September 2005, 
Zacatecas, Mexico – the cradle of the innovative two-for-one and three-for-
one programmes that match funds for every dollar raised by Home Town 
Associations for approved public infrastructure projects in Mexico169. This 
conference included a field trip to the various projects of the Federación de 
Clubes Zacatecanos del Sur de California;  
• To stimulate exchange of ideas and experiences, Oxfam Novib co-organised 
four debates per year on topics related to migration and development attended 
by migrants and refugees. 
 
A diverse audience consisting of policy makers, migrants, diaspora organisations and 
academics generally attend these conferences and workshops gatherings. Oxfam 
Novib supports migrant and refugee associations in a variety of ways, mainly through 
the provision of capacity building and financial assistance to migrant organisations. 
Although this support may be linked to development projects that such organisations 
conduct in the country of origin, this is not necessarily the case. Oxfam Novib does 
not engage in activities targeted at facilitating the return of (rejected) asylum seekers. 
 
In concrete terms, support to diaspora organisations is mainly realised through Oxfam 
Novib’s Front Office, which is part of the broader Linkis initiative170. Linkis/Oxfam 
Novib was established in 2004 and is part of the Popular Campaigning bureau. The 
Linkis/Oxfam Novib fund supports development activities of smaller and bigger civil 
society organisations in the Netherlands of in developing countries. Such activities 
may relate to capacity building, public campaigns, fundraising and project finance. In 
2004, of a total number of 451 applications, Oxfam Novib agreed on 158 smaller 
projects representing 5.4 M of funding initiated by mostly relatively small 
organisations within the Linkis framework. Some 40 percent of all these cooperation 
projects concern diaspora organisations171.  
 
To ensure that migrants have access to funding, Oxfam Novib allocates at least 30 
percent of the total number of projects it receives annually to activities and projects of 
diaspora organisations in the Netherlands in their countries of origin. Linkis Oxfam 
Novib has an annual budget of 7 M for North-South Cooperation. Until 2006, 25 
small projects in the North, mainly in the Netherlands, have been funded; 36 small 
projects in the South (support ranging from 5,000 to 50,000 ); and five larger, 3-year 
projects (average 100,000 - 150,000 ), which will possibly be extended. 
Simultaneously, Oxfam Novib provides funding for small projects of diaspora 
organisations to support Netherlands-based lobbying and awareness campaigns to 
draw attention to development issues in their countries of origin. On average, 20 such 
projects are supported annually. Capacity building has a separate budget. 
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For instance, in 2004 Oxfam Novib provided 40,000  funding for a project by the 
Ethiopian migrant organisation Stichting Dir172 to establish an Ethiopian coffee house 
in Amsterdam. This will provide jobs for Ethiopian migrants in the Netherlands and 
for small Ethiopian farmers who produce ecologically grown coffee and for local 
workers who will process and pack the coffee. Oxfam Novib also collaborates with 
the Dutch head office of the transnational Somali migrant organisation Hirda (Himilo 
Relief and Development Association). They received over 100,000  and the 
collaboration with Hirda is regarded as a best practice example within Oxfam Novib. 
Hirda is an NGO established in 1998 by Somali refugees living in the Netherlands. 
With Oxfam Novib’s help Hirda runs projects to improve education in the Somali 
village of Bardhere in the Gedo region173. 
 
Oxfam Novib has increased its involvement in microfinance, including programmes 
that aim to channel migrant remittances for microfinance. A notable example is its 
support for Ercmove (Economic Resource Center for Migrants and Overseas 
Employees), an NGO aiming at, amongst other things, ‘harnessing the development 
potential of migration, by providing the means to foster the economic empowerment 
of migrants and overseas workers in the Netherlands that will enable them to 
contribute to the sustainable development of local communities in their countries of 
origin through innovative micro-finance and alternative investment schemes’174. In 
collaboration with Oxfam Novib and other funding bodies, Ercmove has conducted 
several projects in this field, such as Linking Organised Migrants in NL and NGO 
Partners in their Developing Countries of Origin through Microsavings and 
Investments towards Local Economic Development and Improved Standard of Living 
and a project aimed at promoting microsavings in The Netherlands and 
microinvestment in the Philippines175.  
 
Oxfam Novib also strives to establish long-term collaborations with diaspora 
organisations, and to contribute to capacity building through facilitating meetings, 
training, conferences and expert meetings, with a focus on enhancing migrant 
contribution to development in countries of origin while improving their position in 
the Netherlands. For instance, Oxfam Novib also supports Tiye International, a 
platform uniting ‘black, minority and refugee’ organisations, which aims at improving 
equal opportunities and societal participation of women with a migrant or refugee 
background as well as ‘improving interaction between women from the South living 
in the North with women in the South’176.  
 
Oxfam Novib also supported the formation migrant networks such as Multicultural 
Women Peacemakers, Migrant Women Initiatives in the Netherlands for 
Development (MIND), the Sudan Civil Society Forum and a network of Ethiopian 
diaspora organisations involved in development cooperation. Other organisations that 
have recently been supported by Oxfam Novib include: Management Development 
Foundation (an international management training and consultancy bureau, supported 
for capacity building among migrant organisations); Mama Cash (an NGO working 
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for women’s rights worldwide through supporting women’s groups177); and The 
Hague Process (an initiative to ‘develop concrete proposals for sustainable refugee 
and migration policies’178). 
  
In its strategic management plan 2007-2010, Oxfam Novib focuses on stimulating the 
social and political participation of migrant organisations. The main goal of such 
support is to strengthen migrant organisations and to advocate national and 
international recognition of their role. The objective is that by 2010 such support will 
have contributed to the establishment of international diaspora networks that are able 
to influence decision making on migration and development issues by development 
agencies, states and international organisations, and that are able to initiate 
development projects independently to exploit the development potential of migration 
and remittances.  
 
 
3.3. Cordaid  
 
Cordaid is a Dutch development NGO established in 1999 through a merger of three 
Catholic development organisations179 Except in the case of emergencies, Cordaid 
does not carry out its own project in developing countries, but works with over 1000 
local development organisations to implement its policies. Its total yearly income is 
175 M, two-thirds of which originate from the development budget of the Dutch 
ministry of development cooperation, and one quarter from own (donor) funding. 
With approximately 280 people working for Cordaid, its total budget for local 
organisations and projects in development countries amounts to approximately 150 
M.  
 
Cordaid’s involvement with diaspora organisations is relatively old, which can be 
attributed to the specific historical background of Memisa Medicus Mundi and 
Mensen in Nood, two of the three merger partners of Cordaid. These organisations 
were not part of the Dutch co-financing structure; historically they had more room to 
obtain funding for projects in the Netherlands or initiated by migrant organisations 
based in the Netherlands. The third merger partner, Bilance (the earlier Cebemo) 
depended almost entirely on co-financing, within which there was very limited room 
for such support. Nevertheless, since the 1980s Bilance has established some links 
with migrant organisations. This started off with Moluccan organisations, which gave 
small contributions to development programmes on the Moluccan island of Ambon in 
Indonesia180.  
 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, debate was renewed in the Netherlands on the role 
of the ‘new Dutch’ (immigrants and their descendants), and in particular whether they 
should have access to co-financing. At the time, Cebemo was approached by HIMOS 
(Hindoe- en Moslimorganisatie voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking) a mixed Hindu 
                                                          
177
 http://www.mamacash.nl  
178
 http://www.thehagueprocess.org/about/samenvatting.htm (accessed March 2006). 
179
 These organisations were Memisa Medicus Mundi, Mensen in Nood and Bilance, mainly with a 
background in the Catholic mission.  
180
 The Moluccans had an established tradition of remittances dating back to the colonial era – a 
tradition that they ‘exported’ to the Netherlands. Support for this organisation can be seen as an 
example of Linkis avant-la-lettre.  
 48 
(dominant) /Muslim development organisation created by Surinamese migrants. To 
facilitate its activities, HIMOS was given office space inside the Cordaid building, 
while retaining their separate organisational structure. Over the 1990s, HIMOS 
gradually broadened its scope of development activities beyond Surinam towards 
India and other countries; and it also appointed a Turkish collaborator.  
 
In the early 1990s, the ‘new Dutch’ became increasingly active, and complained about 
not having access to governmental development funding. This discontent was also 
voiced in the Arc Mundi project established by Oxfam Novib. The 1999 merger into 
Cordaid enabled a broadening of opportunities for building links with migrant 
organisations, because the two other merger partners had an established tradition of 
collaborating with Dutch-based organisations and also had substantial (approximately 
one-third) own funding. Upon the merger, all the HIMOS personnel were integrated 
into the Cordaid organisation. When DGIS started to support ‘civil society 
construction’ as part of a general change of policy course after 1998, more room was 
also created for Cordaid to support migrant network organisations. Since then, 
Cordaid has initiated a specific programme, Projecten Nederland Internationaal 
(Projects Netherlands International) supporting migrant networks in the Netherlands 
that are involved in stimulating development in countries of origin.  
 
Such network organisations generally emerged from previous cooperation between 
migrant organisations with a similar ethnic or religious background working together 
in giving humanitarian and development aid. Cordaid does not directly support 
development projects, but rather aims to strengthen migrant network organisations, 
which in turn support local organisations in developing countries. Through providing 
financial support and capacity building, the Projecten Nederland Internationaal 
programme aims to contribute to the growth of these migrant network organisations 
into professional development organisations. The stated objective is that, in this way, 
‘the migrant networks can themselves concretely contribute to durable poverty 
reduction’. In 2004, 21 projects were approved, representing a total budget of 
1,294,000 181. 
 
Network organisations that have been supported by Cordaid include: 
 
• The Seva network, which presents itself as an international organisation, 
inspired by Hindu values, for development cooperation182. Its development 
projects aim at fighting poverty and promoting the socio-economic 
emancipation of populations in India, Nepal and countries of the Indian 
diaspora such as Surinam, Guyana and Mauritius. It was initiated by people 
who were formerly active in HIMOS, and the first diaspora organisation 
supported by Cordaid. It is also the first Dutch migrant organisation that 
acquired the TMF (Thematic Co-Financing) status of DGIS, through which 
Seva now receives a TMF subsidy for civil society organisations involved in 
development cooperation, heralding its transformation from migrant to 
professional development NGO; 
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• The Africa network, which also originated from Himos. It groups about 28 
African organisations including some ‘White’ organisations working in Africa 
or with Africans183; 
• The Selam network, which also originated from Himos, and is a development 
organisation based on moderate Muslim values. It was initially oriented on 
Turkey, but is now also broadening its development activities towards other 
(predominantly Muslim) countries184; 
• SMHO (Cooperating Muslim Aid Organisations), which was a branch that 
split off from Selam185;  
• SMS (Global Society Foundation), which was an initiative of three refugee 
organisations but now counts 150 refugee organisations. It is not a genuine 
network organisation, as its activities focus on provision of training of refugee, 
migrant and other organisations in development cooperation186. It also receives 
European funds to train diaspora organisations so that they are more able to 
understand the workings of European institutions; 
• The Morocco network; the 2004 earthquake in the Moroccan Rif incited the 
emergency aid department of Cordaid to urge Moroccans to donate money. 
The ensuing collaboration with Moroccan organisations led to the formation of 
a Morocco network. In November 2005 they followed their first training with 
SMS on development aid; 
• A ‘meta-work’; in 2004 the MOS (Consultative Development Cooperation 
Body for Migrants was established, and is a meta-network of migrant and 
refugee organisations working on migration and development187. 
 
Cordaid supports these migrant networks, which are already working with local 
associations in the countries of origin, with funds and capacity building through its 
‘projecten Nederland international’.  
 
The Particulier Initiatief Fund (Private Initiative Fund, PIF) is Cordaid’s Linkis Front 
Office, which was established in 2004, at which time it received 500 funding 
applications for small projects, of which 225 were approved, and 70 under review at 
the end of that year188. Funding is based on doubling the own funding up to a 
maximum of 12,500  per project. It is not known what proportion of the approved 
projects was initiated by migrant organisations, but the proportion is substantial. 
 
Cordaid has also supported SSR (Stichting Steun Remigranten), a foundation 
established in 1989 by the council of churches in the Netherlands, which aims to 
assist migrants who return to Morocco. SSR operates a support office in the town of 
Berkane in north Morocco, in the main areas of origin of ‘Moroccan Dutch’. This 
office is managed by two social-juridical counsellors who give practical support to the 
returnees with the manifold juridical and administrative problems they tend to 
encounter on issues like the payment of allowances from the Dutch government, tax 
policy, divorce and guardianship. As well as providing individual assistance, SSR 
supports local development NGOs and women’s organisations in this region and has 
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attempted to establish a regional network of NGOs working in the field of 
development. They also encourage returnees to organise themselves and to participate 
in the social and educational activities of local NGOs. The local organisation of 
returnees, El Fath, is equally supported by SSR189. SSR is one of the few examples of 
effective post-return support, which has proven its value against relatively low costs, 
and which is highly appreciated by Moroccan return migrants, who, once returned, 
often feel let down by Dutch institutions.  
 
Cordaid also offers support to the assisted return of rejected asylum seekers through 
the Bureau Maatwerk bij Terugkeer (Individual Return Assistance Agency), which 
was established in 2001 and is now supported financially by the DGIS programme 
Return, Migration and Development (TMO)190. In 2004, mediation was provided to 
109 people as they returned to their countries of origin, and assistance was given to 29 
people outside the context of return proceedings. Within this framework, Cordaid 
cooperates with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the Dutch 
Central Missions Commission (CMC).  
 
 
3.4. Hivos  
 
A CFA guided by humanist values, Hivos was established in 1968. Its most important 
activity consists in providing financial and political support for local NGOs. Ninety 
percent of its budget is provided by DGIS co-financing. In 2004, expenditures went 
primarily to Civil Society Building (41%) and Direct Poverty Alleviation (29%). 
Africa is the region to receive the largest portion of Hivos support; 32.3 M went to 
the sector Sustainable Economic Development; nearly 12 M to Human Rights and 
8.6 M to Gender, Women and Development. A total of approximately 137 people are 
employed by Hivos191.  
 
Hivos does not have a specific programme for migration and development, although 
migrant organisations can and do apply for funding through Linkis. Part of the annual 
Linkis budget (approximately 100,000 ), called the diversity fund, is earmarked for 
the support of development initiatives of migrant organisation. Most of the funding 
requests received through Linkis focus on sub-Saharan Africa. Several funded 
projects are said to suffer from a lack of focus and expertise, and better counselling 
and training could improve the success rate. Nevertheless, there are also successful 
examples, such as the project based on an Argentinean architect’s proposal to recycle 
waste. There have been internal discussions on whether to recruit personnel with a 
specifically migrant background. They have now been abandoned, partly because 
most of the countries targeted by Hivos do not correspond to the most important 
countries of origin of migrants living in the Netherlands. Since 2004, Hivos has also 
contributed to IntEnt (approximately 100,000  in 2006), an NGO assisting migrants 
who wish to set up an enterprise in their country of origin192.  
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3.5. NCDO  
 
The NCDO (National Committee for International Cooperation and Sustainable 
Development) is a foundation that focuses on raising public awareness about and 
support for international development cooperation in the Netherlands. NCDO 
develops its own activities and funds activities initiated by others. The NCDO also 
organises debates and events but it mainly provides funding. Although its yearly 
budget 30 M (2005) is almost entirely funded by DGIS, NCDO is independent of the 
government. It is also free to work in all developing (ODA/DAC) countries, and 
therefore does not have to restrict its activities to the target countries of official Dutch 
development cooperation. Thus the relative freedom it enjoys even in comparison to 
the CFAs enabled NCDO (similar to two of the three merger partners of Cordaid193) 
to support several development-oriented diaspora organisations well before the Front 
Offices were established.  
 
NCDO has played a key role in putting the issue of migration and development on the 
Dutch development policy agenda and in network building between diaspora 
organisations and development actors. It accomplished this by organising two major 
conferences in 2004 and 2005, which were attended by major stakeholders (migrants, 
development NGOs, policy makers, and academics)194. 
 
As was mentioned in section 3.1.3, the Small-Scale Local Activities (KPA) 
programme was introduced in 1991 and is currently carried out by NCDO, awards 
grants of up to 100,000  to top up (i.e., doubling) the proceeds of privately initiated 
fund-raising activities in the Netherlands for projects in developing countries. The 
Matra/KPA programme supports in particular small-scale projects in Central and 
Eastern Europe, but also in Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Turkey, Morocco and 
Jordan, aimed at stimulating political change and supporting civil organisations. 
 
The NCDO Front Office and also the KPA programme contribute to projects in 
developing countries that are not eligible for a subsidy from any of the other financing 
NCDO programmes. For migration and development policies, this has the advantage 
that it can also fund projects initiated by migrant from countries such as Turkey and 
Morocco, major source countries for Dutch immigration that are not on DGIS’s target 
countries list. A particular condition for funding is that projects have to stimulate the 
debate about international cooperation and provide information in the Netherlands 
about the project in order to increase public support for development cooperation.  
 
Both KPA and the NCDO Front Office encourage migrants and refugee initiatives 
that focus on the development of their countries of origin. However, as has been said 
earlier, relatively few migrant organisations make use of these and other NCDO 
programmes, which recently led to increased efforts by NCDO to involve migrants in 
its activities. NCDO’s aim that at least 10 percent of the project proposals should be 
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submitted by diaspora organisations was achieved in 2005. In that year a group of 
‘Moroccan Dutch’ established the Foundation Marokko Fonds (Morocco Fund) 
through NCDO’s support. The fund aims to support development projects in Morocco 
and to increase the involvement of migrants of Moroccan origin in such activities.  
 
 
3.6. IntEnt  
 
IntEnt195 is an NGO that was established196 in 1996 as a sequel to the Dutch SEON 
programme, which aims to assist migrant entrepreneurs to set up a business in the 
Netherlands. Both programmes were initiatives of FACET BV197, an SME 
Consultancy and Implementation Company working primarily in developing 
countries. It was a response to the growing number of successful migrant 
entrepreneurs operating in the Netherlands wishing to start a business in their country 
of origin, but who faced difficult access to information, financial facilities and 
specialised services.  
 
In the first years, the Dutch government was the sole financier. Since 2002, IntEnt has 
received additional funding, such as from the EU for its Morocco programme. In 2004 
a partnership agreement was signed between IntEnt, HIVOS (one of the CFAs) and 
DGIS on funding until the end of 2007. Between 1997 and 2000 the programme 
focused on Ghana, Surinam, Morocco and Turkey, but through additional funding 
IntEnt has been able to extent its business development services to migrants who wish 
to start a business in the Netherlands Antilles (Curaçao), Afghanistan, Ethiopia and 
Burundi.  
 
IntEnt implements a SME promotion programmes focused on ‘bridging two worlds’. 
It focuses mainly on the establishment phase, and there is a cut-off point in the 
programme at the moment the businesses are operational. IntEnt stresses that it does 
not focus on return migration, but on circular migration and reaping the advantages of 
simultaneously living in and having experience in two countries. The programme 
emphasises the personal responsibility of the entrepreneurs, who are expected to 
finance most of their enterprise with their own funds. However, the programme 
provides possibilities to obtain additional external financing from a bank in the 
country of origin, in most cases with a supplementary guarantee from IntEnt198. 
 
Prospective migrant entrepreneurs can receive support from IntEnt, which comprises 
assistance from the orientation until the actual start of the business and the first period 
of operations. If accepted, they enter the IntEnt programme, consisting of four phases: 
(1) Promotion and publicity phase; (2) preparatory phase; (3) starting (financing) 
phase; and (4) implementation phase. In the IntEnt Information and Entrepreneur 
Centre clients can make use of a wide range of facilities to collect market data, which 
can also be used to prepare and finalise the business plan. IntEnt applies the ‘tilted 
funnel‘ concept: over a period of time people who have registered and requested 
assistance gradually drop out. Hence, only the entrepreneurs with sufficient 
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motivation and promising projects complete the entire process. Many interrupt the 
preparations during the process199.  
 
Since its programme became truly operational in 2000 until end 2005, about 4,666 
persons contacted IntEnt for information. Of the 1071 persons that were admitted to 
the programme, 163 had their business plan approved and 154 actually started their 
business, of which 13 were abandoned after being set up. The total investment made 
possible by IntEnt clients amounts to 11.2 M for 179 businesses started since 2000. 
The average investment per client was 62.694  in 2005. The total amount of 
guarantees approved (net value) amounted to 1.4 M by the end of December 2005 
for 98 clients, with an average commitment of 14.398  in 2005. The lion’s share (1.2 
M) of its 1.4 M budget (2004) is funded by DGIS200.  
 
In her study on the developmental impact of Ghanaian migrants’ business enterprises 
in Ghana, Casini201 acknowledged that the support provided by an organisation like 
IntEnt, such as access to credit and capacity building, is useful and often necessary for 
starting enterprises. However, she saw room for improvement, particularly to 
concentrate not only on the financial side of business but to take more readily into 
account the social constraints in developing and implementing business plans. For 
instance, she observed that the pressure by family and friends to share resources can 
undermine the success of business initiatives. IntEnt has also recently started to 
establish local IntEnt representations in Surinam, Morocco and, at a later stage, 
Ghana. Recently, the French AFD (French Development Agency) has expressed 
interest in the IntEnt approach. 
 
In 2005, IntEnt developed www.geldnaarhuis.nl (Money [to] Home), a website where 
the public can perform online comparisons on costs of remitting money to Morocco, 
Turkey, Somalia, Ghana, Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles. This website was 
established after a study it commissioned together with NCDO revealed the low 
transparency and high transaction costs of the Dutch remittance market202. The 
initiative is similar to and seems strongly inspired by DfID’s 
www.sendmoneyhome.org website in the UK203. 
 
Particularly relevant for the active involvement of migrants, IntEnt has recently 
supported the establishment of the Promio (Professionalisation of Migrant 
Organisations) programme so as to strengthen the institutional and organizational 
capacity of migrant organisations. The idea is that this will help them to become 
professional and independent ‘service providers’, able to implement (development) 
projects, to develop training programmes or to do consulting.  
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3.7. Other development agencies  
 
ICCO is an independent CFA that was founded more than forty years ago by Dutch 
Protestant churches. ICCO sees itself primarily as a financing organisation and does 
not post people abroad or implement their own projects. It has a few small field 
offices. Its turnover in 2005 was 138 M and it works with 885 partner organisations 
in 50 countries. Around 2003 ICCO started developing a policy on migration and 
development, not only in developing countries but also in the Netherlands. Like other 
CFAs, ICCO has established a Front Office (called Front Desk) for small projects. 
With an annual budget of 2 M, in 2005 ICCO supported 97 organisations in the 
Netherlands with a total amount of almost 2 M. There is no criterion stipulating that 
a certain proportion of approved projects should be initiated by migrant organisations. 
In the framework of the ‘inter-religious dialogue’ ICCO supports small migrant-
churches (Co-operating Churches in the Netherlands). ICCO also explores 
possibilities to involve migrants and migrant organisations in supporting partner-
organisations in countries of origin and in conducting development projects in 
countries of origin. 
 
Oikos is the Ecumenical Institute for Church and Developmental Cooperation 
supported by various churches. It does not provide funds, but supports activities in the 
Netherlands that contribute to a ‘worldwide just and sustainable development’, 
including research, lobbying, education and campaigns204. Oikos has also developed 
some activities around the topic of migration and development, for which a total 
budget of 50,000  is allocated. Since 2003, Oikos organises in collaboration with 
Cordaid and SMS an annual Ideas Competition for development projects proposed by 
migrants. The three winners receive cash prizes of 10,500 , 7500  and 5000 , 
respectively, to be spent on a development project205. The ideas competition is 
generally evaluated as positive, but the organisation’s experience is that more training 
is required to improve the capacity of the proposers to convert their ideas into 
concrete propositions. In September 2004 Oikos organised an expert meeting on 
remittances206, and in 2005 it published a booklet, To Make a Difference, describing 
practical cases of migrants who had succeeded in contributing to development in their 
countries of origin. Oikos has also organised expert meetings and has dealt with 
remittances and other migration-related issues.  
 

3.8. Conclusion 
 
After a long period of scepticism and neglect since the failure of the REMPLOD 
projects in the 1970s, the internationally increased interest in the topic of migration 
and remittances has had a huge impact on development actors in the Netherlands. In 
its official policies, and notably according to its 2004 policy memorandum, the Dutch 
government is focusing on stimulating temporary and return migration in order to 
harmonise migration and development agendas, although the development agenda 
seems somehow subordinate to the migration agenda. However, there is considerable 
discrepancy between this official policy discourse and the practice in which diaspora 
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organisations and migrant-led development initiatives are indirectly supported by 
Dutch co-financing government funds for development cooperation. Although DGIS 
does not see a specific place for facilitating or influencing remittance flows, it does in 
practice support remittance policies through NFX. It also supports migrant 
entrepreneurship in countries of origin through funding IntEnt.  
 
Perhaps the most innovative element of the Dutch policies is the establishment of the 
KPA, Front Offices and the Linkis programmes. These have significantly increased 
the access of private or civic development initiatives to government funding. This has 
been part of the new policies that DGIS has pursued since 1998 to lower the threshold 
between the professional development world and the Dutch civil society. Although 
this paradigm shift in Dutch development policies was not inspired by a specific 
concern about the issue of migration and development – which in 1998 was still 
entirely out of sight – a positive side-effect has been that also migrants and their 
organisations can now access development funding through such programmes. In 
addition, the specific, decentralised features of the Dutch co-financing structure 
through which the new policies have been implemented have also played a certain 
favourable role in promoting cooperation with migrant organisations.  
 
Because the Dutch development agencies have considerable leeway in implementing 
their policies, significant differences exist between the different development NGOs 
with regard to their migration and development policies. Besides NCDO, Oxfam 
Novib and Cordaid have been most active in this field, and specifically encourage 
migrant organisations to apply for small-scale funding through their Front Offices, not 
only for project funding but also to support their professionalisation.  
 
Both organisations claim to have somewhat different policies, with Cordaid 
emphasising support to (independent) migrant networks and Oxfam Novib stressing 
capacity building to stimulate migrants’ own advocacy. Although there is probably an 
element of truth in this, in practice the differences are sometimes less than in theory. 
Several organisations, in fact, organisations such as Hirda and Dir, are supported by 
Oxfam Novib and Cordaid as well as by NCDO. A significant difference is that 
Cordaid supports programmes linked to return migration, from which Oxfam Novib 
abstains. Due to the specific background of two of its three merger partners, Cordaid 
has the longest involvement with diaspora organisations. The case of the Seva 
network points to the importance of continuity of support: Only through consistent 
support over a longer period can we expect experience to mature and collaboration to 
flourish. 
 
A recent external evaluation of the Linkis programme concluded that they have 
generally been successful. However, it also observed that several obstacles remain: 
Most people who successfully apply are already familiar with development 
cooperation to a certain extent, while many ‘outsiders’ are not even aware of Linkis. 
Hence there is room for improved transparency and internal coordination between 
Front Offices and training, and assistance to applicants can be improved. 
Interestingly, it was observed that the instant success of Linkis leads to rapid budget 
depletion, increased competition of limited resources and a professionalisation of 
applicants, which eventually risks limiting the accessibility of the programme. 
Therefore, the whole endeavour can be undermined by its own success. For that 
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reason, a recent evaluation recommended to increasing the Linkis budget. This 
evaluation also stressed the importance of continuity of support to organisations207.  
 
The total funding allocated to the Front Office is small compared to the total project 
funding available among Dutch development NGOs. There is general agreement that 
what applies for ‘outsider’ organisations in general applies even more for migrant 
organisations208. Migrant organisations have had even more difficulties in gaining 
access to the Front Office209, partly through a lack of information about and 
awareness of the existence of the Front Offices.  
 
Unfortunately, there is little independent information on the success of the initiatives 
by CFAs (in particular Oxfam Novib and Cordaid) to support diaspora network 
organisations. Nor are external evaluations of development projects initiated by 
diaspora organisations available to the public yet. This makes it difficult to judge the 
success of such projects, the major problems encountered, and the lessons learned as 
well as to critically assess the extent to which diaspora involvement has an added 
value.  
 
One study showed that migrant and refugee organisations still find it difficult to gain a 
clear overview of the complex regulations and conditions for submitting a proposal, 
but this was before the Linkis and Front Offices were launched210. For Novib and 
Cordaid this has been a reason to specifically encourage the involvement of migrant 
organisations. Some oppose too much positive action and take the position that no 
distinction should be made between migrant and non-migrant applications and that 
such an attitude is in fact patronising towards migrants. As one respondent working 
for a Dutch development agency said:  
 
‘My scenario of worst practice would be a too narrow focus on obtaining more 
[funding] requests by migrants: Then they will remain a target group that, in 
the worst case, will lead to drop out in the longer term. I favour initiatives by 
development NGOs to support migrant organisations. However, development 
NGOs tend to become patronising rather quickly and that is 
counterproductive. People have to be addressed on the basis of their own 
qualifications and that is why I oppose the argument that migrant are not 
necessarily the best development workers. This is often raised in debates by 
White organisations, but in the perspective of what migrants are already doing 
[in development] and in the perspective of their strengths this is somehow a 
non-debate.’ 
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A certain paradox arises between, on the one hand, the wish among development 
NGOs to financially support migrant organisations to strengthen their involvement in 
development cooperation, and on the other hand, their aim to strive for the ultimate 
independence of such organisations. This paradox was illustrated by another 
respondent, who stated:  
 
‘In some sense, we create our own competitors in the development field, and 
the ultimate goal is that they make us superfluous.’  
 
For migrant organisations, a similar dilemma exists between remaining independent 
but lacking funds or gaining access to funding at the ‘risk’ of being ‘incorporated’ and 
losing a significant degree of independence. By ‘becoming’ professional development 
organisations, they might also lose some of their unique features as independent 
migrant organisations. Significant suspicion remains among migrants about why, after 
decades of neglect, governments and development NGOs are suddenly so interested in 
‘them’. In fact, several established, development-oriented – for instance, Turkish – 
migrant organisations have been remarkably underrepresented at Dutch ‘migration 
and development’ conferences and in other activities. It is unclear to what extent this 
reflects ignorance or intentional refusal to be ‘incorporated’. There seems to be 
disagreement on this point both within migrant organisations and development NGOs. 
In any case, it indicates that development actors should be aware of the risks of 
adopting a patronising stance in trying to involve or to sustain diaspora groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 
United Kingdom  
 
 
4.1. National policies  
 
From an early stage, even before migration and development was placed on the global 
development agenda, the UK Department for International Development (DfID) has 
been active in the field of migration and development. DfID has a migration team in 
their Policy Division, and has played a leading role in knowledge formation on the 
issue of migration and development policies through organising and funding 
conferences and through commissioning and funding research211.  
 
There is now a wealth of DfID-sponsored studies on migration and development 
issues. A particular characteristic of these studies is that they go ‘beyond remittances’ 
and cover a broad range of issues, including diaspora involvement in the development 
of sending countries212. Moreover, DfID provides funding for the Development 
Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty at the University of Sussex, 
which focuses in particular on the interactions between livelihoods, inequality and 
poverty in sending societies213. Together with the World Bank and International 
Migration Policy Programme (IMP) it organised the first major international 
conference on Migrant Remittances in October 2003214. Along with the Netherlands 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and IOM, the UK government organised the intersessional 
workshop on migration and development cooperation in Geneva in February 2005215. 
DfID also instigated and funded the South Asia Migration Resource Network216.  
 
In contrast to several other European countries, British development NGOs such as 
Oxfam, Save the children, Action Aid, World Vision, Cafod, Christian Aid and 
Care217 have not developed specific policies towards migration and development or 
the involvement of diaspora organisations in their activities.  
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Remittances 
 
The UK has played a leading role not only in designing but also in actually 
implementing policies to facilitate remittances. This priority is based on the 
conviction that particularly in this area there is a high degree of coherence between 
economic (financial markets) and development policies. According to DfID, 
stimulating remittances fits in with its main objective of poverty reduction, and a 
‘win-win’ situation can thus be easily created: ‘Remittances are a fast and effective 
way of shifting resources to the developing world, thus giving the means for poverty 
reduction and sustainable development’, while ‘From a private sector point of view, 
increasing the value of remittances will increase the size of the market218.’  
 
Although the financial sector team at DfID has aimed at improving the developmental 
impact of remittances, this has in practice been mainly implemented through 
remittance facilitating policies, which concentrate on increasing volumes and speed 
and reducing costs, but are not related to impacts per se. With regard to remittances, 
DfID’s priorities are  
 
‘to improve access, transparency and choice for remittance senders and 
recipients, with lower costs and greater security. Remittances can therefore 
have an even greater impact on people on low incomes, and can better assist 
them to improve their livelihoods and take advantage of opportunities. DfID 
also sees remittances as a key means of reducing financial exclusion 219.’ 
 
Practically, DfID thinks to facilitate remittances through sharing international best 
practice, technological innovation such as the use of mobile phones for banking 
purposes, helping governments develop financial regulatory frameworks and policies 
that improve the operation of financial markets, and helping to build a domestic 
financial infrastructure in developing countries while providing access to financial 
services to the unbanked poor220.  
 
The flagship initiative of DfID’s recent remittance activities is the Sending Money 
Home? programme, comprising the website www.sendmoneyhome.org, country-
specific leaflets for diaspora communities in the UK and a market survey report. The 
objective is to increase transparency of the UK remittance market through providing a 
central information platform, where the terms of money transfer services are clearly 
presented. A consumer section on the website was established which allows 
customers to compare money transfer providers on the basis of cost and speed. The 
initiative is widely regarded as a success, as is demonstrated by the high website 
usage statistics and high national and international press coverage and the fact that the 
example has already been copied abroad through the recent creation of a similar 
website in the Netherlands. Not only individuals but also organisation such as the UN, 
EU, World Bank, US Government Accountability Office, central banks, NGOs and 
providers of money transfer services regularly use the site. Moreover, DfID’s country 
offices in Rwanda, Jamaica, Ethiopia, Kenya, Ukraine, India and South Africa have 
all signed contracts to add their countries to the initiative, and negotiations with other 
countries are underway.  
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Furthermore, Remittance Country Partnerships have been concluded with the 
governments of Ghana, Nigeria and Bangladesh and designed with Nigeria and 
Pakistan. Such partnerships include a range of measures to remove impediments to 
remittance flows, to improve access to remittances and ‘other financial services and to 
strengthen the capacity of the financial sector to provide efficient and widespread 
transfer payment services’221. The financial sector team at DfID has also recently 
started working with DfID Pakistan on a financial sector access programme with a 
remittances (post earthquake) component. DfID has also participated in the Inter-
Agency Remittances Task Force, which emerged from the major remittances 
conference in London in October 2003222, and in which Oxfam Novib has also been 
involved and has contributed to data collection.  
 
DfID is also involved in the Remittances Principles Task Force, led by the Bank for 
International Settlements and the World Bank. This task force was set up to develop 
principles for countries who want to improve the market for remittance transfers and 
bring down the price of these transfers. The principles cover the following areas: the 
market environment, transparency and consumer protection, payment system 
infrastructure, the role of remittances services providers, and the role of public 
authorities.  
 
Based on the notion that ‘the private sector holds the key to improved access and 
lower costs’, DfID initiated a high level dialogue in June 2004 with banks, money 
transfer companies and other ‘stakeholders’ on ways to reduce costs and improve 
access to low-income senders and recipients. This has led to the formation of the UK 
Remittances Working Group, in which leading banks and money transfer companies 
have worked with the government (notably DfID and the Treasury) to improve 
remittance services to developing countries from the UK. The group released a report 
into the £2.7 billion UK remittance market in November 2005. The report provided 
orientations to increase the flow of (regulated) remittances to developing countries 
from the UK through making remittance cheaper, quicker and easier. The report 
particularly recommended the creation of a private sector task force to draw together 
research, information and discussion from the industry and to deliver increased 
competition and choice for consumers223. The working group also supports a new 
association for small money transfer providers in the UK.  
 
 
4.2. Beyond remittances: Connections for Development 
 
The 1997 White Paper on International Development, Eliminating World Poverty 
committed DfID to ‘build on the skills and talents of migrants and other members of 
ethnic minorities within the UK to promote the development of their countries of 
origin’224. However, in contrast to remittances, it has proved much more difficult to 
put this policy objective into practice. Subsequently, DfID created the Development 
Awareness Working Group (DWAG) to advise the government on its development 
awareness, education, and information work in relation to international development 
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issues. Between 1999 and 2000, a number of participants from the DWAG formed a 
black and ethnic minority (BME) sub-group, ensuing from the concern that, despite 
the 1997 White Paper commitment, little had in fact issued from DfID in terms of 
practical steps towards engaging BME groups interested in and supportive of 
international development225. Prior to publication of the second White Paper on 
international development in 2000, the African Foundation for Development 
(AFFORD) submitted a position paper stressing the relevance of diasporas for 
development in countries of origin226.  
 
DfID subsequently commissioned a study to increase understanding of the UK’s black 
and ethnic minority (BME) civil society. In 2001, the report Getting it Right 
Together: Black and Minority Ethnic Groups and DfID’s Development Agenda were 
published, which identified the need to increase the capacity of the BME community 
organisations to engage with DfID in policy development, implementation and 
promoting institutional diversity internally. One of the report’s observations was that 
only a very small percentage of the 6,000 to 15,000 BME organisations define 
themselves as oriented towards international development. However, it also 
concluded that many such organisations are unaware of DfID and its goals, while at 
the same time ‘DfID does not have a feel for the sector and its works’227. 
 
DfID’s perceived lack of success in engaging non-traditional development partners 
such as BME groups was the basis of a decision to explore the potential for a Strategic 
Grant Agreement (SGA) with the BME civil society. This led to the DfID-supported 
formation of Connections for Development (CfD), a network of BME voluntary and 
community organisations that aim to mobilise UK BME civil society for action on 
development. In April 2003 DfID concluded a three-year Strategic Grant Agreement 
(SGA) with CfD worth £750,000 (£250,000 per year). DfID sees the SGA as a tool to 
raise awareness within BME organisations of international development issues and to 
build their ability to plan and deliver effective activities contributing to poverty 
reduction. Activities are based around raising awareness in the UK and building the 
capacity of BME groups to become more actively involved in international 
development. However, the SGA has a UK focus and does not provide funding for 
projects in the South. 
 
The activities within the SGA include: 
 
• bringing together diverse segments of UK diaspora groups, providing 
leadership and enabling debate, shared learning and collaboration for action 
around international development issues; 
• facilitating engagement with DfID and other key international players to help 
proactive engagement on international development issues throughout UK 
diaspora groups via the networks; 
• facilitating engagement of UK diaspora groups into different policy areas of 
international development across the UK. 
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CfD’s main information and networking vehicle is its website 
www.cfdnetwork.co.uk. CfD’s aim is not to undertake international development 
projects, but to help its BME members to become actively involved in development 
through establishing a network, undertaking research, informing about all aspects of 
development, lobbying for BME participation in policy making and through 
supporting its membership members and connecting them to training and funding 
agencies. Currently, CfD is undertaking research to map BME voluntary sector 
groups across the UK and their involvement in international development. Now, in 
2006, the SGA with CfD has been extended to March 31, 2007. No formal evaluation 
of CfD has taken place. DfID has involved diaspora organisations in the development 
of a number of Country Action Plans (Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria, India), and has 
actively consulted African diaspora organisations as part of the Commission for 
Africa process.  
 
In June 2004, the House of Commons International Development Committee 
presented its report Migration and development: How to make development work for 
poverty reduction. The report reiterated earlier statements from the 1997 White Paper 
that ‘The diaspora and its members can be important agents of development. 
Governments have much to learn from a deeper engagement with the diaspora, its 
members and constituent organisations. The diaspora should be involved in 
discussions on development strategies, voluntary remittances and sustainable 
return228.’  
 
DfID’s migration team provided funding to support an annual meeting of 
AfricaRecruit www.africarecruit.com. This is an initiative launched in 2002 as a 
mobilisation programme of The New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD), The Commonwealth Secretariat and the Commonwealth Business Council. 
AfricaRecruit facilitates the African diaspora towards capacity building in Africa 
either through skills or investment in areas such as remittances. It provides links to 
www.findajobinafrica.com and the IOM’s MIDA programme. 
 
However, despite the wealth of studies and policy papers stressing the desirability to 
support the transfer of skills, knowledge, experience and other resources from migrant 
communities to their countries of origin, this has, apart from the establishment of 
CfD, yielded limited practical results, thus scarcely meeting the expectations raised in 
the 1997 White Paper229.  
 
In principle, work through the SGA with CfD runs parallel to work that other sections 
of DfID might do with BME groups. This means that work through the SGA does not 
exclude BME organisations applying for other DfID funding schemes, notably the 
Civil Society Challenge Fund (CSCF). However, relatively few BME organisations 
have found their way to fundraising from such funds. The Civil Society Challenge 
Fund (CSCF), which was established in April 2000 and has a budget of £19.6 M, is 
open for applications from civil society organisations in the UK. As the Getting it 
right together report observed, the CSCF was set up ‘to encourage grass roots groups 
but applications demand a lot of systems and procedures of accountability’230; this is 
quite similar to the reasons the Dutch DGIS set up Linkis. The same report noted from 
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the total of 742 applications for the CSCF that were submitted between April 2000 
and the time of reporting only 19 were from BME groups, and of the 146 accepted 
applications only one was from a BME group. Equally, no BME groups were among 
the 11 recipients of the £49.6 M Partnership Programme Agreement (PPA) funding, 
and only 15 of 293 applications and 3 of 79 approved projects for the £6.5 M 
Development Awareness Fund (DAF) were from BME groups231. Six years later, this 
situation does not seem to have drastically changed.  
 
DfID commissioned a number of studies to look at what other steps could be taken to 
further engage the diaspora. One study on the role of the diaspora in poverty reduction 
in countries of origin recommended that donors ‘should invest heavily in a stronger 
knowledge base for policy making through research, analysis and rigorous evaluation 
of diaspora involvement in development and its impact on poverty’ as well as 
recognize ‘that successful diaspora projects for home-country development must be 
led, or ‘owned’ by the diaspora groups themselves is an important starting point for 
donors, who are advised to build upon successful endeavours rather than create them 
from above’. It also concluded that donors should consider providing support to build 
and strengthen diaspora networks that have a strong developmental potential.  
 
The study also stated that ‘donor governments that are serious about transnationalism 
as an engine of development will strive for policy coherence across departments of 
government’. This coherence implied ‘an immigration policy that creates 
opportunities for legal residence and fosters integration, and visa policies that make it 
easier for diaspora members of to come and go between home and host countries’ 232. 
This vision is opposed to the coherence that many European governments envisage, 
which seems to focus on temporary, return and ‘circular’ migration as development 
tools. 
 
Another study explored more specifically the many ways in which UK-based 
diasporas contribute to development and poverty reduction in countries of origin. The 
report observed that ‘Migrants’ incentives to participate in origin country 
development or reconstruction depend on the extent to which they feel they have a 
stake in their home nation-states as well as in the countries that host them’233. It 
recommended securing the rights of migrants, cutting the cost of money transfers and 
encouraging migrants to invest in community development initiatives in their origin 
countries as well as ‘taking steps to give diasporas a more active voice in the 
development arena’ 234. Moreover, the study endorsed the proposals made earlier by 
the African Foundation for Development (AFFORD, see also section below): 
 
• Acknowledge that the diaspora merit as serious an engagement as the private 
sector with DfID and other relevant government departments with a 
development brief; 
• Draw UK-based diaspora groups into the formulation of Country Strategy or 
Assistance Plans, Poverty Reduction Strategy Planning, and other instruments 
of UK development policy; 
• Make greater efforts to bridge the UK’s two parallel development and relief 
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efforts, one mainstream-led (DfID plus UK-based NGOs engaged in 
development and relief) and the other diaspora-led;  
• Form a dedicated unit within DfID (along the lines of the Private Sector Unit) 
to engage with UK-based diaspora groups235. 
 
In August 2005, two BME (AFFORD and AFP) groups published another report 
commissioned by DfID providing orientations for DfID staff to engage with diaspora 
groups and communities to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. The report 
emphasised the importance of a sustained two-way dialogue to improve mutual 
understanding and to avoid a mismatch of expectations. It also identified obstacles to 
DfID-diaspora engagement, among which the heterogeneity of diaspora groups, 
DfID’s decentralised structure and the regressive attitudes of some diaspora groups 
towards DfID’s development agenda, as well as mindsets among development 
professionals resisting engagement with diaspora groups. Some DfID staff suggested 
that colleagues schooled in particular theories and approaches to development may 
simply find the idea of diasporas and migrants as major stakeholders in development 
counterintuitive and difficult to assimilate236. 
 
In March 2006, DfID issued its draft migration and development paper. Although the 
paper reiterated the 1997 commitment to build on the skills and talents of migrants to 
promote the development of their countries of origin, it is not clear from the report to 
what extent and how the initial steps such as CfD and engagement in Country Action 
Plans will be extended into more concrete steps towards a more intensive and 
continuous engagement in practical terms237. 
 
 
4.3. The AFFORD case 
 
It is worth paying more specific attention to the African Foundation for Development 
(AFFORD, www.afford-uk.org) as an illustration of the potential strength and 
influence of spontaneously created diaspora organisations that are not necessarily 
government supported. AFFORD was founded as a UK-registered charity in 1994 by 
a group of Africans in the UK, in response to concerns that, despite the vast number 
of Africans in the UK who organize themselves and contribute to Africa's 
development, Africans were effectively marginalized from mainstream development 
activity directed towards Africa.  
 
AFFORD intends to connect Africans and their organisations abroad working for the 
development of Africa and African people directly with organizations on the 
continent working toward the same goals. Its mission is to expand and enhance the 
contribution that Africans in the diaspora make to Africa’s development. Its three 
work programmes are (1) to support UK-based African organisations in their quest to 
support development in their regions of origin, (2) to support African input into 
mainstream development policy and practice and (3) to facilitate direct developmental 
linkages between Africans in the UK and counterparts in Africa. 
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AFFORD has been or is engaged in a range of activities; for example:  
 
• Africa21, a consortium of nine UK-based African-led development 
organisations that sponsors a yearly ‘African Development and diaspora Day’ 
(ad3) and that provides an opportunity for Africans in the UK to work together 
to promote development in Africa as well as to meet with various international 
development agencies, donors, NGOs and others; 
• The African Diaspora Voices for Africa’s Development (ADVAD) coalition, 
consisting of UK-based African organizations formed to give Africans in the 
diaspora the opportunity to ‘speak with one voice’;  
• In February 2004, AFFORD collaborated with a social justice organization 
called Fahamu, based in Oxford, Durban and Cape Town, to offer an Oxford 
University-accredited distance-learning course for UK-based Africans. The 
course is on fundraising and resource mobilization, focusing on how Africans 
in the diaspora can increase their own fundraising capacities238; 
• AFFORD is negotiating with a number of Australian and American companies 
to provide a remittance transfer service that will enable migrant workers to 
send any amount of money from any part of the world for a fee of only one US 
dollar239; 
• AFFORD has also set up the ‘Hello Africa’ programme, which aims to tackle 
poverty by facilitating and sustaining developmental linkages and partnerships 
between Ghanaian, Nigerian and Sierra Leonean communities in the UK and 
counterparts in Africa240;  
• The Opportunity Africa (OA) project provides a gateway to Africa-related 
international development careers, training and education for young people of 
African descent in the UK diaspora. It also aims to enhance their skill base and 
job preparedness, making it easier for them to move into full-time employment 
in this sector.  
 
In addition to its practical role, AFFORD has also played a leading role in the 
advocacy of migrant roles in development both nationally and internationally. Over 
the past decade, AFFORD has been able to exert considerable influence on DfID and 
in particular in raising awareness on the relevance of diaspora organisations for 
development and their right to become engaged while retaining their independence 
through their website, publications, press releases and participations in conferences. It 
has for instance played a leading role in establishing CfD. It has thereby always 
retained a remarkably independent and (self-) critical voice, regularly putting forward 
original ideas. For instance, in March 2006 AFFORD called for Remittance Tax 
Relief241. 
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4.4. Conclusion 
 
 
In terms of practical action, UK migration and development policies have been 
characterised by a strong focus on remittances. In coalition with multilateral 
organisations, in particular the World Bank, it really has pushed the agenda forward in 
facilitating remittances and channelling them into formal channels through increasing 
transparency and competition in the remittance market. It forged a public-private 
partnership in the form of the UK Remittances Working Group. The 
sendmoneyhome.com website symbolises the leading role of the UK in remittance 
policies. These policies are apparently based on the conviction that there is a strong 
coherence between the poverty reduction focus of its development agenda and the 
expansion of the remittances market both in sending and receiving countries.  
 
On paper, the UK approach towards migration and development is much more 
comprehensive than that of the Netherlands and, as we will see, of France. DfID 
neither links migration and development to return or temporary migration nor does it 
suggest a link between development cooperation and migration reduction. In this 
manner, DfID has apparently kept a position relatively independent of the Home 
Office, which approaches migration from the perspective of control, safety and 
security242. Instead, DfID is committed to address the (apparently positive) links 
between migration and poverty reduction and clearly sees a role for diaspora 
organisations. 
 
However, DfID’s often repeated commitment in 1997 to ‘build on the skills and 
talents of migrants and other members of ethnic minorities within the UK to promote 
the development of their countries of origin’ has shown to be very difficult to 
implement, despite an abundance of DfID-funded studies on migration and 
development and diasporas. While the global policy and research community is 
reaping considerable benefits from these research efforts, DfID’s 2006 draft migration 
and development paper showed an apparent inability to translate the recommendations 
into practical ways to involve diasporas in development policies, such as expressed in 
commissioned studies and as expressed by the independent and critical voices of UK 
diaspora organisations such as AFFORD. This also exemplifies that governments 
should not overestimate their role; nowhere else in Europe do diaspora organisations 
seem as active and as vocal as in the UK. 
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France  
 
 
5.1. The evolution of French policies: beyond return? 
 
In the Anglo-Saxon field of migration and development policies, the French 
experience is frequently ignored. This is striking, because France has arguably the 
most long-standing and developed migration and development policy in Europe. In 
fact, France’s experience seems to be highly instructive for countries that have only 
recently developed initiatives in this field.  
 
In the 1970s, France’s policy was strongly associated with the return of migrants to 
their countries of origin. This focus on return has also been one of the main reasons 
this policy was severely criticized both internally and by other European countries. In 
his landmark study on French migration and development policies, Thomas Lacroix243 
has described how, partly as a consequence of this criticism and ‘feedback’ by 
diaspora organisations, this approach has gradually evolved into a policy called co-
développement.  
 
From 1977 to 1986 the objective of these policies was to diminish the migrant 
population through stimulating return migration mainly under the aide au retour 
(1977-1980) and aide à la réinsertion (since 1983) programmes. The main 
instruments of these policies consisted of return bonuses to help the migrants to 
establish a new livelihood, and, in the case of Algerian and Senegalese migrants, 
offering professional training before return. In general, only a few migrants 
participated in these schemes. The majority who did so were Portuguese and Spanish 
migrants, who returned mainly because of the democratisation and economic take-off 
in their countries prior to and after their accession to the EU.  
 
The main reason for the failure of return migration policies seemed the lack of 
perspective in most countries of origin. The relatively low level of the return bonuses 
(approximately 5,300  at current standards) also did not help to make the project 
succeed. Because these return policies only targeted non-EU citizens, they were also 
seen to violate republican principles, and the pretext of development was seen to 
disguise the economic rationale of these policies. In addition, the extreme right Front 
National party supported the idea of helping migrants from non-European countries to 
return by giving them support to set up their own enterprises similar to the Dutch 
Remplod project. This support did not contribute to the credibility of these policies 
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among migrants and others, who suspected that the stated development intentions of 
such policies camouflaged a hidden agenda of stimulating return migration244. 
 
Although the aide à la réinsertion programme has formally continued to persist, the 
bureau de la réinsertion has closed down and the number of migrants signing up has 
fallen to negligible levels. The explicit return policies have been gradually abandoned 
and after 1986 political discourses put an increasing emphasis on development aid as 
an instrument to reduce ‘migration pressure’ in sending countries. Although return 
was no longer the primary means, the underlying thought remained to reduce 
migration through ‘instrumentalising’ aid. Another distinct feature was the specific 
role these new policies attributed to development-oriented diaspora associations, in 
France known as OSIM (Organisations de Solidarité Internationale Issues des 
Migrations), whose cooperation in development policies was deemed necessary to 
effectively curb migration flows.  
 
In 1991, a special inter-ministerial officer (chargé de mission) for réinsertion et 
coopération was appointed within with the office of the Prime Minister. After several 
years of internal reflections within the government, in 1995 the Programme 
Développement Local Migration (PDLM) was established as the first concrete 
measure in the direction of the current co-development policies . The PDLM is largely 
inspired by the significant contribution of Senegalese migrants to (agricultural) 
development along the Senegal River. An equivalent of 2.6 M was invested over a 
period of five years. The programme aims to assist migrants wishing to establish 
enterprises in their countries of origin. The programme concentrates on facilitating 
local development projects through conducting feasibility studies and on support in 
detecting and connecting project partners such as OSIM, twinned municipalities and 
development NGOs.  
 
A second component of the programme, as it was implemented in Senegal and Mali, 
constitutes technical and financial (an equivalent of 3700  on average) support for 
individual return migration projects. These programmes promoted the voluntary 
return of Senegalese and Malian migrants by providing assistance to migrant workers 
for reinsertion, in the forms of credit funds for the establishment of businesses, 
training-for-return programs, and so on. The program also aimed to ‘reverse the 
exodus of the Senegalese’, by ‘explain[ing] to people the problems and hazards of 
emigration. . . . [and] demonstrat[ing] to them that their territory is full of gainful 
opportunities’245. The hope was that they could exploit these opportunities in 
association with Senegalese living abroad. In order to convince the Senegalese that it 
is for their own good not to go abroad, and to urge migrants to ‘return and invest’, 
they advocated, amongst other things, the ‘publication of a brochure on business 
opportunities’ in Senegal246. In the Kayes region of Mali, the Malian government 
cooperated with assisted return programs for unauthorised Malians in France, and 
works with international organisations to attract educated Malians back to Mali247. In 
total 200 projects, of which 180 in Mali and 20 in Senegal have been realised. 
However, a significant proportion of projects have failed in the longer term, and the 
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programme was also harmed by delays in payment and a lack of motivation among 
French and Malian officials248.  
 
According to Lacroix, the novelty of the PDLM programme is the dismissal of return 
migration as the prime objective of migration and development policies. Instead of 
directly reversing the migration flows through stimulating return, the goal was now to 
stop flows through development. This also reveals the conceptual weakness of the 
programme. Although its goals are ambitious and address the longer term, the limited 
financial means involved make it impossible to achieve them by definition249. 
Moreover, the rationale of this and similar ‘development instead of migration’ 
programmes ignore substantial evidence that development and the concomitant socio-
economic transformations almost invariably tend to be associated with increasing 
migration at least in the short to medium term250. 
 
As well as the low level of financial support given to migrants, Lacroix blames in 
particular ‘the ambivalence of the governmental attitude’ as the major factor harming 
the credibility of these migration and development programmes. For instance, in 1995 
the Minister of the Interior – who reinforced the ‘fight against illegal immigration’ in 
France – convoked Malian migrant associations to support collective projects in the 
Senegal River area, but on the condition that the returnees were undocumented 
migrants who renounced a return to France. The Malian associations subsequently 
refused to cooperate and only ten candidates accepted the proposition251. This type of 
experience in combination with anti-immigration discourses by politicians fuelled 
considerable suspicion that such projects focused more on return than on 
development.  
 
 
5.2. Co-development  
 
In the light of past failures, the current French migration and development policies 
have been formulated over the past nine years, and have been officially coined co-
développement252. The concept of co-développement (co-development, or 
‘cooperation for development’) policy is based on the principle that migrants are 
central actors in the development process of receiving countries, and that their 
contributions should be recognised and encouraged. The underlying original intention 
of reintegration in countries of origin has not entirely disappeared. Moreover, another 
fundamental notion is still that development will ultimately lead to decreasing 
migration to France253.  
 
In 1998 the Mission interministérielle au codéveloppement et aux migrations 
internationales (MICOMI) was established, whose mission was to ‘propose 
orientations and measures to reinforce the collaboration of France with countries of 
emigration with the aim of agreeing with them, in the perspective of co-development, 
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on an improved control of migration flows’254. However, the strong association made 
regarding the return of undocumented migrants harmed the implementation of these 
new policies . The Contrat de Réinsertion dans le Pays d’Origine (CRPO) targeted 
undocumented migrants from Mali, Senegal and Morocco who were not eligible for 
regularisation. This time the reward was not a certain amount of money, but an EU 
visa, to be granted the moment that the French Office des Migrations Internationales 
(OMI) judged that the return migrant had successfully re-integrated into his country of 
origin. Because of this link with illegal migration, migrant associations refuse to 
collaborate. According to Lacroix, the CPRO durably discredited French co-
development policies because it again fuelled suspicion that the development 
objective disguised the real goal of return migration.  
 
After the failure of CPRO, MICOMI was dismantled and replaced by the 
Ambassadeur Délégué au Co-Développement in 2002. This decision was motivated 
by the wish to establish a better connection between co-développement and the 
general strategy for development cooperation, as well as to further distance it from 
policies to combat undocumented migration and stimulate return migration, which 
have proven to be so harmful to the objective to involve OSIM. Officially, co-
development is now seen as ‘any development activity, regardless of its nature or area 
of activity, that involves the contribution by migrants if they either wish to return to 
their origin country or would like to help their countries of origin while they remain in 
France255.’  
 
In a communication to the French cabinet in 2003, the Minister Delegate for 
Cooperation and Francophony announced that the government had decided to give 
new impetus to the idea of co-development, while admitting that, ‘since the beginning 
of the 1990, [co-development] had largely remained a concept’ and was primarily 
brought up in the framework of (return) migration and re-integration policies. In an 
explicit breach with this narrow concept, the minister stated: ‘The agenda of co-
development is in fact broader and is not solely intended to encourage the re-
employment of migrants in their countries of origin’256. The idea is that migrants can 
act as mediators between home and host countries. The two official priorities of the 
new French co-development policies are (1) to facilitate remittances and to channel 
savings of migrants towards productive investment as well as (2) to mobilise the 
diaspora elite for the development of their countries of origin. 
 
 
Channelling remittances and migrants’ savings  
 
The first programme, launched in 2004, targets better channelling of remittance flows 
by assisting migrants wishing to invest in their origin countries. In comparison to the 
remittance optimism voiced by DfID in the UK, French policy makers tend to take a 
more critical stance towards the benefits by stressing that most remittances are mainly 
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used for family consumption, health and housing257. One of the priorities of the co-
development strategy is therefore ‘to channel the remaining funds into productive 
investments able to contribute to the economic growth of developing countries’258 In 
2003, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the Fédération Bancaire Française 
(French Banking Federation), the French Treasury and the AFD (French Development 
Agency) launched a programme aimed at (1) collecting the savings of migrants in 
France; (2) transferring these savings with safe, regular, inexpensive and simple 
mechanisms; (3) supporting guarantee mechanisms for savings and discount 
mechanisms for credit rates; and (4) accompanying and advising investors. 
 
 
Mobilising the diaspora elite  
 
The second priority of the French co-development policy is to mobilize the skills and 
know-how of diasporas for the benefit of origin countries. This is based on the idea 
that ‘Development is not possible without guidance and the transfer of expertise’259. A 
study commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has shown that many migrants 
are willing to provide their expertise and their experience to their countries of origin 
on a limited basis. In fact, many OSIM were already active in development activities 
in countries of origin. The new co-development policies aim at providing the 
organisational and financial means to meet this desire among many OSIM. In order to 
promote ‘brain circulation’, one of the programmes involves short-term missions for 
scientific and technical diaspora members to lecture at the universities or participate 
in research in their home countries. Currently, the French government covers the 
travel expenses and there is a possibility that in the future and in exceptional cases a 
salary supplement will be paid. A proposal also exists to establish dual Chairs at 
universities in France and countries of origin. 
 
 
Pilot co-development projects 
 
As part of the new co-development policies, four countries were chosen for pilot 
projects: Morocco, Mali, Senegal and the Comoros. The Ambassador delegate of co-
development describes the programme implementation as ‘highly decentralized’: 
‘credit fund administration is devolved to embassies and projects are selected by Joint 
Committees made up of representatives of the French embassy and of authorities, 
local authorities and associations in the country concerned; during the project 
implementing phase, liaison with migrant communities in France is ensured by the 
Ambassador delegate for co-development260. These projects build on the longer 
experience France has accumulated with regard to return migration and co-
development projects with Mali and Senegal in particular.  
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In 2003, a co-development project in Mali of 2.6 M (Priority Solidarity Fund) was 
launched. It was implemented by the French Embassy, with the support of the 
Ministry of Social Affairs, Labour and Solidarity. Its aim is threefold: (1) the co-
funding of local development projects initiated by diaspora associations (from 7,500  
to 45,700  and up to 70 percent of the total budget); (2) the re-employment of 
migrants wishing to return to their countries to set up a small enterprise in 
collaboration with the Office des Migrations Internationales (OMI) and aided by a 
grant of 4000 to 7000  and technical support in Mali (700 persons have returned to 
Mali since 1995 via such programmes); and (3) the mobilization through ‘brain 
circulation’ of the Malian scientific diaspora for the benefit of the University of 
Bamako. The latter component of the Mali Co-Development programme is being 
implemented in collaboration with the TOKTEN programme of the UNDP261. The 
Malian government provides accommodation and the TOKTEN programme covers 
their travel expenses and their daily allowance of 30  and a wage of 3.50  per hour. 
In exchange, the Mali Co-Development PSF contributes 65,000  to the TOKTEN 
programme. Up to July, 40 missions were realised. The French Development Agency 
(AFD) is investigating a project for the creation of homebuyer savings products in 
Mali.  
 
As a follow-up to the Mali co-development programme, a second bilateral 2.5 M 
programme has been implemented in Senegal. The programme has been designed by 
the French embassy and the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and 
Development (DGICD), and was adopted by the joint French-Senegalese Committee 
for Co-development and Migration in 2005. The Senegal programme is similar to the 
Mali programme, and consists equally of three parts: (1) providing co-funding (up to 
70 percent) for projects (such as schools, health centres, farming and water supply) 
conducted by Senegalese OSIM in their villages of origin; (2) supporting short-term 
missions by highly qualified members of the Senegalese diaspora in France mainly in 
agribusiness, new technologies and management; and (3) economic reintegration 
assistance for Senegalese nationals living in France who wish to return to start an 
income-generating activity through technical assistance, a 4,000 to 7,000  grant, 
training and management assistance. Management of this project is decentralised, 
which means that a technical unit has been set up in Dakar and that projects are 
selected in Dakar. To overcome weakly developed banking sectors and unattractive 
credit markets in Senegal, the French government strives to establish a mechanism 
enabling migrants or other Senegalese citizens to obtain loans to set up small 
businesses.  
 
In Morocco, a project of 3.8 M implemented by the AFD includes European funding 
of 1.5 M – the remainder of which was funded by investors – and will enable the 
creation of rural tourism infrastructures in the south Moroccan Taroudannt region as 
well as the creation of SMEs, financed by a start-up fund set up by the French Caisse 
des dépôts et consignations and its Moroccan counterpart. The two programmes are 
supported financially by the Priority Solidarity Fund (FSP) as part of the budget of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
 
Migrants from outside the four states can already receive assistance within the 
framework of the Migration and Economic Investment Programme if they have 
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investment proposals for their country of origin. Through specific credits from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs the French government can support migrant initiatives to 
invest in the country of origin to finance economic and social activities, such as the 
construction of schools and health centres. The French government plans to expand 
the co-development programmes beyond the four pilot countries. New programmes 
are envisaged to come into force in 2006, enabling us to implement projects in other 
French-speaking African and Southeast Asian countries.  
 
 
Forim and PRA/OSIM 
 
With government support, the Forum des Organisations de Solidarité Internationale 
Issues des Migrations (FORIM) was established in 2002. It was the first genuine 
effort to establish a dialogue with OSIM, in France known as OSIM (Organisations 
de Solidarité Internationale Issues des Migrations). The establishment of FORIM is 
the result of a long struggle by the manifold French diaspora organisations to become 
recognised as equal partners in development cooperation. There has long been a 
particular reluctance among the governments to work with and fund associations in 
which non-French citizens were also represented. This forced many OSIM to obtain 
funding through non-migrant French NGOs262.  
 
FORIM is a consultative platform between the government and the approximately 700 
OSIM it represents. FORIM officially aims at ‘associating at all components of 
French civil society in order to promote the integration of populations with a 
migration background, to reinforce the exchanges between France and the countries of 
origin and to contribute to the development of regions of origin’263. FORIM has 
activities aimed at informing, training and coaching its members, network building, 
representing migrant organisations in policy discussions with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, facilitating the interaction between its members and other civil society 
organisations, and providing information on possibilities for project funding. FORIM 
is also member of the French Haut Conseil à la Coopération Internationale (HCCI) 
and the Commission Coopération Développement (CCD). 
 
Besides setting up an observatory and resource centre and running a programme for 
exchange and training, FORIM runs the experimental PRA/OSIM (Programme 
d'Appui aux Projets des OSIM) programme in collaboration with the French Catholic 
Committee against Hunger and for Development (CCFD, a French development 
NGO264) PRA/OSIM enables OSIM to finance small local development projects in 
the French priority countries for development aid, with the exception of Mali and 
Senegal (which are integrated in the Fonds de Solidarité Prioritaire Codéveloppement 
(FSP) programme of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). OSIM organisations can submit 
project proposals through an open call for tenders. The budget of projects should not 
exceed 120,000  and the maximum amount of co-financing is 15,000 .  
 
Both the PRA/OSIM programme and the FORIM receive 150,000  in financial 
support, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Employment, 
Labour and Social Affairs both contributing half of the total sum of 300,000 . To put 
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this into perspective, the newly created French agency for the reception of foreigners 
and migration (ANAEM) receives an annual budget of 65 M.  
 
The current co-development policies assign an important role to local authorities. In 
the framework of ‘decentralised cooperation’, French local authorities can engage in 
partnerships with counterparts in other countries with the objective of stimulating 
cultural, technical and economic cooperation. Existing city twinning programmes are 
encouraged to participate in the PRA/OSIM programme.  
 
In July 2005, the co-development team of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched a 
Co-development Newsletter as a platform to disseminate information, stimulate 
debate and increase awareness about French co-development policies and actions. 
Although it was intended to appear four times per year, no second issue has been 
forthcoming.  
 
Over the past decades, numerous French development NGOs have established 
contacts with OSIM organisations and vice versa. In recent years, several have 
associated themselves with the governmental co-development policies both 
financially and organisationally. To illustrate this we will give examples of some of 
the most prominent development NGOs in this respect: the CCFD and the Panos 
institute. Regarding its importance in the implementation of co-development policies, 
we will also describe the activities of the pS-Eau (Programme Solidarité Eau) 
association.  
 
 
5.3. CCFD265 
 
The French Catholic Committee against Hunger and for Development (CCFD or 
Comité Catholique contre la Faim et pour le Développement) was established in 1960 
and claims to be the largest development NGO in France. The Paris-based CFFD 
comprises a permanent staff of 170 persons and 15,000 local volunteers across 
France. Its two main missions are to support development projects and to raise public 
awareness of the situation in poor countries. Its total budget for support to partner 
organisations in developing countries amounted to 19.5 M in 2004. Project funding 
is directed to sub-Saharan Africa (26 percent), Latin America (15 percent), Asia and 
Oceania (16 percent) and the Mediterranean (15 percent)266. 
 
Since CCFD’s establishment, migration has been one of its priorities . It has lobbied 
to extend Loi 1901, the law on the right to establish an association to migrants and it 
supports various migrant groups267. In 2004 the CCFD spent 930,000  or 2.6 percent 
of its development budget on its ‘migrant project’, which comprises (1) support to 
organisations that defend migrants’ rights and that assist refugees; (2) support to 
lobbies and public campaigns for the recognition of migrants’ rights and to raise 
awareness on the human reality of migration; (3) support to organisations that combat 
human trafficking and (4) active support to migrant associations involved in 
development cooperation.  
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CCFD has supported migrant-led development projects since 1976, and between 1983 
and 1986 it supported 70 individual re-integration projects. Throughout the 1990s, the 
return and re-integration declined in importance and the emphasis was placed 
increasingly on migrant-initiated development projects without return. In 2000, CCFD 
has supported 56 projects against a total budget of an equivalent of 570,000 . 
Projects under this programme are implemented jointly with the involved migrant 
associations. The CCFD is one of the major organisations through which migrant 
organisations can access public funding for their development activities.  
 
On the political level, CCFD strongly advocates recognition of OSIM as development 
actors. It also vigorously advocates the right to migrant mobility as a condition for 
genuine double citizenship, which can also be beneficial for development in countries 
of origin. It has also acquired a central role in FORIM and the PRA/OSIM 
programme as well as other programmes such as PMIE268. In fact, CCFD has become 
the central node between migrant NGOs and the official world of development 
cooperation. 
 
 
5.4. Institut Panos269 
 
The Panos Institute was established in 1986 as a non-governmental organisation 
focusing on giving support to Media pluralism. Its objectives are to strengthen the 
media in sub-Saharan Africa, the Maghreb and the Mediterranean region as well as 
their ability to produce and disseminate pluralist information. Panos has three main 
establishments, in London, Paris and Washington, which operate in distinct 
geographical areas: Eastern and Southern Africa and South Asia for Panos London; 
Western Africa and now Central and Northern Africa for Panos Paris; Caribbean 
Islands for Panos Washington. In 2000 Panos West Africa was created, with offices in 
Dakar and Bamako. The Panos institute has collaborated with and received funding 
from a large number of French and foreign organisations, including the French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the CCFD (see above), DfID (United Kingdom), the 
European Commission, Cordaid (Netherlands, see) and the Ford Foundation (United 
States)270.  
 
Although strictly speaking Panos is not a development NGO, it has developed various 
activities in the area of migration and development, in which it has taken a position 
against the idea that there is a correlation between development and migration 
reduction. It aims at education and raising awareness in order to achieve a greater 
inclusion of immigrants and members of ethnic minorities in Europe in the defining 
and implementing of policies and actions for development cooperation. Between 2000 
and 2003, Panos led the IEMOs271 in Europe project to raise awareness and provide 
development education for the greater inclusion of diasporas in the formulation and 
implementation of development policies. Panos has organised meetings of European 
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diaspora organisations and has published a series of papers mapping their role in the 
development of countries of origin272.  
 
Between 1992 and 1997, Panos conducted the Migrations et Coopération 
Internationale programme to analyse the involvement of migrants in regional 
development in the Kayes region in Mali and in the Senegal river basin. In 1999 
PANOS launched the MIDEIP (Migration, Développement et Intégration 
Pluriculturels) programme, with a budget equivalent to 1.2 M over a three-year 
period. MIDEIP aimed at ‘promoting the added value of people from immigrant 
origin to the development of societies in the South and the North’.  
 
The programme – which has been renamed MIME (Migrations internationales & 
médias) – concentrates on supporting scientific production, training and support to 
migrant associations, promoting the migrant know-how and diffusing through the 
media a positive image of migrants and their significant contribution to development. 
Panos specifically aims at sustaining the professionalisation of NGOs of migrants and 
in the South, so that they can become more autonomous from the established 
development NGOs. Panos therefore considers professional training and network 
support more important than local development. Between 1996 and 2004, Panos also 
awarded 20 grants (ranging from 1200 to 1800 ) for missions of immigrants with a 
project for the transfer and/or exchange of skills with their country of origin during 
one- to three-month periods. This programme was first funded by the Greater Paris 
Regional Council of Ile-de-France and since 1998 has been funded by CCFD. Under 
the scheme, a wide range of assignments, dealing with new information and 
communication technologies (ICT), hydraulics, renewable energy, socio-cultural 
activities, sport, and so on, have been funded in a number of countries, including 
Morocco, Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Vietnam, Congo and Cape Verde. 
 
 
5.5. Ps-Eau 
 
The Programme Solidarité Eau (pS-Eau, or Water Solidarity Programme) is an 
association established in 1984 to facilitate local initiatives of international 
cooperation and North-South exchange with the aim of improving the water access of 
people living in developing countries. The pS-Eau board consists of local authorities, 
enterprises and other professional organisation dealing with water issues, as well as 
research organisations and development and migrant NGOs and governmental 
representatives. This Paris-based association has a permanent staff of 10 people273.  
 
Over the past two decades pS-Eau has worked intensively in the Senegal river basin in 
Senegal and Mali, and because of this experience pS-Eau has now become the 
operator in France of the government-funded FSP co-development programmes in 
Mali and Senegal274. A recent evaluation of 123 projects established between 2003 
and 2005 in the framework of the Fonds de Solidarité Codéveloppement Mali showed 
that 60 percent of the projects were stable, 20 percent unstable and 20 were 
abandoned. On average each enterprise generated two jobs275.  
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pS-Eau also conducts its own VALEPRO (Valorisation de l’ Epargne des Migrants 
par l’Appui des Activités Productives) programme, for which its received 800,000  
funding from the EU over a three-year period. The project is funded from the 
experimental B7 667 budget line, which ‘is designed to finance the fight against 
illegal immigration, but in the broad sense of the idea of prevention also finances co-
development projects’276. The programme targets five African countries, and pS-Eau 
implements this programme together with the Belgium Flemish Refugee Council 
(Overleg Centrum voor Integratie van Vluchtelingen or OCIV277). pS-Eau supports 
economic projects of migrants from Benin, Cameroon, (Conakry) Guinea and Togo 
and the OCIV supports migrant projects in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The 
assistance comprises advice and training on setting up businesses, a 600  grant for a 
feasibility study and a start-up grant of up to 3,500  provided that the investor invests 
at least the same amount. At the first VALEPRO meeting in April 2005, three 
resettlement and two long-distance investment projects were selected for funding.  
 
Since 2001, pS-Eau has also run the Programme Migrations et Initiatives 
Economiques (PMIE or Economic Initiatives and Migration Programme) to facilitate 
the implementation of economic projects by migrants both in their country of origin 
and in France. The programme is funded by the French Foreign Affairs Ministry and 
Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Cohesion, the European Commission and 
the CCFD (Catholic Committee against Hunger and for Development)278. 
 
Since 1996, pS-Eau has coordinated a network, the Micro Enterprise Support Group 
(GAME or Groupe d’Appui à la Micro Entreprise) which combines 18 development 
NGOs, migrants associations and public authorities specialised in supporting 
economic projects of African migrants. The need for such a network was based on the 
observation that many commercial enterprises or development projects set up by 
migrants in their country of origin failed due to technical, administrative and financial 
obstacles. This revealed the importance of project preparation in France, of 
methodological and technical support and the need for close monitoring by a 
specialised operator on the ground. In the countries of origin pS-Eau collaborates with 
local partner organisations experienced in accounting, feasibility studies and the like. 
By conducting a feasibility study financed by the PMIE and in identifying a partner 
organisation in the country of origin, GAME assists migrants wishing to start an own 
enterprise or wishing to provide long-distance support to the project of someone 
living in the country of origin. Since the programme 2001 has been launched and 
2004 33 grants were allocated to projects in 15 African countries. In 1999 GAME 
issued a practical guide called Se réinstaller et entreprendre au pays (Re-installing 
and setting up a business), which was updated in 2005279. 
 
A PMIE seminar in 2004 brought to light the fact that many projects face difficulties 
due to various problems such as lack of experience, vagueness and the often naïve 
character of business plans, the heterogeneous character and lack of quality of 
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counterpart organisations, high costs and the difficult access to the weakly developed 
local credit markets280.  
 
 
5.6. Migrations et Développement281  
 
The association Migrations et Développement (M&D) was created in 1986 by 
Moroccan migrants in France, and was the pioneer diaspora movement developing 
substantial development activities. M&D has now evolved into one of Europe’s most 
prominent diaspora organisations committed to the development of regions of origin. 
It has even been suggested that it is the world’s most successful example of a 
development-oriented diaspora organisation282. Originally established as an 
association to assist its members to return during the 1980s economic downturn, 
M&D has rapidly veered away from the return aspect. Since 1988 it has totally 
committed itself to release the potential of migration and migrants to promote 
development in regions of origin.  
 
Over a twenty-year period, M&D has implemented development projects in 420 
villages (comprising 105,000 people) in southwest Morocco (Anti and High Atlas), 
among which 118 electrification projects, 92 drinking water projects, 13 schools and 2 
dispensaries. It has also helped to establish seven agricultural cooperatives, two 
artisan cooperatives and one rural tourism project comprising the constructing of 21 
‘rural lodgements’. The latter project was supported by the AFD and the EU. It has 
also implemented numerous activities to train local politicians, local civil servants and 
project participants as well as education projects for women. M&D has 3 staff 
members in its Marseille branch, 8 in its Morocco branch, and it provides the salaries 
for 13 schoolteachers. All except one employee are Moroccan. For the 
implementation of projects, M&D relies on approximately one hundred volunteers, 
mostly recently retired professionals such as engineers, generally of French origin. 
 
M&D implements its projects through a participatory approach. The villagers and 
migrants have to decide jointly on their priorities and they also have to provide part of 
the funding. The migrants, villagers and Moroccan institutions usually provide the 
project ‘hardware’ (such as pumps, tubes, furrow digging) while the funding bodies 
from the North usually finance the ‘software’ (such as social mediation, coordination, 
training and technical expertise,).  
 
All local stakeholders have to constitute a village association before starting a project. 
During the design and implementation of projects, M&D functions as coordinator 
with other partners, such as local authorities and funding bodies, and assures the 
‘capacity building’ through training of villagers who will be actively involved in a 
project. Each project must be based on intra-community solidarity. This means that 
although services such as electricity and drinking and irrigation water are subject to 
fees, the poor villagers should be helped by others to access these services. A third 
principle is that projects should be implemented in partnership with local authorities. 
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The CCFD has supported Migrations et Développement since 1993. Over the past 13 
years, M&D has succeeded in building substantial expertise in project implementation 
and obtaining substantial funding from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, AFD, 
private charities and European municipalities and Moroccan public institutions, as 
well as the European Union, which funded approximately half of the total budget of 
1.127 M in 2002 283. According to an evaluation by the French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, most of the infrastructures created through M&D are still in good shape, 
including the institutions created to implement the projects – such as village 
associations and regulations concerning maintenance of technical equipments – also 
after projects have been formally finished. This seems to testify to a relatively high 
degree of ownership that partners feel towards projects.  
 
Relations with local authorities are often described as difficult, because they might 
see projects as challenging their authority. On a national level, the situation is totally 
different, as M&D has gained increasing recognition from the Moroccan public 
authorities for its expertise in ‘social engineering’ proven through its success in rural 
infrastructure and other development and projects. Moroccan authorities now even 
consult M&D in implementing rural infrastructure development schemes. For 
instance, ONEP, the national Moroccan Waterworks company (l’Office National 
d’Eau Potable), which works mostly in urban areas, has consulted M&D with regard 
to its knowledge of rural Morocco, its capacity to mediate between different social 
actors and its accumulated technical and managerial expertise to implement public 
infrastructure projects through a participative approach.  
 
 
5.7. Conclusion 
 
Despite the changes in discourse and implementation, the continuity of return 
migration in French migration and development policies is striking. The French 
experience is particularly instructive, because on the one hand it shows the 
incoherence between the goals of promoting return migration and on the other the 
desire to involve diaspora organisations. The main reason is that the latter generally 
refuse to associate themselves with migration and development policies whose 
suspected real aim is to encourage return migration. Diaspora organisations are keen 
not to be used to legitimise and de-politicise such policies let alone to recruit 
(undocumented) candidates for return migration284.  
 
Through associating co-development programmes too closely with return 
programmes, politicians in the past have often discredited these programmes. 
Although French politicians have recently done their best to deny any link with return, 
the proposals by the French government in the Spring of 2006 to increase the return 
bonuses for undocumented migrants285 and the introduction of tighter, selective 
immigration laws while curtailing family reunification, will probably not help to 
dispel the suspicion that the real aim of co-development programmes is to reduce 
immigration and to increase return migration. In this context, it is important to 
reiterate that French co-development policies remain a fundamental part of the 
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bilateral negotiations with countries of origin. Lacroix286 has argued that because the 
origin countries refuse to directly cooperate with return migration policies, co-
development has become a sort of compensation for France’s restrictive immigration 
policies: There usually is a development element in the readmission agreements 
signed by France and African countries.  
 
Lacroix concludes his analysis on the relations between the French government and 
diaspora organisations with the observation that the refusal of the latter to be 
mobilised for return migration policies has triggered a feedback process in which the 
co-development focus has gradually shifted away from return. This ultimately led to a 
formal disconnection between return and development policies in 2002287. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that return migration programmes have been 
abandoned, but rather that they have been supplemented by initiatives to support 
development projects initiated by the diaspora organisations as well as the 
government-led creation of the FORIM platform for diaspora organisations oriented 
towards the development of countries of origin. It is still too early to say whether 
these new ‘inclusive’ policies have been successful both in terms of building a bridge 
between governmental actors for development cooperation and in terms of the success 
of projects in countries of origin. 
 
The example of Migrations et Développement, however, shows how a migrant 
grassroots organisation can successfully engage in promoting development in regions 
of origin. It shows the potential added value of migrants through their profound 
knowledge of two societies, and their capacity to build local coalitions and to connect 
local communities to foreign funding bodies. It also provides a lesson against 
blueprint thinking: Migrations et Développement has been particularly successful in 
implementing projects because of its participatory, local-oriented and small-scale 
approach. It also demonstrates that successful implementation of projects cannot be 
achieved overnight, but should evolve from a long learning process and a thorough 
knowledge of local contexts, power relations and cultural sensitivities. In the end, the 
personal engagement and perseverance of the migrants involved has been truly 
decisive in its success. It seems unlikely that an association like Migrations et 
Développement could ever have been successful if it had been ‘invented’ or imposed 
by policy makers.  
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Other national experiences  
 
 
 
6.1. Belgium288  
 
The Belgian federal government distinguishes between direct, indirect and 
multilateral development cooperation. Direct bilateral aid is mainly the responsibility 
of the Directorate General of Development Cooperation or DGOS (Directie-Generaal 
Ontwikkelingssamenwerking), which in 2004 spent almost 61 percent of the total 
budget for Official Development Assistance (ODA), and is executed by the Belgian 
Technical Cooperation or BTC (Belgische Technische Coöperatie). Indirect bilateral 
cooperation is funded by DGOS but implemented by development NGOs and other 
organisations. In 2004, indirect aid amounted to 175 M, representing 15 percent of 
the total ODA budget. Direct and indirect aid are targeted at 18 partner countries289. 
DGOS channels funds for multilateral cooperation to international organisations 
including the European Union.  
 
Migration and development was never one of the policy priorities of DGOS until the 
Secretary of State for Development Cooperation created a special migration and 
development ‘budget line’ in 2002, which replaced the former 1997-2002 budget line 
for the Voluntary Return and Re-Integration Programme. This programme envisages 
promoting the development of partner countries through, amongst others, mobilising 
the development potential migrants represent. It also coincided with the establishment 
of a small policy unit (a steuncel) for migration and development. In his 2004 policy 
document the new Minister for Development Cooperation described migration as a 
‘particular challenge’.  
 
In the meantime a number of NGOs had independently taken steps to design 
migration and development policy. In 1999 together with the Solidarité Socialiste 
(OLSOC) and the Centre de formation pour le développement (ITECO) and Oxfam-
solidarité, the Centre National de Coopération au Développement (CNCD) (itself a 
platform of Walloon development NGOs) established the Plateforme Migration et 
Développement (PFMD), which was sustained by a halftime staff member to promote 
the recognition and involvement of migrant NGOs in development cooperation. 
Establishment of the platform has facilitated the creation of the policy unit for 
migration and development in DGOS. Supported for the CNCD-led Plateforme 
Migration et Développement (PFMD) was stopped in 2003. The platform only 
targeted the French speaking community; similar efforts in Flandres have failed. The 
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organisation 11.11.11, the Flemish counterpart of the CNCD, has not initiated 
migration and development initiatives.  
 
This has made it possible to allocate funds to migration and development projects in 
the framework of direct and indirect bilateral cooperation. Nevertheless, the focus in 
the policy document is on curbing migration through brain-drain prevention and 
encouraging return migration. Although the document also mentioned migrants and 
their organisations as potential partners in indirect development cooperation, a 
practical obstacle is that migrant organisations can only acquire NGO status if a 
majority of their board members are Belgian nationals.  
 
A next step towards the elaboration of migration and development policies was the 
establishment of a special commission of the Belgian Senate on migration and 
development, which after eight hearings with relevant specialists published its report 
in 2004, entitled Migrants and development: forces for the future 290. The commission 
concluded that development NGOs are in general barely aware of migration issues. 
Although it was observed that migrant organisations have a great potential to 
contribute to development, they are seldom involved in development policies and 
have no access to project funding, due to the problems mentioned in the previous 
paragraph. The commission therefore concluded that migrants and their organisations 
should be recognised and be eligible for DGOS funding, and that a coordinating 
governmental body on migration and development should be established. The report 
also recommended a series of measures to facilitate remittances.  
 
However, these recommendations have not been followed up by concrete measures. 
This might be partly explained by the fact the DGOS was not involved in the 
commission’s hearings. Also in 2004, De Bruyn and Wets published two 
comprehensive studies commissioned by DGOS on migrant remittances and the 
involvement of diaspora organisations in development cooperation291. They have also 
been largely ignored in Belgian policy circles, although the Dutch AIV advisory 
report drew partly on their results292.  
 
Thus far, the following organisations have been subsidised within the existent 
migration and development budget line:  
 
In 1998. OCIV (Overleg Centrum voor Integratie van Vluchtelingen or Consultation 
Centre for the Integration of Refugees) launched the OCIV Entreprendre programme. 
It was initially set up to support the ‘re-integration’ of rejected asylum seekers and 
undocumented migrants to set up businesses in their countries of origin, mainly in 
Africa. This approach failed, mainly because the target group was not interested in 
setting up enterprises. The idea of return was subsequently abandoned and the target 
group became all migrants who had lived for longer than one year in Belgium. After 
candidates had presented their business plans to OCIV, the selected candidates 
followed a preparatory programme of training and seminars. After approval, the 
candidate was assisted financially by local partner organisations through a micro-
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credit or subsidy. Of 99,456 applicants, 210 potential entrepreneurs received training 
in business creation. The programme worked in collaboration with SME support 
organisations in nine countries (Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Benin, Togo, Guinea Conakry, 
Niger, Cameroon, RDC and Bolivia). Problems encountered included a lack of 
business attitudes, planning and preparation of entrepreneurs, inappropriate SME 
support programmes and financial support of the programme293. 
 
After an evaluation and reorientation in 2002 and 2003 the programme was renamed 
Migratie & Ontwikkeling (Migration & Development), the emphasis shifted to 
identification of partnerships with migrant organisations. This programme targeted, 
advised and coached migrant organisations that wished to set up a development 
project with local partner organisations, and was funded by DGOS. The OCIV also 
collaborated with the French pS-Eau in the EU-funded VALEPRO programme, which 
supported economic projects of migrants originating from the Democratic Republic of 
Congo294. Three years after its establishment, OCIV’s migration and development 
programme were suspended on October 1, 2005. The associated website migratie-
ontwikkeling.org has equally been discontinued. Persons involved described the 
project as a success responding to an enormous demand. The decision to suspend the 
programme was presumably related to the OCIV decision to focus exclusively on the 
refugee issues in Flanders, coinciding with it being renamed Vluchtelingenwerk 
Vlaanderen (Refugee Work Flanders).  
 
Similar to OCIV, CIRÉ (Coordination et Initiatives pour et avec les Réfugiés et 
Étrangers), a Walloon association of organisations working with refugees and 
immigrants, has worked with migrant organisations to establish development projects 
in countries of origin. In 2004, it launched the Migr’actions programme, which 
targeted migrant organisations from the DR Congo, Niger, Senegal, Cameroon, 
Ecuador and Bolivia. The programme comprises training, feasibility studies, 
assistance in the implementation of projects, guidance in fund raising and a grant of 
up to 10,000 . Projects are implemented in collaboration with pre-selected local 
development NGOs295.  
 
DGOS has also funded the Young Women's Christian's Association (YWCA, 
Intercultureel Vrouwencentrum Antwerpen) in Antwerp, which conducts migration 
and development projects focused on gender issues in Burundi and Rwanda. As far as 
we know, other major Belgian development NGOs such as Aquadev, Oxfam and 
Coprogram have not developed specific activities in this field. The only exception 
perhaps is VIC, a Flemish development NGO that has worked together with 
Moroccan migrants in Belgium in the implementation of projects in Morocco.  
DGOS also provides funding to the MIDA programme of the IOM in the African 
great lakes region, which concentrates on virtual transfers (e-learning, etc.), 
remittances and competency transfers296. DGOS has also funded a programme of 
Collectif des Femmes, an organisation favouring the re-integration of migrant and 
refugee women into the Belgium employment market, to help women willing to find 
work in their country of origin. 
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In 2004, the total DGOS budget for these projects was 1.71 M Euro, which is 
allocated as follows: 781,000  for MIDA, 300,000  for YWCA, 600,000  for CIRÉ 
and 60,000  for OCIV. On the Flemish and Walloon level separate budget lines exist. 
For instance, the Flanders government gives specific support via OCIV to the 
Moroccan community and through the YWCA for the African community297.  
 
In 2005, both the Voluntary Return Programme (1997-2002) and the current 
Migration and Development Programme of DGOS were evaluated. The first 
programme has allowed the creation of 289 micro enterprises through channelling 3.1 
M of funding to OCIV, CIRÉ and Collectif des Femmes. It is not clear how many 
enterprises durably succeeded, as the annual character of the funding was not an 
incentive to collect data on the viability of projects. The programme suffered from 
numerous problems, such as a weak assessment of candidates’ entrepreneurial 
capabilities , delays in payment and weak management and monitoring of projects by 
the NGO organisations lacking a business culture. The average cost per project was 
estimated at 10,644 , which is high considering the fact that the grant given to the 
migrant is only 2,500 . In general the migrants involved only contributed about 10 
percent of the grant. It was also evaluated that in relative terms the impact of the 
programme on return migration was negligible298.  
 
The current DGOS Migration and Development programme has been evaluated as a 
good idea, which has, however, proven to be very difficult to implement due to lack 
of experience. The evaluation identified as obstacles the lack of coherence between 
the different projects funded under this programme, the lack of overall vision and the 
difficult communication between the DGOS and NGOs involved. The projects funded 
were also seen as cost-inefficient: about 40 to 50 percent of the budget allocated to 
migrant organisations was spent in the North as opposed to 19 percent for Flemish 
development NGOs. The evaluation also showed that, despite the attention given to 
the topic, the budget destined for training and implementation represented only 2.6 
percent of the total budget of all the associations involved299.  
 
Despite past efforts, and notwithstanding a certain interest in the issue, DGOS has not 
yet succeeded in developing a more comprehensive agenda on migration and 
development. Stakeholders have described the Belgian policies as volatile, lacking 
vision and ‘very ambiguous and undefined’300. Most programmes and initiatives such 
as the Migration and Development Platform have suffered from a lack of stability and 
are often terminated after only a few years. They have therefore scarcely had the 
opportunity to build the necessary expertise to achieve successful project 
implementation. This seems to be related to the lack of a clear long-term vision on the 
part of the government. In the meantime, migration associations feel they are not 
taken seriously and they face legal obstacles when trying to access indirect 
development funding. 
 
Nevertheless, there remains a certain interest in migration and development within 
DGOS. This is testified to by the major international conference on migration and 
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development DGOS organised in collaboration with IOM Brussels, the European 
Commission and the World Bank in Brussels in March 2006301. It remains to be seen 
whether this event is also going to trigger a more elaborate policy framework for 
migration and development. So far, as can be deducted from the public addresses 
given at the Brussels conference by the Belgian Minister for Development 
Cooperation, an important focus of the Belgian policies remains long-term migration 
prevention through development. 
 
 
6.2. Germany  
 
Since the 1970s, Germany has developed significant assisted-return migration policies 
for Gastarbeiter (guest workers), roughly comparable to similar policies pursued in 
France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Return migration projects for the Gastarbeiter 
were terminated in the 1990s. The ongoing programmes address mainly university 
leavers or refugees, such as from Kosovo and Afghanistan. The current reintegration 
programme of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ, Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung) 
targets nationals of developing countries who have either completed studies or gained 
professional experience in Germany and who want to return to their countries and 
apply their know-how in their countries of origin to promote development there.  
 
For instance, AGEF (Arbeitsgruppe Entwicklung und Fachkräfte im Bereich der 
Migration und der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit) was founded as an association of 
Experts in the Field of Migration and Development Cooperation, founded in 1992. 
AGEF’s target groups comprise refugees, labour migrants and foreign students. Since 
1992, AGEF has run about 250 projects aiming to mobilise the potential of migrants 
to contribute to the development of their country of origin, as experts, as 
entrepreneurs or as trainers for vocational education and training. The main focus of 
these projects has been Eastern Europe, Southern Africa, Asia and the Middle East. 
Notwithstanding these general developmental aims, AGEF has been mostly active in 
implementing programmes aimed at facilitating return migration and re-integration 
partly similar to the Dutch NMI activities 302. Its activities also include employment 
finding. AGEF currently aims at creating a network of organisations and interest 
groups working with returnees303. 
 
However, the elaboration of a broader migration and development policy that 
dissociates development from return and includes diaspora involvement is in a 
preliminary stage compared to other northwest European countries. At the federal 
level, migration is not (yet) a core theme of German policies for international 
cooperation. However, as in other countries, the broader issue of migration and 
development has recently been placed on the (development) agenda. At the national 
level, German migration and development policies are still very much in the 
discussion, research and design phase, and to date no concrete policies have been 
implemented. 
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BMZ has one policy advisor working on general issues of migration and 
development. Another advisor is in charge of the ministry's programme on the 
professional reintegration of returning migrants. The German Agency for Technical 
Cooperation (GTZ; Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit) began to 
deal with migration issues in 2003 by establishing the Migration and Development 
project304. It has assigned one staff member as well as one senior consultant to work 
in this field.  
 
The first phase of the project focused on a general orientation towards the migration-
development nexus through investigating the relevant debates taking place in 
academia as well as among international and national organisations. This 
investigation focused on the migration of the highly skilled, as this was seen as a 
phenomenon potentially endangering the efforts of development agencies in education 
and training in developing countries. In October 2003 GTZ organised a first 
conference in Berlin entitled Immigration of the highly skilled: Brain Drain or 
Development Engine for countries of Origin. In May 2004 GTZ organised an expert 
meeting in collaboration with the ILO, entitled Migration and Development - Working 
with the Diaspora in Berlin, which was attended by several members of important 
diaspora groups in Germany305. 
 
In the second phase, the concrete mechanisms through which development of sending 
countries can benefit from migration were investigated. GTZ also commissioned a 
study implemented by IMIS Osnabrück and HWWI Hamburg on the potential for 
cooperation in development policies with three main diaspora groups in Germany: the 
Serbians, the Egyptians and the Afghans. The third phase, which should start in 2006, 
will comprise an effort to mainstream migration issues into the development 
programme of the Federal government, which is projected to take at least two years.  
 
The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, a prominent German development NGO, has contact 
with migrant organisations but mainly in the context of conferences and debates on 
integration issues. As well as a Discussion group on migration and integration 
(Gesprächskreis Migration und Integration), it has also published a report entitled 
From brain drain to brain gain. None of the approximately 20 projects led by Oxfam 
Germany – which with only four permanent staff is one of the smallest members of 
Oxfam international – has a migration component. Oxfam Germany has also not 
developed any policy on migration and development issues.  
 
Although at the federal level or among national development NGOs no concrete 
policies have been implemented to involve diaspora groups, respondents have 
mentioned that there is a large ‘grey zone’ in which at the municipal level migrant 
organisations are involved in development cooperation. For instance, the Berlin 
development NGO council includes a few migrant organisations based in Berlin. 
However, as far as we have been able to detect, there is no significant formalised 
cooperation between such organisations. 
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6.3. Italy  
 
Large-scale immigration and settlement of immigrants is a more recent phenomenon 
for Italy than for northwest European countries. This probably explains why many 
migrant organisations in Italy are relatively informal and mainly tend to fulfil an 
internal social-cultural, community-binding role. After organisations become more 
stable, they tend to focus on integration and on protecting the fundamental rights of 
their members306. However, some migrant communities in Italy, such as Moroccans 
and in particular Senegalese migrants, are now also becoming increasingly involved 
in development activities in their countries of origin.  
 
At the national level, Italian migration and development policies are relatively weakly 
developed. Most of the ‘co-development’ action is taking place at the local and 
regional level in the form of trans-local partnerships between Italian regions and 
municipalities in Italy and institutions in countries of origin of migrants, who often 
participate in such projects307 308. 
 
At the national level, migration policies have recently been dominated by a focus on 
migration control and on the return of undocumented migrants, as is corroborated by 
the recent agreements concluded between the Italian government and the Libyan 
government. Generally these policies do not include development objectives, although 
the Italian government has been involved in MIDA projects in Ghana and Senegal, 
which are operated by the IOM309. A second national level initiative has been the 
Italian-Egyptian IMIS (Integrated Migration Information System Project) recruitment 
scheme for temporary labourers, which was funded by the Italian government and 
implemented by the IOM. Although principally designed as a labour recruitment 
scheme, the IMIS project comprised a component for capacity building of the 
Emigration Sector of the Egyptian Ministry of Manpower and Emigration in order to 
sustain its relationships with the Egyptian diaspora. This includes a website facility 
(www.migration.gov.eg) and creating a computerised matchmaking facility for labour 
recruitment. The project equally comprised research activities including a study 
identifying Egyptian-Italian co-development opportunities310.  
 
Several Italian regions have implemented recruitment projects in countries of origin. 
Beyond the problems involved in managing recruitment effectively – the number of 
migrants recruited through these schemes projects is low and the costs are very high – 
the majority of these projects do not take into account the impacts of such recruitment 
on countries of origin. Some of these recruitment programmes, however, contain 
components to finance development initiatives or to compensate for the ‘brain drain’ 
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through supporting education in localities where recruitment takes place, stimulating 
the transfer of migrants’ competencies or specifically recruiting workers among 
unemployed people311.  
 
At least 60 pilot schemes regarding decentralised trans-regional and trans-local co-
development have been identified. For instance, a project funded by the Italian region 
Emilia-Romagna links private companies and agricultural cooperatives with 
Moroccan joint ventures and cooperatives, which work jointly with migrants to 
promote the strengthening and creation of Moroccan cooperatives and SMEs. Another 
example is a (failed) project aiming at channelling remittances between Livorno and 
the Moroccan town of Khenifra, where several local immigrants originate, into micro-
credit organisations. The region of Tuscany and the province of Livorno funded the 
project312. In other instances local authorities and NGOs have been involved in 
assisted-return projects, which encountered many difficulties and sometimes failed313. 
On the whole, local and regional projects still tend to suffer from serious growing 
pains in the form of institutional and financial shortcomings. On the other hand, they 
illustrate the willingness and creativity of local authorities and of the increasingly 
vocal migrant communities.  
 
There are also examples of more successful undertakings. Erythros, an Eritrean-
Ethiopian migrant association, has successfully set up a project to take care of, to 
provide a shelter for and to advocate the rights of marginalized populations, and in 
particular prostitutes in Rome, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Birma. Interestingly, it has been 
suggested that the fact that this association is not dependent on public funding and 
relies rather on volunteering and own fundraising has made it more independent in the 
selecting of projects. This is said to have contributed to its success. However, 
successful co-development alliances of migrants with local authorities are also 
known, such as the public infrastructure projects set up by a Senegalese association in 
Tuscany. The fact that association members contributed financially to the micro-
projects themselves and that they were directly in control of its implementation on the 
ground is said to explain this more successful experience314. 
 
In 2005, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the IOM commissioned a project 
to CeSPI (Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale in Rome): Development & 
Migration Circuits, Research, networking and public initiatives to enhance synergies 
between migration management and development cooperation315. This project aims to 
enhance synergies between migration management and development cooperation, 
according to the following themes: Transnational partnerships for co-development; 
migration and transnational welfare and sustainable migration management in Africa. 
This will be done through research, networking and the raising of public awareness. 
CeSPI and Coopi (a development NGO) are also collaborating in the project 
Fostering social capital among migrants from Senegal316. This project was co-funded 
by the EU Aeneas programme317.  
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6.4. Spain318 
 
 
For reasons similar to those regarding the situation in Italy, Spain’s migrant 
communities are not yet as ‘settled’ as they are in northwest European countries. It is 
less than three decades ago that many Spanish migrant workers lived in northern 
Europe. The restoration of democracy and rapid economic growth after 1975 restored 
migrants’ trust in Spain’s future and led to a large-scale return movement of Spanish 
migrants. Since Spain’s accession to the EU in 1986, Spain has rapidly developed into 
a new destination for migrants, in particular from Latin America and Morocco. Like 
Italy, the Spanish government has yet to develop its migration and development or co-
development policies.  
 
In Spain, most of the action is taking place at the levels of autonomous regions and 
municipalities. The most active governments in co-development are located in the 
Community of Madrid, the Basque Country, Catalonia and Andalusia, not 
coincidentally all areas that have witnessed a high immigration rate. The autonomous 
regions do not coordinate their own co-development programs with those carried out 
by the Spanish central government. Through this lack of coordination, their 
programmes might differ from each other or overlap319. 
 
In Catalonia, the autonomous region with the highest immigration rate, local and 
national governments have recently developed policies to promote the role of 
migration and migrants in the improvement of development and democratisation in 
their countries of origin. The concept of co-development is now being mentioned in 
Spanish and Catalan policy documents on migration. Recent governmental policy 
documents (such as El Plan Director de la Cooperación Española) seem to indicate a 
shift away from the former emphasis on promoting and facilitating return migration 
and now state that settlement in Catalonia can coincide with transnational 
engagements of migrants. The Catalonian co-development debate is extremely 
animated, with four conferences and seminars being devoted to the topic in 2004 
alone320. 
 
While at the government level the focus is still on policy development, several 
Catalan local authorities and development NGOs have already started implementing 
projects. As in Italy, the Senegalese communities are well organised in comparison to 
Moroccans, who are relative latecomers. Moroccan migrant associations have 
conducted a series of interesting co-development projects321. However, other 
associations tend mainly to be concerned with their position in Catalonia and with 
issues like discrimination, employment, the place of Islam in the public space and the 
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education of their children. This seems to exemplify that transnational civic 
engagement is mainly a phenomenon for settled and integrated migrants322.  
 
However, Moroccan migrant organisations in Catalonia work in an environment that 
encourages their involvement in co-development. For instance, Xarxa Cornisa, a 
network of development agencies, was established in 2004 to mobilise Moroccan 
migrants for development. In Catalonia, the Fons Català de Cooperació al 
Desenvolupament is probably the most active development organisation in trans-local 
development cooperation323. Another important organisation is the Unió de Pagesos 
(Farmers’ Trade Union), which trains and coaches seasonal migrant workers, 
including Moroccans, to enable them to identify, formulate and implement projects324.  
 
The potential impact of Catalan and Spanish co-development programmes including 
migrants is undeniable, but it is still too early to make any definite judgement on the 
success of such programmes. As pointed out by Østergaard-Nielsen, more research is 
needed to evaluate the extent to which migrant associations retain autonomy and 
‘voice’ during the formulation and implementation of co-development projects in 
collaboration with governments and development NGOs325.  
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Conclusions and recommendations  
 
 
 
Mobilising development actors to engage with diasporas  
 
Within only a few years, the issue of migration and development has risen to the top 
of the agenda of development agencies, governments, multilateral agencies and 
migrant and diaspora organisations themselves. This has been triggered by an 
unprecedented surge in remittances and by an increasing awareness of the 
developmental potential of migration, in particular under the influence of researchers 
and institutions such as the World Bank. Positive contributions of migration have 
traditionally been strongly associated with the return of (entrepreneurial) migrants. It 
has, however, become increasingly clear that also settled migrants and their 
descendants often maintain a strong interest in the well-being of relatives and the 
development of countries of origin. This interest can be expressed through remitting 
money, ‘long-distance investments’, personal engagement in politics or civil society 
or through all kinds of development activities, either in the form of individual efforts 
or through projects initiated by migrants and diaspora organisations.  
 
This study exemplifies the huge variety of spontaneous initiatives and shows the 
strong transnational engagement of diaspora members towards the development of 
countries of origin. Return is by no means conditional for development, migrant 
orientations have become increasingly transnational, and people can be 
simultaneously involved in several countries.  
 
This also belies the notion that orientation of migrants to countries of origin is an 
automatic indication of their lack of social and economic integration into the receiving 
countries. This study indicates that it is not only unnecessarily harsh, but also 
factually incorrect to automatically interpret migrants’ commitment towards their 
countries of origin as a consequence of their inability or unwillingness to integrate. 
The reverse has turned out to be more likely: it is in particular the relatively 
successful and ‘integrated’ migrants who have the time, know-how and resources to 
remit money, to become active in diaspora organisations and to remain involved in the 
social and economic development of countries of origin.  
 
The relevant question now is how can development agencies and governments in 
receiving countries act to further increase and solidify the development potential of 
migration. Based on the preceding analysis of the characteristics and outcomes of 
policies formulated and concrete actions undertaken by development actors in Europe 
over the past years, we will formulate a set of recommendation for further policies in 
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this field. However, before proceeding with formulating more practical orientations, it 
is useful to first identify a number of necessary points of departure of successful 
policies.  
 
• Mobilising development actors, not diasporas. A first point of departure 
should be that development actors should not so much try to ‘mobilise’ 
diasporas for development, but rather link up with and build on the wealth of 
existing initiatives. It is important to recognise that many migrants are already 
mobilised for development on their own force. Most successful Diasporic 
development initiatives were spontaneous movements, as exemplified by 
AFFORD in the UK and Migrations et Développement in France. 
Development actors should therefore reinforce rather than direct their 
transnational engagement in development cooperation. Rather than 
‘mobilising diasporas’, development actors should be ‘mobilised’ for engaging 
with diasporas in development cooperation and be open to actually learn from 
the field experiences of a highly successful diaspora development NGO like 
the French-Moroccan Migrations et Développement, which is now even 
consulted by the Moroccan government on implementing rural infrastructure 
development schemes. 
 
• The danger of patronising. It would be a fatal mistake to think that diaspora 
organisations and their members should be taught how to ‘do’ development, 
let alone be steered in setting their development objectives or determining how 
to best spend their remittances. Diaspora members have strong personal 
convictions to devote their energy and resources to what they perceive as 
valuable for the development of countries of origin. After having survived 
independently for many years and having often been disregarded as ‘amateur’ 
development workers by the established development sector, diaspora 
organisations and their members are rightfully distrustful of the rather sudden 
interest in their activities and resources. Any attempt at ‘patronising’ – telling 
‘what is best for them’ – is a recipe for failure. Such a policy is likely to put 
off the more successful and critical diaspora organisations, because they refuse 
to be ‘tapped’, and is likely to attract the less committed and less talented. 
 
• Recognising the unique and added value of diaspora organisations. It is 
generally true that the ‘diaspora’ and ‘development’ sectors are weakly 
interconnected and that a cultural gap and even a certain level of distrust often 
stand in the way of successful alliance building between governments and 
development agencies on the one hand and diaspora organisations on the 
other. However, the implication should not just be that diaspora organisations 
should be trained to find and fight their way to development funding or should 
transform themselves into development agencies. This would testify to a 
myopic, development agency-centred or government-centred view. Successful 
alliance building also implies that the established development actors should 
recognise the actual developmental role and not only the potential of 
diasporas. If development actors truly believe that involving diasporas has an 
added value, this also implies that they should be open to learn lessons from 
them so as to establish a genuine two-way working relationship. 
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• Avoiding double agendas. Diaspora involvement in promoting development 
is valuable in its own right. In particular the French experience has shown that 
diaspora organisations are unlikely to cooperate with development policies 
whose hidden agenda is to curb migration or to stimulate return migration. 
Reducing migration through development is not only an unrealistic aim 
(because development will initially lead to increased migration326) but will 
also almost certainly lead diaspora organisations to shun cooperation with 
development actors.  
 
• Gaining credibility through serious and durable commitment. 
Consequently, if governments and development agencies are serious about 
involving diasporas in development policies they should show a serious 
commitment to giving them a real say in policy formulation and access to 
substantial funding. This should also be a long-term commitment, which 
should not be given up after the first disappointment. Considerable stamina is 
needed for projects to bear fruit, but this is the only way to gain credibility. 
This study has shown that the few successful initiatives in alliance building 
between diaspora organisations and the established development sector have 
been based on many years of mutual learning and understanding. Only in this 
way can trust and understanding gradually be built.  
 
• Increasing coherence between development cooperation and migration 
policies cannot be achieved be subordinating the first policy area to the 
second327. Recently, much of the debate on migration and development has 
focused on increasing coherence between the two policy areas. Migration and 
integration policies directly affect the development contribution of migration: 
migrants with access to jobs, the ability to travel freely and integration within 
the host society will be able to play more effective roles as development 
players than ‘those marginalized and stigmatised by laws, policies and hostile 
public opinion’328. Although greater coherence would indeed be desirable, 
there is in fact a persistent and even increasing divergence between these 
conflicting agendas. For instance, the recent Dutch policies have been 
celebrated as an example of achieving greater coherence, while, in fact, the 
agenda of increasingly restrictive migration policies focusing on temporary 
and (forced and voluntary) return migration has been imposed on the 
development agenda. Highly restrictive immigration policies do impede 
circular movement and paradoxically push migrants into permanent settlement 
and restrict their mobility with negative consequences for their transnational 
engagement. Another incoherence is the fact that most (poor) target countries 
for development cooperation do not belong to main origin countries of 
migrants in Europe.  
 
• However, it is not always possible to reconcile all the various interests at 
stake329, and incoherencies at the official policy level of governments do 
not impede civil society actors such as development agencies and diaspora 
organisations from engaging in successful alliances to enhance development 
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impacts of migration and to collaborate in lobbying and raising awareness on 
such incoherencies. 
 
• Setting realistic expectations. Last but not least, expectations must be set 
realistically so as to avoid disappointment and subsequent abandonment of the 
migration and development agenda. The imminent danger of the current 
‘migration, remittances and development’ hype or trend is that it can easily 
result in disillusionment if development actors are not sufficiently aware of the 
manifold studies and experiences showing that migration is no panacea for 
development. At the family and community level, migration, remittances and 
migrant-initiated projects can contribute to wealth and small-scale 
development, and targeted policies by development actors can contribute to 
this; but migrants alone are unlikely to resolve more structural development 
problems. Past experiences, for example with the Dutch REMPLOD project, 
have shown that development in migrant-sending regions was a prerequisite 
for return and/or investment rather than a consequence of migration. The true 
development potential of migration will only be released if conditions in 
countries of origin structurally improve and migration policies do not obstruct 
people from circulating freely330; these broader issues are clearly beyond the 
scope of this study. We can therefore only assess the contribution of migrants 
and diaspora organisations to development at its true value, and if we place 
our expectations into a realistic perspective from the start. This is certainly 
important considering the extremely limited funds actually made available for 
‘migration and development’ and for sustaining diaspora organisations.  
 
 
 
Moving on to action while building on previous experiences  
 
Provided that the above-mentioned conditions are fulfilled, development actors and 
diaspora organisations and their members can work together successfully. Too often, 
however, and with the exception of remittance-facilitating policies, migration and 
development policies remain limited to declarations of good intent. Development 
actors find huge difficulties converting intentions to involve diasporas in development 
cooperation into concrete action, as demonstrated by DfID’s difficulties in going 
beyond remittances. This is partly related to the aforementioned problems of mutual 
lack of trust, knowledge and recognition as well as differences in organisational 
culture and policy agendas, but also to a sheer lack of experience involving such 
cooperation. In order to successfully pass to action, the following general 
recommendations can be formulated: 
 
• Prevent the waste of resources by not stating the obvious. It is abundantly 
clear now that migration, migrants, remittances, and diaspora organisations 
can potentially contribute to development in origin countries. There is no 
longer a need for yet another conference or study restating this fact. It is 
necessary to take one step further, and to devote energy to identify the 
conditions under which the positive consequences for development in societies 
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of origin can be maximised and the negative consequences can be minimised, 
and the role the engagement of diasporas can play in this.  
 
• Increase awareness on previous experiences. Selective amnesia regarding 
previous projects and research is one of the reasons development actors often 
continue to reinvent the ‘migration and development’ wheel. The issue of 
‘migration and development’ is by no means new. Diaspora organisations such 
as the French-Moroccan Migrations et Développement in France (or US-
Mexican hometown association) can boast over two decades of experience. 
Moreover, a number of governments and development agencies have been 
experimenting with migration and development policies for the past several 
decades. The Dutch Remplod project, a ‘migration and development’ 
programme avant la lettre, as well as UNDP’s TOKTEN were initiated three 
decades ago.  
 
• Learn from the experiences of others. As well as a lack of historical 
awareness, there is also a lack of awareness of experiences in other countries. 
There are, for instance, parallels between the support of the French Panos 
institute and the Oxfam Novib and Cordaid in the Netherlands to diaspora 
organisations; the remittance programmes in the UK and the Netherlands; and 
between the entrepreneurial support, assisted return and ‘brain circulation’ 
programmes implemented by national governments or multilateral 
organisations such as the IOM and UNDP.  
 
• Build an online knowledge facility on diasporas and development. One 
reason for the lack of awareness of previous and other experiences is that 
many resources on experiences and policies with regards to diaspora 
involvement in development are scattered and difficult to find. While 
conducting this study, for instance, it often proved difficult to retrieve policy 
and evaluation documents. In order to prevent the unnecessary and wasteful 
loss of memory regarding former policies, projects and research, it is useful to 
construct a central online facility, where relevant documents on diaspora 
organisations involved in development, projects, policies and research can be 
easily tracked down and retrieved.  
 
• Identify conditions for success. Policies can only advance if we learn from 
and build upon previous and other – successful and less successful – 
experiences. Networks, conferences and research should focus on comparing 
experiences and on mutual learning as to which policies work to successfully 
support diasporas’ transnational engagement.  
 
This study has identified four broad areas in which development agencies and 
governments can support and strengthen the engagement of diasporas and their 
members in the development of countries of origin:  
 
1. Facilitate and reduce costs of remittances; 
2. Support individual or family efforts to set up small enterprises in countries of 
origin, sometimes associated with temporary or permanent return;  
3. Support collective development projects initiated or implemented by diaspora 
organisations and their members; 
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4. Support diaspora networks and the capacity building of diaspora organisations, 
and create durable alliances with established development actors. 
 
This study has revealed that certain development agencies in particular countries and 
certain multilateral agencies are more experienced or have achieved success in 
particular policy areas. This enables one to formulate a number of recommendations 
on how development agencies can support diasporas in their transnational engagement 
of development. These recommendations can also serve as a basis for further debate 
and policy making.  
 
 
 
Facilitating remittances: a win-win situation?  
 
Facilitating and reducing costs of remittances seems the most tangible and therefore 
least problematic area of policy intervention. The implementation of such policies 
seems well underway, mainly because at first sight there are no obvious conflicts of 
interests between the different stakeholders: Governments, banks and migrants all 
seem to benefit from increasing the amount of remittances sent through formal 
channels. In this respect, other countries can particularly learn from the UK 
experience. DfID and other partners have shown a serious commitment to increasing 
transparency of the remittance markets, increasing competition, reducing costs and 
improving access of people to financial services. In particular the 
www.sendmoneyhome.com website has been instrumental in improving access to 
information about remittances services and costs to migrants. This example has been 
copied in the Netherlands through www.geldnaarhuis.nl. However, a number of issues 
merit consideration:  
 
• In contrast to popular belief, sending remittances through informal channels 
can be considerably cheaper and more efficient than formal channels. 
Therefore, the only feasible way to ensure that more remittances are sent 
through formal channels is to improve the banking system rather than to 
clamp down on the informal system without creating viable alternatives. 
For instance, the African Foundation for Development (AFFORD) in the UK 
is negotiating with a number of Australian and American companies to 
provide a remittance transfer service to migrant workers that will enable them 
to send any amount of money from any part of the world for a fee of only one 
US dollar331. 
 
• Avoid overly technocratic views on remittances that ‘commodify’ 
migrants and migration. A narrow focus on the technical dimension of 
remittances risks losing focus on the fact that committed people – the migrants 
– are the real agents of a remittance-driven development. A bank, government 
and security-focused view on remittances are likely to alienate diaspora groups 
if they feel merely perceived as owners of resources ‘to be tapped’. It can also 
lead to an undervaluing of other aspects of the migration-development 
relationship: namely, the ability of diasporas to affect the civil society and 
politics through lobbying and advocacy work. 
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• Projects trying to channel remittances into productive investments will 
fail as long as general investment conditions do not improve. Telling 
people how to spend their remittances is not only patronising, it ignores the 
fact that expenses on consumption, health care, education and housing may 
significantly improve well-being and that this may have positive multiplier 
and employment effects in migrant-sending communities. 
 
• Generate balanced views on migration and poverty reduction. DfID in 
particular has recently emphasised the benefits of remittances for poverty 
reduction. Nevertheless, there is also evidence that most of the benefits of 
remittances often do not accrue to the poorest members of community and that 
they might under certain circumstances increase inequality or even fuel violent 
conflict. An uninformed and uncritical ‘celebration’ of remittances can lead to 
exaggerated hopes on their development potential or to the false suggestion 
that they are an alternative to development policies. 
 
 
 
Individual return, circulation and enterprise projects  
 
The oldest areas where migration and development policies have been linked are the 
assisted-return migration programmes implemented since the 1970s in various 
western European countries, whereby migrants receive diverse types of support for re-
employment and the setting up of businesses. In this field, we can learn especially 
from the French experience; through a learning process of trial-and-error the focus of 
French co-development policies has gradually shifted away from a focus on return, 
which ultimately leads to a formal disconnection between return and co-development 
policies.  
 
• Repeated experiences have shown that projects to assist migrant 
entrepreneurs are likely to fail if they focus on or are conditional upon 
return. Assisted return policies in France, the Netherlands and IOM’s 
experience with RQA and RQAN programmes have been repeatedly 
disappointing. As long as structural investment and political conditions in 
origin countries do not improve, few migrants sign up and many projects that 
have been implemented seem to fail. Migrants should be seen as a potential 
resource rather than as a problem. Their decision to return should not be 
prompted by the prospect of financial support, but by a genuine willingness to 
return and a capacity to be reintegrated. The French experience shows that 
diaspora organisations refuse to be mobilised for return migration policies. 
 
• More promising results can be achieved in the field of entrepreneurial 
projects that are not conditional upon return. In particular the IntEnt 
programme in the Netherlands seems to be relatively successful, and French 
policy makers have recently shown serious interest in learning from this 
experience in investissement à distance. IntEnt’s relative success can be 
attributed to the following factors: (1) a serious selection process based on 
entrepreneurial attitudes and quality of business plans and (2) not giving 
grants but providing training, tailor-made advice and assistance to obtain 
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loans. However, structural improvement is possible through addressing the 
social and other constraints that entrepreneurs encounter in developing and 
implementing business plans.  
 
• Some programmes to further brain circulation through facilitating a reverse 
transfer of competencies through sending out qualified migrants on 
temporary consultancy missions against local salaries seem to be relatively 
successful. Here it is useful to learn from the successful TOKTEN programme 
of the UNDP, which was established back in 1977. In recent years roughly 
similar programmes have been adopted by the IOM (MIDA), by the French 
government, by www.africarecruit.com in the UK and by the related 
www.africanressource.org initiative by NEPAD and UNESCO.  
 
• Evaluations of IOM’s MIDA programme indicate that they are successful only 
when they are ‘owned’ by the African countries and migrants who fully 
participate in the vision and implementation of the project. At the same time 
the political and economic stability in countries of origin and residence will 
greatly determine the level of diaspora participation. MIDA Italy-Ethiopia 
shows that top-down-designed brain circulation programmes are likely to fail 
because they do not take into account the actual needs and wishes of sending 
countries and of the migrants themselves332. To improve a connection 
between a demand and an offer of competencies, the active involvement of 
diaspora organisations already active in deploying their members for 
development deserves to be encouraged.  
 
 
Support to development projects of diaspora organisations 
 
Development actors can play a useful role in sustaining development projects initiated 
by diaspora groups. However, it has proven difficult to put this idea into practice. This 
is due, on the one hand, to differences in scale, organisational culture and objectives 
of large, formalised state actors and development agencies and, on the other hand, to 
the relatively small-scale, flexible diaspora NGOs who often lack the resources to 
fulfil all the formal conditions for projects to be eligible for funding and who often are 
outside the information loop and development discussions. This has regularly led to 
mutual disappointment and to the swift discontinuation of projects.  
 
To break this deadlock, the Dutch approach, in which co-financing development 
agencies such as Oxfam Novib, Cordaid and NCDO have been channelling substantial 
funding to development activities of diaspora NGOs, can perhaps serve as an 
example. The most innovative element of the Dutch policies is the establishment of 
accessible funding channels such as the KPA, the Front Offices and the Linkis 
facility, which have significantly increased the access of private development 
initiatives to government funding.  
 
Although this was part of a general policy shift to lower the threshold between the 
professional development world and the Dutch civil society, a positive side-effect has 
been that this also allowed diaspora organisations to access development funding. In 
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addition, the specific, decentralised features of the Dutch co-financing structure 
through which development agencies dispose of substantial funding give considerable 
leeway to support migrant organisation through conferences, training and project 
funding. While the Dutch example may serve as an inspiration on how to lower 
thresholds of the established development sector, the long-standing French-Moroccan 
experience of Migrations et Développement might teach us valuable lessons on how 
to successfully implement diaspora-initiated projects.  
 
• For projects to succeed, it seems important that development actors do not 
impose the kind of projects to be funded but rather link up with existing 
initiatives and new proposals from diaspora organisations. The example of 
the French Migrations et Développement is a lesson against blueprint thinking: 
It is unlikely that it could have been successful if they had been ‘invented’ and 
imposed on diaspora organisations by policy makers, or if diaspora 
organisations had only been ‘used’ for project formulation. 
 
• Also in this field, project quality, ownership and the commitment of 
diaspora organisations towards projects is a condition for success. 
Therefore, co-funded projects that have been selected through an open 
tendering system have been far more successful than co-opted projects based 
on 100 percent funding. The Dutch Front Offices comprised a general 
initiative open to all civil society development initiatives, which favours the 
much-desired mainstreaming and equality of diaspora involvement and seems 
therefore preferable to ‘special treatment’ programmes uniquely open to 
diaspora organisations. 
 
• Although this is a contested point, positive action to endorse and favour 
diaspora-initiated projects might contribute to creating a level playing 
field. For instance, the experience with the Civil Society Challenge Fund 
(CSCF) in the UK suggests that diaspora groups face more difficulties in 
finding their way to development funding than other NGOs. The Dutch 
experience suggests two ways of positive action: capacity building through 
support and training in proposal writing and the guaranteed allocation of a 
certain percentage of all project funding to diaspora initiatives, such as the 
model followed by Oxfam Novib, Cordaid and NCDO.  
 
• The example of Migrations et Développement shows that the successful 
implementation of projects cannot be achieved overnight, but should evolve 
from a long learning process and a thorough knowledge of local contexts, 
power relations and cultural sensitivities. Through trial-and-error, a successful 
model of project implementation has been engineered, in which the 
ingredients for success consist of a participatory, local-oriented and small-
scale approach, in which projects are not imposed by diaspora 
organisations (which can be looked upon with considerable suspicion by local 
communities), but are designed and implemented in close and genuine 
consultation and with local communities and local authorities through the 
formation of joint associations. 
 
• Continuity of support and increasing funding to development initiatives 
of diaspora organisations from the side of development actors is important 
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so as to show a true commitment, to build mutual trust and to allow for trial-
and-error; only in the longer term are efforts likely to bear fruit. Ad hoc, short-
term programmes such as the OCIV Migration and Development programme 
in Belgium will have few tangible results apart from increasing frustration. 
 
 
 
Strengthening diaspora organisations and alliance building 
 
 
A final policy area consists of the efforts by development actors such as Oxfam 
Novib, Cordaid, and NCDO in the Netherlands and Panos in France to strengthen 
diaspora organisations and networks or platforms of such organisations. Such support 
is not directly linked to specific development projects, but rather serves to provide 
financial support and training to these diaspora organisations. This is usually believed 
to improve their role in advocacy of migrant rights, to raise awareness on the role of 
diasporas in development, and to increase their capacities to raise funds and 
implement development projects. Whereas organisations like Migrations et 
Développement in France and Seva in the Netherlands have been established by 
migrants themselves, the support they have received from development actors has 
strengthened their functioning and contributed to their growth. Diaspora platforms 
themselves such as AFFORD also play a vital role in stimulating the development 
engagement of diaspora members. In addition, many governments have established 
national platforms of diaspora organisations so as to create representative bodies, 
which can be consulted in policy formulation or involved in development projects in 
countries of origin. On the basis of previous experiences, the following 
recommendations can be formulated: 
 
• Government or agency-led efforts to engineer consultative bodies or 
migrant platforms do not seem to be the way forward to create alliances 
between the established development sector and diaspora organisations. 
Bodies such as FORIM in France, the LOM (National Ethnic Minorities 
Consultative Committee) in the Netherlands, and Connections for 
Development in the UK might play a certain useful role in dissemination and 
awareness raising and in consultations during bi-lateral negotiations. However, 
top-down-designed, entirely subsidised migrant platforms tend to have limited 
or nonexistent legitimacy among their supposed constituencies, are not 
allowed a genuine influence in policy development, and can actually reinforce 
the separation between the ‘two worlds’.  
 
• As with sustaining development projects, a more fruitful strategy seems to be 
to support (through co-funding) and build on existing, spontaneously 
created diaspora organisations or networks that are based on a true 
commitment of its members who have already gained legitimacy through their 
active role in advocacy (e.g. AFFORD) or development (e.g., Migrations et 
Développement, Mama Cash, Ercmove, Seva, Selam network). Giving support 
to capacity building seems important, so that diaspora organisations do not 
become or remain dependent on funding by development agencies.  
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• Diaspora organisations do not ‘represent’ diasporas, and development 
agencies are not their spokespersons. It is frequently argued that diaspora 
organisations do not necessarily represent migrant communities let alone their 
countries of origin. A careful choice of partners is certainly important, but 
representation does not really seem the issue here. As long as they function 
democratically, organisations primarily represent themselves, their members 
and their own objectives. In addition, development agencies do not represent 
national populations. Instead of identifying ‘the right interlocutors’333 among 
organisations representing diasporas, a more fruitful step towards establishing 
effective cooperation seems to involve building alliances with truly engaged 
diaspora organisations sharing similar development objectives. Similarly, 
instead of acting as spokespersons of diasporas organisations, it seems a more 
productive strategy if development agencies support diaspora organisations in 
their own advocacy.  
 
• There is a delicate balance between strengthening and patronising 
diaspora organisations. It has often been argued that migrants are not 
necessarily the best development workers. Even if this is true in certain cases, 
this is very much a non-debate from the perspective of diaspora organisations 
that are already engaged in development. Moreover, such a stance is likely to 
be counterproductive, as it might sustain the organisation members’ 
impression of the established development sector as arrogant and patronising, 
trying to impose its own view of what development actually constitutes and 
what is good ‘for them’, and not willing to engage in a true alliance. 
Therefore, sustaining capacity building is only likely to succeed if it is based 
on a true willingness and openness to mutual learning among both diaspora 
organisations and development actors.  
 
• The power relation between diaspora organisations and development agencies 
is often a highly unequal one, with the latter having access to the development 
funding. This can negatively affect the independence of diaspora 
organisations. However, to reiterate AFFORD’s and AFP’s recent position: 
Most diaspora organisations interested in and supporting international 
development are not ‘wannabe’ development agencies (as is Seva in the 
Netherlands perhaps), and the challenge for development agencies is not to 
make diaspora organisations more like them but to work with them to 
build on their unique strengths and to minimize their limitations334. 
Diaspora organisations have a distinct approach, focusing on both advocacy of 
the rights of migrant rights and the recognition of their role in development. 
Overzealous attempts at professionalising or pushing diaspora organisations 
into engaging in development can be counterproductive, and successful 
attempts at the incorporation of diaspora organisations can coincide with the 
loss of their unique strengths.  
 
Diaspora organisations and their members already play a vital role in the development 
of countries of origin. This study has made clear that, through sensible and informed 
policies, development agencies have a certain scope to forge alliances with diaspora 
organisations to strengthen their mutual unique roles. While the French-Moroccan 
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Migrations et Développement association embodies the highly successful way in 
which they can implement community-based and participatory development projects, 
the British-African Foundation for Development (AFFORD) embodies the 
independent, critical and original voice with which diaspora organisations advocate 
migrant rights and the recognition of their role in development. As Chukwu Emeka 
Chikezie, executive director of AFFORD, recently stated:  
 
‘When analysing the role of diasporas in development, it is necessary to 
remember that the term ‘development’ is not uncontested…. Diaspora 
initiatives, which are often criticized as being too local in focus or too short-
term oriented, should rather be seen as representing a different perspective on 
development.... In order to mobilize migrant communities and facilitate their 
participation in the development process, there needs to be a shift in attitudes. 
First of all, it is important to ensure that migrant communities are not seen as 
instruments to achieve government aims, but as potential partners to engage in 
dialogue, seek common ground and attempt to achieve shared objectives.335’ 
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